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Abstract 
 
This thesis aims at answering the following questions: To what extent does the Eurozone 
represent a federal political system; to what extent does the EU’s monetary integration through 
the Eurozone represent a process of federal state-building; and to what extent can the Eurozone 
represent a case of asymmetric federalism? 
In this thesis, federalism is described as a process of state-building, and more precisely, 
the theory of replicating the features of states, in particular federal states, (and thus, of, federal 
state-building), to include the presence of a common market, foreign policy, trade policy, and 
monetary policy. The Eurozone was selected as a case study, as it represents the most integrated 
case of federal state-building; and the economic and monetary policies as the policy areas of 
the Union most echoing the traditional elements of states, although the Eurozone it is not itself 
a state. The thesis highlights the process of monetary integration and how this has been a de 
facto attempt, sometimes in a more Europeanised fashion, sometimes with just an 
intergovernmental outcome, to tackle the sovereign debt crisis in a way which vindicates the 
federalist arguments. 
In the conclusions I argue that while the specific case of the Eurozone does not represent 
a federal political system per se, it remains the most important example of federal state-building 
at the supranational level. Additionally, I argue that the presence of many typical elements of 
federal states are indeed a confirmation that the process of European integration is, above all, 
one of federal state-building, with all its complexities and specificities.  
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Introduction 
This thesis is about the Eurozone as a prototype of federal state-building for the European 
Union (EU), and seeks to understand if it represents a separate federal political system inside 
the EU. The thesis sets out to analyse the dynamics of institutional change, such as Quantitative 
Easing, the introduction of the European Semester and the establishing of the European 
Stability Mechanism in the Eurozone, and to what extent the definition and categories of 
asymmetrical federalism can be applied to the reforms that the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) underwent after the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis in 2009.  
The crisis had a huge impact on the governance of the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) and represented an existential threat to the success and survival of the Euro, and to the 
integrity of the Eurozone. However, this was not the only dramatic event threatening the EU at 
the time. Firstly, the EU had to face increasing migratory pressure that placed the Schengen 
agreement under stress. Secondly, the emergence of governments and political forces 
threatened traditional understandings of liberal democracy, with Orban’s Hungary representing 
the quintessential example of this trend, followed by Poland’s PiS-led government; both 
exhibited similar attempts to thwart the rule of law and seize control of the media. Thirdly, the 
EU faced the potential withdrawal or disengagement of Member States (MS) (namely, the 
United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the Union). And, fourthly, there were similar discussions 
about the possible withdrawal of Greece from the Eurozone in the peak of the financial 
turbulence, and the antagonistic behaviour of the Italian government towards the Commission 
in 2018-2019, during the populist-far rightist coalition (Chiaramonte, Emanuele, Maggini, & 
Paparo, 2018; Garzia, 2019; Sciorilli Borrelli, 2019; Rivera Escartin, 2020; Baldini & Giglioli, 
2020).  
The combination of these events sparked a substantial debate among scholars of 
European integration about disintegration processes (Eppler, Anders & Tuntschew 2015; 
Brack, Coman & Crespy, 2019; Coman, Crespy & Schmidt 2020; Hodson & Puetter 2019; 
Jones 2018; Vollaard 2014; Webber 2019), or collapse of the Eurozone (Stiglitz, 2016), the 
role of the Council and the Member States, and on the future of the EU in the post-Maastricht 
integration (Bickerton, Hodson & Puetter, 2015). After years of stagnation, we saw a 
resurgence of literature on the future and the nature of the EU. The academic world offered its 
interpretations of what was happening during these existential threats to the EU (Katainen, 
2017), or polycrisis (Juncker, 2016; Verhofstadt, 2017). Scholars embracing neofunctionalist, 
new intergovernmentalist and even post-functionalist theories of European integration have 
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offered different interpretations of these events (Hooghe & Marks, 2019). In the specific case 
of this thesis, I have chosen as a topic the sovereign debt crisis and its consequences on the 
development of EMU governance, even though the politicisation of the Commission, EU 
disintegration, or illiberalism are all the subject of much debate and might also deserve an 
assessment. Specifically, the sovereign debt crisis had a huge impact on the governance of the 
EMU, and consequently on the power relationship inside the EU, and on the dynamics between 
the EU and its MS (Friedrich, 1961). Even though the European Central Bank (ECB) emerged 
as a major player, in some areas the crisis saw a change of balance in the relationship between 
Commission and MS. More importantly, the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone led to more 
centralisation, by increasing the oversight of the Commission through the Six-Pack and the 
Two-Pack legislation (Becker & Bauer, 2014), and an increase of the role of the Commission 
in shaping policies, even when decided in intergovernmental forums (Becker & Bauer, 2016). 
More specifically, in the thesis I show how the Eurocrisis had an impact on integration in terms 
of federal state-building, and how, from this perspective, it increased institutional asymmetries 
between Euro and non-Euro MS (Piris, 2012; Fabbrini, 2015). In broader terms, this thesis aims 
at assessing if there are different forms of federalism in the EU, and if there is a case for arguing 
the existence of different categories of federal political systems within the EU (Elazar, 1987; 
Watts, 2007).  
This thesis not only focuses on the changes in EMU governance but, more importantly, 
it assesses these changes through the theory of federalism. Federalism has been, to some extent, 
notably absent from the current debates on European integration. While the aforementioned 
neo-functionalism, postfunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism still represent the most 
referenced theories used to assess current developments (Hooghe & Marks, 2019), federalism 
has remained relatively absent. Federalism is superficially associated only with the political 
stance of “more Europe”, meaning the demand for more Europeanised or centralized areas of 
intervention. By contrast, this thesis does not seek to dismiss the finalité of unity and the 
achievement of a single polity, but to take federal state-building as the main driving force 
behind integration. Unity still remains one of the greatest drivers behind integration, even if it 
does not necessarily mean replacing MS with a single unitary state; it may mean a broad range 
of arrangements, and federalism is a necessary tool to evaluate the interaction between 
constituent units and supranational institutions in the EU. Therefore, this thesis also aims to 
take a small step in relaunching federalism as integration theory. While in the last years liberal 
intergovernmentalism and new intergovernmentalist theories, multilevel governance and 
neofunctionalism all seem to have maintained a strong presence among theorists of European 
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Integration studies, federalism seems to have progressively lost ground, at least among 
academics (Burgess, 2014, Fossum & Jachtenfuchs, 2017). While lazily dismissed as just the 
ideology of “more Europe” (Castaldi, 2007), or critisised for being too political and not  
analytical enough (Fossum, 2017) federalism, as a dynamic form of government based on 
“shared rule and self-rule” (Elazar, 1987), gives us many tools to analyse the latest 
developments in the future of the Union.  
Research questions 
The main question that this thesis aims to answer is how federal theory explains changes in the 
Eurozone in the wake of the financial crisis, what impact these changes have had on the idea 
of a federal Europe, and to what extent have these changes influenced the process of federal-
state building in the EU and increased the level of asymmetry inside it. The idea behind this 
thesis starts from an observation that changes in commitments due to crisis management were 
changing the nature of membership, and causing a shift of the Eurozone towards a more 
interlinking form of membership. Given the pre-existing ideas of Core Europe and the 
suggestions by Burgess (in highlighting the constitutional moment of the Treaty of Maastricht), 
Pinder, who highlighted the role of the Euro and the EMU in a future developments of 
federalism in the EU (1996), Piris (2011), and Fabbrini (2015) (who suggested and advocated, 
in different ways, for a decoupling of the EU governance between core and non-core countries), 
I explain how these developments can be framed within federal theory. 
As follow ups, some sub-questions will also be answered, that will help to solve the 
puzzle represented by the main question. The first of these questions is how we can frame 
federalism in the current debate on the EU and integration. As a matter of fact, the EU 
represents one of the most distinct federal political systems (Elazar, 1987; Watts, 2007; 
Palermo, 2017) currently existing. It currently unites 27 different MS, all with their own 
constitutional systems, their own internal challenges, political cultures, traditions, cultures and 
languages. The EU also is a single market, and an Economic and Monetary Union under 
construction. More recently, initiatives have been taken to integrate defence and security. More 
importantly, the debates over the spitzenkandidat, in 2014 and 2019, reflected the complexity 
in creating a supranational democracy in the EU. In the end, among existing regional 
organisation, the EU is the one that mirrors the features of a State the most. Some compare the 
EU to a confederation (Church & Dardanelli, 2005; Forsyth, 1981, 2015). The fact that the EU 
as a federal political system is both so diverse and unique makes it a perfect case for applying 
a federalist analysis, so that it becomes possible to frame it within the same dynamics of 
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centralisation/integration, decentralisation/disintegration that has been a feature in other federal 
political systems, both past and current. As Burgess highlighted in his last major contribution, 
“In search of the Federal Spirit”, (2012), there are common patterns which make comparative 
analysis between federal political systems possible. In this framework, elements coming from 
neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism are not dismissed or rejected, but they are 
included and reframed inside a discourse of federal state-building. More specifically, the thesis 
will show how the incremental gradual process of integration, sometimes highlighted by 
neofunctionalist dynamics of spill-over, is a federalising process, where these are indeed 
transitional phases of a process of federalisation (Friedrich, 1962: 514). Likewise, 
intergovernmental bargaining is framed as a natural constitutional moment of every federal 
political system, as discussed in Friedrich, where interaction among autonomous communities 
is defined as a form of genuine federalism (ibid.: 516).  
The thesis will therefore advance and develop the notion of asymmetrical federalism. 
It will highlight how asymmetrical federalism, independently from any other consideration, is 
a common reality in the EU. The thesis will explain how the concept of asymmetric federalism, 
as developed by Tarlton (1968) and Agranoff (1994), relates to the concept of multi-speed 
Europe and differentiated integration. I will explain how asymmetries form part of EU 
governance, and how the greatest case of asymmetrical federalism is specifically the case of 
EMU. It is clear that this is not the only instance of asymmetric federalism in the EU, other 
similar cases are represented by the Schengen Agreement, by PESCO and other cases of 
enhanced cooperation. However, even though these cases of asymmetries all have some 
specificities, and deserve a deeper analysis, the focus of the thesis is the EMU, since the 
development of a currency union is a dimension of integration, most representing elements of 
federal state-building, and therefore, the one that represents the most interest for analysist. 
The thesis will highlight how this process accelerated, and was placed under stress, with 
the events of the sovereign debt crisis. I will show how the actions of the ECB, and measures 
to overcome market uncertainty, and the fears and possibilities of a Eurozone break-up, 
triggered a process of federal state-building that pushed the development of EMU towards a 
state model. These institutional innovations also led to an increase in differences and divisions, 
in terms of obligations between Euro and non-Euro MS. In the conclusion, I will set out how 
these changes caused, perhaps temporarily, a stronger divide between Euro and non-Euro MS. 
More importantly I evaluate how these changes have influenced the elements underpinning 
autonomous federal political systems, like elements of statehood and the creation of a public 
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sphere among Eurozone MS, elements corresponding to those defined by Burgess as ‘the 
federal spirit’ (2012).  
Core definitions 
The development of the research questions is based on the following key concepts: (federal) 
state-building, sovereignty, and asymmetrical federalism. I set out to define these below. 
Federal state-building is considered to be a process of creating a polity or a state, based 
on the principles of federalism. Recently, especially in the media, state-building has been 
associated with the process of building the features which are associated with statehood, like 
law-making processes, rule of law, division of powers, and internal and external security in 
post-conflict realities (Fukuyama, 2004). Sometimes, these post-conflict scenarios were stages 
for civil wars and tragic conflict between interethnic groups. In these cases, the rebuilding of 
the state had to go together with reconciliation policies and specific arrangements (Lijphart, 
1969; Boogards, 2019). Here, I mean the need for ethnic groups to enter in power-sharing 
agreements (like Iraq or Sudan, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Ethiopia) or for the new state to be 
founded on territorial and non-territorial settlements, granting the same rights to all the ethnic 
or national groups living inside the same polity (Lustick, 1979). Nevertheless, the definition of 
state-building comes from different, and historical experiences.  
State-building is in fact a process, that states like France, Switzerland, or the United 
Kingdom have undertaken over centuries. These processes are the result of a combination of 
conflicts and conquests, alliances and leagues, processes of power grabbing by a central 
authority, civil wars, and constitutional and parliamentary development. Sometimes a 
combination of all of these elements occurred, sometimes of just some of these. Some processes 
of state-building went together, in an intrinsic way, with nation-building processes (i.e. the 
processes of creation of the concept of nationhood and its key features), especially in Europe. 
For this reason, some cases of state-building may seem “more natural”: i.e. as the result of very 
long, and unplanned historical processes which, by accident, led to the birth of a state (and a 
nation, where applicable).  
By contrast, other cases of state-building might seem more artificial, because they came 
as the result of political, often military, and intellectual action, aimed at creating a polity, a 
state with the traditional features of sovereignty, in a specific region, in order to give 
representation and territorial autonomy to a specific ethnic or national group. It is indeed the 
case of Germany and Italy in the 19th century (Ziblatt, 2006). Actually, even if the German and 
Italian unification processes, in all their differences and similarities, might seem more artificial, 
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while other seem more natural, there is nothing natural in state-building. States do not occur 
by accident but are all equally artificial. As Weber argued, but equally Tilly and others (Weber, 
1968; Tilly, 1985; Duzsa, 1989), states are the result of long, artificial developments, usually 
with a military, violent side. Especially when it comes to the European national state (where 
nation-building and state-building are intrinsically entangled), authors like Ernest Gellner and 
Anthony Smith (Gellner, 1983; Smith, 1986, 1994), despite their disagreements on the role of 
ethnicity in the birth of the state, highlighted how the birth of the national state, as we know, 
as a consistent, homogeneous centralised unit, was made possible by sociological phenomena 
like industrialisation, capitalism, urbanisation.  
However, as I will discuss later on in this thesis, nation-building and state-building are 
not the same concept. Even though regional integration has different patterns and dynamics, 
which differ from building a national state or rebuilding a state in post-conflict areas, this thesis 
advocates the fact that the European integration project was started with the purpose of state-
creation. However, even if neorealists may argue that dynamics of power and hegemony have 
not completely gone from the European post WWII scenario (Mearsheimer, 1990, 2019), 
European integration occurred as a voluntary act between European states. Therefore, as argued 
in Chapter I, federalism as a normative principle, and in Friedrich’s terms as a dynamic process 
of polity formation, is still the most suitable paradigm to assess the integration of Europe.  
The definition of asymmetrical federalism, which will be developed further in  Chapter 
II, is the idea that some federal arrangements may differ. The idea behind asymmetrical 
federalism is that, within the same federal polity, different states or regions may have specific 
arrangements, for geographic, economic, or ethnic reasons, so that the internal framework of 
federalism has an asymmetry, compared to all the other arrangements and provisions (Tarlton, 
1965; Agranoff 1994). As I will discuss, forms of asymmetrical federalism exist in many 
federal political systems. One quintessential case is Quebec in Canada, but this is not the only 
one. In Spain, both Catalonia and the Basque Country represent cases of asymmetrical 
federalism. In Italy, the five regions with the “Special Statute” represent cases of asymmetrical 
arrangements. Likewise, the EU has many asymmetrical arrangements in its governance. The 
Eurozone is one of these. The thesis links the concept of asymmetric federalism with that of 
differentiated integration and it will argue the reasons for this parallelism. 
Even if there is some consensus on what sovereignty means, there are different 
interpretations on the nature of sovereignty now. The definition which is normally referred to 
is that of the traditional, Westphalian state, which has external and internal sovereignty, is 
responsible for the internal security and the defence of its own territories from external threats, 
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and is provided with law making powers and is unbound to any other superior principle or 
authority (Bodin, 1576; Bull, 1977; Kissinger, 2014). After the disasters of WWII, and more 
recently with the development of globalisation, new understandings of sovereignty emerged in 
the specific case of European integration.  
These approaches, which may be defined as post-Westphalian or post-sovereigntist, 
assert that sovereignty is no longer a single and indivisible concept, but that, with the 
development and growth of interdependence, sovereignty no longer had the same, traditional 
meaning, but was changing. This discourse essentially rejects the Hobbesian and Bodinian 
hypothesis of a single, indivisible sovereignty. The post-sovereigntist or post-traditional theory 
of sovereignty hypothesises that in the post-Westphalian world, sovereignty still exist, but it is 
no longer the same rigid concept that Bodin and Hobbes shaped. There is no consensus on the 
wording, so that different authors have offered different qualifiers of post-traditional 
sovereignty: ‘pooled’ (Peterson, 1997), ‘shared’ (Wallace, 1999), ‘limited’ (Keohane, 2002), 
or ‘plural’ and ‘mixed’ (Bellamy & Castiglione, 1997). Additionally, as recently highlighted 
by Coman & Crespy (2018), there are multiple dimensions of sovereignty. For instance, there 
is not just the dichotomy between national and supranational sovereignty, but for instance, the 
dichotomy of parliamentary and popular sovereignty overlaps that of national and 
supranational sovereignty (Bellamy, 2017; Avbelj, 2014). Therefore, sovereignty has an 
internal and an external dimension, but also traditional and post-traditional. The thesis will 
focus on these too. 
Case selection 
EU integration has faced dramatic changes in the decade 2009-2019. Some of those occurred 
because of the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon, that, maintaining the spirit of the 
Constitutional Treaty of 2004, rationalised the Union’s governance, reduced the veto power of 
the MS in many areas, and introduced new provisions. Nevertheless, many of the innovations 
introduced from 2009 would have perhaps neveroccurred, had the EU not been under the 
pressure of the financial markets, thus partly proving Monnet’s statement that Europe is forged 
in crises, and as a result it is the sum of the solutions adopted to counter them (De Gregorio 
Merino, 2012).  
These innovations were represented by the introduction of the European Fiscal Stability 
Facility and the European Financial Stability Mechanism, before these were replaced by the 
European Stability Mechanism. Another piece of the jigsaw puzzle of EU state-building was 
put into place with the adoption of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance 
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(known in the media as Fiscal Compact), regardless of the fact that its incorporation in the 
treaty of the EU is currently stalled by the European Parliament EP). On the side of the 
Commission, an increase of competences was witnessed with the introduction of the Six-Pack 
and the Two-Pack legislation.  
These new pieces in the puzzle of EU governance specifically targeted changes in the 
EMU. Other innovations, like the Juncker Plan and the European Fund for Strategic 
investments, the trade policies of the EU, or the debate on the lead candidates 
(Spitzenkandidaten), or the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) on Security and 
Defence Policy, are not analysed because not relevant to the thesis, even though, as I will argue 
in the conclusions, they might be the object for further investigations with the same 
methodology, under the lenses of federal theory. More importantly, the reason behind the 
choice of focusing on the Eurozone Crisis, instead of others, is because few other events in the 
history of European integration have sparked a similar number of new institutional 
arrangements in such a short timeframe, and few others have impacted on the EU architecture 
by directing it towards state-building. As I will discuss further, few events in the process of 
European integration have had a similar impact on the lives and emotions of European citizens 
as the Euro, and few things were as close to state-building in the Union as the introduction of 
the single currency. In his work, Burgess (2000) specifically stressed the importance of the 
Treaty of Maastricht as a turning point in integration, a passage from a looser form, and the 
introduction of a single currency played a major role in this.  
Contribution 
As mentioned, this thesis aims at bringing back the intellectual contribution of Carl J. Friedrich, 
in terms of federalism as a dynamic process of state-building, along with John Pinder’s and 
Michael Burgess’s work on a federalist analysis of the European Union. The thesis is strongly 
inspired by the analytical framework Michael Burgess adopted in his work “Federalism and 
European Union: the Building of Europe, 1950–2000” and even if it aims at resuming his work 
and reviving federalist theory after the dramatic changes the Eurozone and the EU 27 
underwent after the crisis, this thesis differs significantly from Burgess’s works. In his works, 
Burgess aimed at contributing to scholarship through an in-depth analysis with a strong 
historical perspective. His focus was on studying the federal state-building of the Union as a 
historical process, while in this thesis the aim is to analyse the institutional changes which have 
taken place, and aims at highlighting how these changes have deepened asymmetry inside the 
Union. Therefore, the analysis in this thesis mainly concerns the current situation, even if a 
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short historical analysis of the crisis will be made in Chapter III. While Burgess in his work 
focused on the historical process of integration, in this thesis the purpose is to focus on the 
current picture and to compare it to the benchmark of federal systems.  
The thesis picks up on Pinder’s work on incremental federalism, which in itself 
continues from Friedrich’s intellectual contribution, and who was among the first to see the 
introduction of the Euro as the main driver of federalisation of the Union, and Murray Forsyth, 
who was among the first scholar to frame, in 1981, the European community in the definition 
of confederation. More recently, Soeren Keil and Simon Bransden (2015) and Rudolph Hrbek 
(2015), have highlighted how the process of European integration is still a process of state-
building, and how federalism is still fundamental to understanding the implications and the 
direction of European integration. Keil and Bransden focused on reassessing the project of EU 
integration as a process of state-building according to federal principles, whereas Hrbek, by 
reviewing the work of Burgess, gave strong evidence of the federal character of the Treaty of 
Lisbon in its amendment of the Treaty of the European Union (Hrbek  2015: 381). For instance, 
the spirit of the Treaty (ibid.: 382), and the principle of division of competences, are strongly 
based on the principle of shared rule and self rule (Elazar, 1987) that, as we will see in Chapter 
I, is one of the core definitions of federalism. 
Methodology 
This thesis is based on qualitative research, encompassing the politics and philosophy of 
international relations, historical and juridical analysis.  
As described earlier, the purpose of the thesis is to assess federalism in the EMU before 
and after the crisis, and how measures to tackle it increased asymmetries in the EU, and how 
this accelerated the process of federal state-building in the Eurozone. Given the purpose, the 
main difficulty to overcome in the project was to choose a proper methodology, which could 
help assess these phenomena and relate them to other cases where federal state-building 
happened, in order to demonstrate that a pattern occurred and that there was a change before 
and after the crisis.  
The first choice was between a qualitative or a quantitative methodology, and as we 
will see later on, when explaining the ontological and the epistemological approach of the 
thesis, the methodology needed to be consistent with the thesis’ ontology and epistemology. 
One of my first considerations was on whether to use statistical methodology to measure the 
change in terms of commitments originated by the membership, in terms of federalism and 
asymmetry. In the field of federal theory, there have been many attempts to measure the level 
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of internal autonomy, federalism or devolution (Rodden, 2004; Dardanelli et al., 2019; Mueller, 
2014; Hooghe, Marks & Shakel; 2016, Shakel; 2019) or even the proper size of a state (Alesina 
& Spolaore, 2003). Similarly, in the field of European integration, there have been attempts to 
measure the degree of integration, or the balance of power in the decision-making process of 
the Union (Barr & Passarelli, 2009). In the case of this thesis, even though a quantitate 
assessment might have been suitable for proving the hypothesis and corroborating the thesis, 
the main consideration was that, before undertaking any attempt to calculate asymmetrical 
federalism, it was necessary to assess if there was a case for federalism, asymmetrical 
federalism and a case of federal state-building. Therefore, I selected a qualitative analysis, 
suitable for analysing institutions, their structure, treaties, and their content, and how these 
relate to federal theory, as developed by Kenneth Wheare, Amitai Etzioni, Carl J. Friedrich, 
and Daniel Elazar.  
As part of the thesis design, and to test the theoretical framework, I needed to decide 
which methodology to adopt. Consistently with my defined ontology and epistemology, I 
focused on the analysis of documentary sources such as historical reports, treaty changes, and 
public speeches. Interviews were also taken into consideration, but given the difficulty of 
getting participation from officials and decision-makers who could have made a significant 
contribution to this thesis, this path was dropped.  
Moreover, and of salience here, the subject of the investigation is federal state-building 
and its relationship with the Eurozone, and especially on the eventual development of forms of 
asymmetrical federalism in the Eurozone. As such, the main clues about federalism are to be 
found in the primary and secondary law of the EU, since these are the most direct indicators of 
changes in the legal framework of the EU. In addition to primary law, declarations are 
fundamental as part of the analysis, since they give us the opportunity to interpret and analyse 
the treaties alongside their teleological dimension, as in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (1969). In this thesis, content analysis will also play a role. Content analysis, the study 
of documents and communication artefacts, will be used to investigate federal content of 
primary and secondary law, as well as founding documents of the EU. As we will see later in 
chapter I and chapter II, federalism has played a role throughout the whole process of 
integration and, as we will see, it still does (Borriello & Crespy, 2015), even though the term 
sometimes became toxified (Laursen, 2016). For this reason, it is often avoided in many 
discussions. Consequently, it will be necessary to use content analysis in some areas, even if it 
is not our primary methodology, for the sake of strengthening our argument and in order to find 
federalism where this is hidden. Additionally, content analysis will be applied to analyse how 
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the meaning of some concepts developed and  changed and of how the institutions changed the 
way they interpret their action and their intervention. The European Central Bank and the 
European Commission represent an example of this development.  
Similarly, before I undertook this project, I had to consider which methodology to build 
this thesis around. Comparative analysis (Lijphart, 1971; Sartori, 1991) or most similar cases 
methodology were both appropriate for framing the methodology. Nonetheless, when it comes 
to apply these comparative-based methodologies to the EU institutions, there is always a risk. 
As Sartori (1991:245-264) teaches us, comparative analyses become inapplicable or redundant 
in cases of very similar and too different cases (because in both cases, there is no point in 
making a comparison, either because they are almost the same, or because they are too different 
to compare), but when it comes to different cases bearing some similarities, then the 
comparison can be done (ibid.: 246).  
Nevertheless, I am aware that this methodology might be risky. For instance, it may be 
criticised that, while researching for elements corroborating the thesis and representing a 
common pattern in other federal political systems, mainly federations, the thesis does not give 
enough weight to the elements that may refute the hypotheses. Even if the thesis is designed in 
a way to avoid such flaws, that would be only the beginning of a more general contribution, 
and there is awareness that, even though it might be partial, this thesis should include even 
critical points, that may contradict the hypothesis.  
Again, comparing cases related to the EU to those of other, emerging federations and 
federal political systems, in a form of “most similar case methodology” (Przeworski & Teune, 
1970) is quite difficult, since the development of the Eurozone and its asymmetries within the 
EU have very specific elements. Even though studies on comparative federalism have made 
much progress, and many hypotheses were made on how federal political systems emerge 
(Riker, 1964; Burgess, 2004, 2012), there is currently no blueprint, especially when it comes 
to federalism when applied to supranational, macro-regional integration.  
Even though I may be a fervent federalist and supporter of European unification, in this 
thesis I do not support a particular federal arrangement. At the same time, and as will be 
explained further in the description of the my ontological and epistemological choices, I am 
aware that there is currently no consensus on which kind of federal arrangement represents the 
EU, or how the EU will or could (or should) develop, but my aim is to make a contribution to 
the debate and develop the notion of European integration as process of federal state-building. 
Additionally, even if there are other regional arrangements, like the African Union, ECOWAS 
or MERCOSUR, none of those have achieved the same degree of correspondence to states as 
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the EU has done. At the same time, the EU is still very far from the benchmark represented by 
states, except for areas like the internal market, international trade and EMU, the Common 
Agricultural Policy and fishery. Consequently, when it comes to the study of the European 
Monetary Union, there are some similarities, allowing us to actually frame the topic of 
monetary union in a federal, comparative discourse (Sartori, 1991), whereas this is not possible 
for other areas of integration, which still remain strongly under the field of intergovernmental 
relations, like security and defence, so that it would not be possible to apply the same 
methodology to those areas. As highlighted in Pinder (1996), and Burgess (2009, 2012), the 
current state of the Eurozone after the dramatic changes in the decade 2009-2019 allows us to 
identify patterns that have occurred in most existing federal systems. In this way, it is possible 
to compare the asymmetrical relationship linking the EU and Eurozone governance with the 
development of the USA, Switzerland, and other federal political systems. When it comes to 
comparing the EU to other federal political systems, the risk is always that there are too many 
differences for a comparison to take place, however, in the case of this thesis, I do not seek to 
make a systemic comparison with the USA or other federal political systems.  
The other main reason for not choosing a comparative methodology is the importance 
to focus on the main case first, before advancing to any other comparative analysis: the first 
point is to focus on the case per se. Therefore, as will be further explained in the Conclusion, I 
made the choice to conduct “single case study” methodology. The reason why I selected this 
methodology can be found in this quote from Robert Yin (2009: 14): “an empirical enquiry 
that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, 
especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”. The 
case study methodology proved to be the best model to analyse the development and changes 
in the Eurozone: a development which has been ongoing and which will continue. Nonetheless 
a critique of the case study methodology is the inherent structural problem that case studies 
have: a case study may be valid only for the case study itself, but it may not be generalised to 
other cases outside the one under scrutiny. Despite this objection, the main purpose of this 
research is to capture the dynamics of the changes of the Eurozone and frame it in the categories 
of federal theory and that of federal state-building. Yin (2009) distinguished five different types 
of case study. In this case, the methodology adopted combines the characteristics which Yin 
defined as single case design.  
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Figure 1  Structure of case studies according to Yin (2009:46) 
In fact, the case that is being researched in this thesis is that of the Eurozone as a whole unit, 
which consequently qualifies for a single case study. On the other hand, the approach adopted 
is holistic, since there are not additional units of analysis chosen. The reason for choosing this 
design are perfectly summarised by Yin (ibid.:47). The case of the post-crisis Eurozone, 
especially under the categories of federal theory, represents an example of what Yin defines as 
a critical case, i.e. a case critical to test an established theory. The Eurozone is a critical case 
for testing federal theory, and for proving the concept of federalism as a normative theory and 
as a process of federal state building at the European supranational level. At the same time, the 
Eurozone could be what Yin defines as a unique case (ibid.), i.e. a case to be analysed and 
documented that is extremely rare. In this case, the Eurozone is unique because it currently 
remains the only case of a currency union at the supranational level, with a fully-fledged central 
bank, despite the fact that the economic union itself is still under construction.  
The methodological framework combines a case study with institutionalism, and there 
are a number of reasons for embedding institutionalism in the methodology. Firstly, 
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institutionalism matches the research design perfectly: institutionalism relies on case studies, 
and is tailored for assessing big structures, large processes and making huge comparisons 
(Tilly, 1984). In this thesis, the purpose is not to conduct a comparative analysis, but is more 
precisely to assess the changes in Eurozone governance and how innovations and changes in 
its governance can be assessed as part of a process of federal state-building. Since 
institutionalism is a methodology designed to assess how institutions change and how 
institutions influence sociological processes, and political, social and economic behaviours, 
institutionalism represents the most suitable methodology for investigating the research 
questions.  
This is the reason why a single-case study and institutional analysis were chosen as 
methodologies for this thesis. The single-case study is in fact shown to offer two main 
advantages: it is flexible and relatively easy to apply, since the n universe is made by only one 
element, and there is no other case to apply to the first one. This choice solves the problem of 
the “comparativeness” of the EU with other federal political systems, since the asymmetry of 
the Eurozone is a unique case that, despite having a pattern, is currently not entirely comparable 
to regional organisations, or to federal states either. Throughout the thesis I will utilise graphics 
and tables, to explain more complex theories and concepts, or to summarise the processes 
which are being examined. I apply historical, theoretical and philological research to assess the 
development of different federal political systems, and identify common patterns. A historical 
review of the phases leading up to the introduction of a single currency will be also performed, 
and any patterns in introducing the Euro will be highlighted. The final method of assessment 
will be a more institutional and juridical analysis, to examine innovations in these areas, and 
establish if they contain elements of federalism, through an increasing role of the supranational 
dimension. I assess how elements introduced mirror those that are also present in other federal 
political systems and federations. Consequently, I apply a more institutional and juridical 
analysis, focusing on innovations in the Eurozone’s governance in the period from 2009-2019. 
In effect, this required a deeper analysis of the content of the Six- and Two-Pack, a review of 
the legislation introducing the Banking Union, a review of the structure of the European 
Stability Mechanism and an analysis of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and governance. 
Ontology 
From an ontological point of view, especially when it comes to European integration studies, 
an anti-foundationalist approach should be embraced. In fact, when it comes to studying this 
specific process, adopting a holistic approach would exclude any other interpretation or vision,  
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whereas, in this case, what I attempt is to integrate different approaches in the framework of 
federalism. At the same time, it would be difficult to give a foundationalist approach to this 
topic and to this thesis in particular. Therefore, an anti-foundationalist stream is adopted, more 
specifically, a social constructivist one. As the phrase suggests, the  
origins and analytical features of social constructivism should in principal [sic.] be 
traceable to, and identifiable from within, the ontology of social construction on which 
its name at least would suggest it is (Hay 2016: 521).  
Social constructivism positions itself in opposition to realism, since, from an ontological 
perspective, posits a reality independent of our knowledge or understanding of it, whereas 
constructivists emphasise the independence of reality as a construct based on human volition 
(ibid.). This especially applies in respect of social phenomena, for it is not reality per se that is 
the interest of investigation, but the significance, the meaning that the human being gives to it. 
The importance and significance of facts depends on human volition (Berger and Luckmann, 
1966) 
Picking up from Searle (1995, 2010), and based on the definition of reality stated by 
Berger and Luckmann, Hay distinguishes three types of “facticity”  
first, those things that can be said to exist independently of our thought (natural or brute 
facts); second, those things which, on a routine day-to-day basis may exist largely 
independently of our conscious thought but whose very existence in the first place is a 
product of human thought and volition and whose specific facticity today bears clear 
traces of this irredeemably social origin and evolution (many institutional facts and the 
practices to which they give rise, such as voting, are of this kind); and third, those things 
whose very facticity is a product and reflection of our thought and which endure only 
for as long as our thoughts are of a particular kind (Hay, 2016:522 emphasis in the 
original).  
In relation to federal and European integration studies, it is possible to state that historical 
events, the content of treaties and constitutions, the institutional structure of federal states and 
polities, and their meaning within federal theory all belong to Hay’s second and third 
categories. Consequently, the ontological approach adopted in the thesis is social constructivist, 
because it is interested in the second and third category identified above. Essentially, federalism 
is a social construct originating in social fact; this is the reason why social constructivism is 
the natural choice for this thesis.  
Epistemology 
In this thesis, the focus will be put on interpreting the subjects under investigation, in this case 
federalism and the eurozone. However, the methodology which is applied here does not aim to 
explain a cause and effect relationship, but rather at studying the phenomenon of the integration 
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of the EMU through the eyes of federalism. Therefore, it might be said that this thesis is deeply 
anchored to an interpretivist approach. 
The paradigm which is being adopted in this thesis is indeed an interpretation of social 
phenomena through federal discourse and federal theory. In this case, it might be argued that 
the interpretitive paradigm applied is biased by the author’s point of view, since it is no secret 
that I used to be an activist in a federalist organisation and I am still one of its supporters, even 
if less active. I am aware that the main criticism coming from scholars adopting a more 
positivist approach is that, in interpretivist approaches, I might dismiss facts if not consistent 
with the theory, rather than the other way around. However, interpretations can only be found 
within established traditions and discourses. Therefore, these should be brought back in, to give 
a proper meaning to social phenomena. 
Nonetheless, even though my political experience was the reason behind me 
undertaking this research, I was aware that my preferences could potentially blind my 
judgement, or as was said about Friedrich, would lead me to “see federalism where there is 
none”(Pentland in Burgess, 2012: 156). By way of rebuttal, this criticism is rejected by the fact 
that all grand theories are biased in this way and in general, all social sciences based on 
interpretivist approaches should be dismissed as biased or influenced by the preferences of the 
author, with all of its consequences. My interest in, and support of, federalism will therefore 
not prevent the development of a consistent and solid theory. Indeed, a rigorous and consistent 
analysis in the interest of the author, in order to demonstrate the contribution that federalism 
still makes to European integration theory, and most importantly in the context of the recent 
changes in the EMU. 
One of the main characteristics of European studies is that it has enough room for both 
qualitative and quantitative analysis. Nevertheless, the main grand theories of European 
integration, neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, are both based on a similar 
interpretivist approach: these theories aim at interpreting facts and highlighting patterns and 
elements, with the purpose of elaborating a consistent theory. The aim of this thesis is indeed 
to analyse recent changes in the EMU through the interpretative lenses of federalism. As I will 
explain throughout the thesis, there is no attempt at proving a specific theory right or wrong, 
but to understand not only what the interpretative paradigm is telling us about the investigated 
phenomenon, and, vice-versa, what the investigated phenomenon is telling us about the 
interpretation I am applying.  
The choice of this approach relates with our research questions. As we saw earlier and 
as we will see again in the next section, the research questions focus on how the process of 
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Eurozone integration is framed within the process of federal state-building taking place in the 
EU, the extent that remains separate or becomes entangled in a form of asymmetric federalism, 
and what the Eurozone tells us about federalism and vice-versa.  
Therefore, given these research questions, the instruments offered by the interpretivist 
epistemology, and a social constructivist ontology, were the natural choices to frame the 
research in the thesis.  
Thesis structure 
To answer the research questions, the thesis is structured in four chapters. The first chapter is 
a theoretical introduction to federalism and the main drivers behind the development of this 
theory, by focusing on the philosophical contributions to the theory of federalism, most 
importantly by Carl J. Friedrich, Kenneth C. Wheare, Preston King, Daniel Elazar, and Michael 
Burgess. This chapter will also focus on the relation between federalism and other EU 
integration theories, and how EU integration theories are, vice-versa, related to the process of 
federal state-building. More specifically, I will then summarise my paradigm of federalism as 
a process of federal state building, consisting of a dynamic combination of self rule and shared 
rule, evolving along the categories of federal political system that depending on a group of 
factors that Burgess already defined as federal spirit and that defined as the elements for a 
successful federation, might determine the outcome of the process. This part will briefly 
highlight how neofunctionalist dynamics can be framed in federalist theory, and explain why 
neofunctionalism should still be interpreted as a fundamental component in federal state-
building, as a component of gradual federalism. The same criterion will be applied to liberal 
intergovernmentalism, and I examine how intergovernmental relations are indeed fundamental 
to the existence of federal political systems since, as Friedrich defined them, relations between 
autonomous units are a fundamental component for genuine federalism (Friedrich, 1968). I do 
not dismiss the fact that intergovernmental agreements in many areas of EU governance are 
still more important than the supranational dynamics, which still prevents the EU from moving 
closer to the model of a federation (Fabbrini, 2015; Martinico, 2018). 
Those sections also explain why federalism is chosen as methodological framework for 
this thesis, and develop the definition of federal state-building and federal political systems, 
together with the ideological reasons behind their development. More specifically, the chapter 
focuses on the development of international organisations, confederations and federations. The 
chapter aims at assessing how and to what extent the EU and the Eurozone will be framed in 
the subsequent chapters.  
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The second chapter moves on to review earlier analyses of the EU as a federal political 
system, and examine the current EU institutional framework, to assess the extent to which the 
current institutional arrangements qualify under the definition of federalism. I explain why the 
European Commission, the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the 
European Central Bank represent elements that qualify the EU as a federal political system. 
Finally, the chapter sets out a definition of asymmetrical federalism, and explains why it is a 
key concept in understanding the changes in the role of the Eurozone inside the EU and how 
this corresponds with the concept of differentiated integration. 
The third chapter moves the focus on to the history of European monetary integration, 
and on how it started developing along different paths from the rest of the EU. I highlight how 
the development of monetary integration was very limited after the Treaty of Rome, and this 
area of the Treaties, that had sunk into oblivion, became increasingly important in European 
integration. I set out how monetary integration advanced through experiments and trials from 
the earliest proposals (Marjolin, 1962; Barre, 1968), through to Werner (1970) and then 
Marjolin (1975). More specifically I show how this process was based on a series of stages, 
which ended up with the introduction of the single currency. The chapter will explain how 
Maastricht was the most important milestone, not only in the development of the single 
currency, but also in the upgrade of the European Community to a Union. The chapter will also 
argue how the building of the EMU can be comparable to building an element of statehood at 
supranational level. This development was perhaps not expected or anticipated by MS, but 
became more evident during the Eurozone crisis. and after Draghi’s initiatives for Quantitative 
Easing and Assets Purchase Programmes. Indeed, this was a form of ‘Big Bang’, in which the 
European Central Bank transcended intergovernmental dynamics. 
The fourth chapter is a review of the changes in Eurozone governance, i.e. the 
introduction of the Six- and Two-Pack legislation, the introduction of the European Financial 
Stability Facility and its development into the European Stability Mechanism, Quantitative 
Easing and the new role of the European Central Bank, the institutions of the Banking Union 
and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance, i.e. the Fiscal Compact. The chapter 
will focus on how these changes are framed inside the categories of federalism, and how these 
changes brought a differentiation in terms of Federal political systems between the Eurozone 
and the EU as a single unit.  
The concluding chapter will summarise the previous discussions, and suggest some 
solutions to the current issues, as well as highlighting some of the other issues the EU is 
currently facing and how federalism, could answer these questions in further research. 
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1 Chapter I. Federalism: an introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Rufus Davis argued that the word federalism comes from the Latin word foedus (Davis, 1978), 
meaning a promise, or an oath (Elazar, 1987; Burgess 2006). Philological and etymological 
research over the years suggest that the term foedus shares its root with the word fides (Davis, 
1978). This implies that in ancient Rome, as in ancient Greece, oaths were sacred, as they were 
taken and sealed in front of the gods, within temples and shrines (Elazar, 1987). Elazar, in his 
1987 book, claimed that federalism is one the most ancient forms of government in history. 
Elazar claimed that it dated back to the first civilisations of the Mediterranean, whose elements 
are even reported in the Bible as the very first form of political organisation of the ancient Jews 
(ibid.). Research has shown that forms of federalism were already present in the ancient Greek 
and Etruscan city-states and their leagues (Beck & Funke, 2015). Leagues and organised 
alliances emerged during the Middle Ages (the Swiss Alliance, representing the first core of 
the Swiss Confederation, was one of these), but, as I will assess further in the thesis, what we 
consider federalism is actually a more recent phenomenon, which emerged during the Age of 
Enlightenment in the Western world. Federalism came through a long phase of cultural 
development, which started being explored during the Renaissance Era thanks to humanist 
authors like Johannes Althusius (Burgess, 2006), and went on throughout the 17th and 18th 
centuries both in protestant, Calvinist countries, thanks to authors like Samuel von Pufendorf 
and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, but also in the catholic world thanks to intellectuals like the 
Abbé de Saint-Pierre.  
More structured federal political thinking started emerging in the German world, and 
in the Northern American colonies, as witnessed by some of the first constitutions of the 
colonial era (McLaughlin, 1918). Federalism as a word was used for the first time at the end of 
the 18th century in the United States of America. As I will see later in the thesis, thanks to the 
intellectual contribution of people like Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, the concept 
of federalism was for the first time rationalised and codified in a proposal for a new form of 
government. As discussed above, Hamilton’s contribution did not come out of nowhere, but 
was the result of an assessment of the political situation in the new-born United States, 
combined with research and understanding of earlier federal arrangements, in the Ancient Era 
and in the Middle Ages. It might be said that it is thanks to the spirit of the Enlightenment, that 
it was possible to finally extract all the elements of federalism from past historical experiences, 
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and codify them into a theory and a constitutional, normative principle of government (Bosco, 
1991). 
Over the centuries, federalism has become the system of government of twenty-eight 
states, and it has become a synonym for accommodating differences within a specific territory 
(Keil & Anderson, 2018). Federalism has more and more frequently become an instrument for 
accommodating diversity within existing states (holding together federalism) and for 
organising new, emerging states (coming together federalism) and in a broader sense (Stepan, 
1999), for settling international conflicts and for providing international common goods 
(Fiorentini & Montani, 2014). For this last reason, federalism formed the basis for proposals 
for the uniting of Europe after the disasters of WWI, with the birth of Federal Union in Great 
Britain, and even more so after WWII, where more and more voices advocating a pacific 
uniting of Europe emerged, and where the federalisation of Europe progressively became a 
real, tangible, political proposal. 
In fact, the process of European integration, since its origins, has been a process of 
building the infrastructure for a single polity (Burgess 2003). By pooling competences, states 
have progressively invested in Europeanisation, thus opening the way to a Single Market and 
the related four freedoms, a common policy on agriculture, fishery, trade, and, when it comes 
to those countries who have already adopted the single currency, economic and monetary 
affairs (Treaty of the European Union, 1992). Other areas have not been turned into exclusive 
competences of the Union, but still have experienced a form of Europeanisation, although 
perhaps in a different form. As we will see in chapter III, the process has been neither smooth 
nor easy. The history of European integration has been a succession of setbacks and successes. 
As a result of this, we have areas where the EU de facto reproduces the model of a state 
(although highly decentralised and at a supranational level) and some where the EU more 
closely resembles an international organisation. As it will be assessed further, the EU bears 
within it the elements of more models of federal political systems. 
Through the perspective of federalism, European integration has not been very different 
from a process of state-building (Keil & Bransden, 2015). Even though a Spinellite “Big Bang 
Moment” has not yet occurred, Europeanisation has become, in some respects, the 
reproduction, at the supranational level, of some of the key features that were traditionally 
associated with states. It is indeed a process which simultaneously encompasses both 
pragmatism and ideological elements, that ultimately may end up with the coming into 
existence of a polity, comparable in many, if not all aspects, to that of a federal state 
(Dosenrode, 2010; Pinder, 1996). Given this hypothesis, and the still significant, constitutional 
   
 
22 
 
differences that do not allow academia to equate the EU (and even less, other attempts of 
regional integration) to states, many important and sophisticated scholars, like Haas and 
Hoffman in the 1950s until today, have tried to distance themselves from federalism and its 
teleological content. Likewise, many new definitions have been tailored for the EU: Union of 
States (Fabbrini, 2015; Law 2012), example of multilevel governance (Marks & Piattoni, 
2010), proto federation (Economou, Kyriazis & Metaxas 2013), third genus polity (Draetta, 
2009), enhanced international/regional organisation, Staatenverbund (Vosskuhle, 2009), to 
mention just some of the most recurrent definitions. 
This long list of descriptors confirms the attempts by scholars (Hix, 1999) to classify 
the EU. It also argues that the EU is a political system that somehow aspires to the model of a 
full federation, comparable to such benchmarks as the United States, Switzerland, or Canada. 
A political system is federal (Elazar 1982; Watts 2007) because it is based on federal 
arrangements (and federations are one of the possible outcomes), even if does not entirely 
qualify for what it is traditionally considered as a state (Hix, 1999).  
Even before the start of the integration process after WWII, the idea of a single 
European polity had been a recurrent element in European history since the Middle Ages, even 
if in very different forms. The earliest proposals may even date back to the time of Italian poet 
Dante Alighieri in the 13th century (Albertini, 1979). Many rulers, in one way or another, have 
tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to unify Europe around their dynasties or persona, ideology, or 
country, from Charles V of the Holy Roman Empire (some may even mention Charlemagne, 
Henry II of England or Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen) to Stalin, many 
rulers like Philip II of Spain, Louis XIV of France, Napoleon (Dwyer, 2010), Wilhelm II and 
even Adolf Hitler. Many of these tried to establish a single hegemony or authority on the 
continent with their military might, with violence, war and conquest, all the elements of the so-
called Satan’s sword (Einaudi, 1947) in contrast with God’s sword (i.e. by mutual agreement).  
But it was after the tragedies of the last world conflict that the first real attempts were made to 
build the unity of Europe around the consent of peoples and states, and around common goals 
like defence (even if this has been delayed since its first attempts in the 1950s) and economic 
reconstruction and development, rather than through coercion. In the same period, with the 
emergence of new forms of statehood and federal arrangement after WWII, not only in Europe 
but all around the world, many scholars contributed with their analyses into what was going 
on, in federal terms, with the building of Europe. 
As a matter of fact, what makes the EU integration process different from other forms 
of regional integration is precisely the fact that the process was specifically started with the 
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purpose of creating a new form of polity, and not a mere market or alliance (Spinelli & Rossi, 
1941; Churchill, 1946; Schuman, 1950; Spinelli, 1957; Haas, 1958, Albertini, 1960). Even 
though this process has been extensively challenged, more specifically through pressures, and 
politicians, which tried to direct European integration towards a different outcome (like De 
Gaulle and Thatcher), there are many elements to support the claim of polity-building. 
Churchill’s speeches at Zurich and The Hague focused on creating a United States of Europe 
(Churchill, 1946), whilst the Schuman Declaration in 1950 called for a European federation. 
As a matter of fact, the European Community, later the EU, was itself the result of a dynamic 
confrontation between different federalist and anti-federalist forces, which alternatively shaped 
the process of integration. Federalism explains the dynamics tending towards the creation of a 
federal political system, in this case: a form of federal union between states. More specifically, 
in this case federalism should be interpreted as a process of creation, and thus, of federal state-
building. 
Framing the European project in the paradigm of federalism and federal state-building 
is necessary to understand the reasons for this evolution, which made the EC and EU 
integration process so different and so unique. Federalism explains not only the birth of the 
European Coal and Steel Community, but also the strong Gaullist opposition to the European 
Defense Community (Burgess, 2000) and Thatcher’s strong opposition to the single currency 
and political integration (Thatcher, 1990). It also explains stalemates and developments such 
as the “empty chair crisis” and the subsequent Luxembourg Compromise (1966), as well as 
unique steps; such as the direct election of the European Parliament, the launch of the Single 
Market or the introduction of the Euro. In this framework, European integration itself is a long 
constitutional process (Glencross, 2009).  
Just like many authors have tried to name and define the EU, since the beginning of the 
process of integration, many scholars such as Stanley Hoffman (Hoffman, 1966), Ernst Haas, 
Lindberg & Scheingold (1970), Gary Marks, Andrew Moravcsik, John Pinder (Pinder, 1996) 
and Michael Burgess (Burgess, 2000; 2012) have tried to develop a theory to explain how 
European integration happened, and continues, and why progress in terms of integration was 
possible. Haas and Hoffman respectively laid the foundations of two of the main theories of 
European integration: neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism (Cini, 2003). The 
latter was drastically upgraded and revisited by Moravcsik in the 1990s (Hix, 1999). As widely 
stated in the introduction, federalism is the theory that will be applied to this analysis of the 
Eurozone. This thesis attempts to revive the contributions made by other federalist authors like 
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Pinder (1996) and Burgess (2001) to assess the dynamics of the Eurozone integration within 
the EU.  
The configuration of European integration as a process of federal state-building can be 
traced back to the founding documents of the European Community, and the speeches of its 
founders. These documents, the Schuman Declaration in particular, established the basis and 
the destination of this process. The process of European integration therefore needs be assessed 
as a political, federal project aiming to create an ever-closer Union of peoples of Europe: a 
project of federal state-building. This process is characterised by incremental developments 
and intergovernmental bargaining (Keil & Bransden, 2015), which played a meaningful, 
constitutional role. As this chapter will assess further, there are different theories of European 
integration that attempted to explain integration, and I will explain why these are relevant to 
federal state-building. Neofunctionalism, as developed by Haas and later theorists, by itself 
explains the dynamics of incremental integration; yet as highlighted by Anderson (1996: 14), 
Harrison (1974: 75), Dosenrode (2010) and Haas himself (1967: 323), this can only be 
understood in the perspective of political unification as a final goal. Moravcsik and other 
followers of liberal intergovernmentalism built a theory to explain the formation of government 
preferences, even if he downplays the role of federalism in his theory (Burgess, 2000, 2009). 
Moravcsik merely includes federalism in his ideological dimension by highlighting it as the 
ideology of the supranational institutions (Moravcsik, 1998), but fails to incorporate federalism 
in his analysis. By contrast, this thesis takes as hypothesis that intergovernmental bargains are 
a fundamental part in federal state-building, and the European case is no exception; similarly, 
functional developments are essential parts of federal state-building dynamics.  
1.2 Federalism and federal state-building: definition and meaning 
As previously mentioned, it is generally recognised that federalism started emerging in 
its current form after a long development that started in the Renaissance, and developed thanks 
to many contributions. By contrast, in the academic, and intellectual world, there is not a fully-
fledged, univocal, and universally accepted definition of federalism (Henig, 2006; Burgess, 
2006). Similarly, there are different interpretations and contributions regarding federalism, 
especially when applied to defining the developments of integration in Europe. Even though it 
might seem unfair to limit our definitions and analysis of federalism to the process of European 
integration, and all the other federal experiences which may be relevant or connected to this 
one, it must be clarified that this is because it is necessary to have a cornerstone, a starting point 
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to begin with, especially since federalism is a concept that, potentially, can go back to the first 
polities of human history (Elazar, 1987). 
In the political literature, federalism has been given many definitions, highlighting 
different aspects of it, and not necessarily in competition. Some authors (Friedrich, 1962; 1968) 
put their focus on federalism as a dynamic process, others on federalism as a sociological 
element (Livingston, 1956), and others on the organisation and structure of power (Wheare, 
1946, 1960; King, 1982; Elazar 1987). Following Elazar’s classification, Watts made a 
taxonomic assessment of federal political systems (Watts, 2003, 2007). Other authors 
interpreted federalism as a tendency in human history (Albertini, 1960), thus following 
Friedrich’s thinking, or even as a revolution against power-oriented politics (Rossolillo, 1972 
in Vigo, 2009) or as an attitude and cultural process (De Rougemont, 1970), 
If we frame federalism as a progression, the most relevant definition is that of C.J. 
Friedrich. Friedrich described federalism as a dynamic process and, consequently, his analysis 
was focused on federalism not in its most mature and static stages, but on the development 
leading to that final stage. To demonstrate this in a metaphor, Friedrich’s interest was not 
focused on taking a single picture, a snap-shot, of the process when it had ended, i.e. in 
analysing federalism when already consolidated in a federal state, but on the sequences of 
pictures leading to it. By extension, in his vision the European Community represented a new 
dimension of federalism (Friedrich, 1969; Burgess, 2012: 139). He saw federalism as a 
progression and, consistently with his vision, he included international organisations, and even 
the entire international system as a whole, linking them under the term federalism. In his 
interpretation of federalism, both intrastate relations (i.e. the relations between subnational and 
regional units inside a state) and interstate relations (i.e. between sovereign states) represented 
a form of federalism. The greatest intellectual contribution of Friedrich is that any polity could 
be represented “as differences of degree in the relation of government to the territory affected 
by it”, (Friedrich, 1950:189-190), where the two extremes of the spectrum are complete unity 
and complete separateness (ibid.). Friedrich defined these federal schemes as a combination of 
unity and diversity following a territorial pattern. Friedrich’s definition of federalism may be 
summarised in this sentence:  
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instead [of a static pattern and a fixed division of powers]: federalism should be seen as 
the process of federalising a political community, as the process by which a number of 
separate political organisations, be they state or any other kind of associations, enter into 
arrangements for making joint decisions on joint problems, or reversely, the process 
through which a hitherto unitary political organisation becomes decentralised to the 
point where separate and distinct political communities arise and become politically 
organised and capable of making separate decisions on distinct problems (Friedrich, 
1962: 514-15). 
This definition contains the idea of federalism as both a centralising and a decentralising 
process, as would be defined later by King (1982). This concept of federalism as a bidirectional 
process, was further developed by Stepan (1999), when describing the archetypes of “coming 
together federations” and “holding together federations.” 
Friedrich’s definition of federalism builds on previously existing traditions. A concept 
that partly summarises the same concept of dynamic federalism is that of “federality”, that was 
coined by Henry Sidgwick (1903: 433) in his work “The Development of European Polity”, 
many years before Friedrich. Sidgwick applied the word federality in a very broad sense. This 
word incorporates federalism both as normative principle and as form of state, in opposition to 
the unitary one: i.e. a federality was any federal political system (Burgess, 2012). Furthermore, 
he applied the word both to Switzerland and the Netherlands, as well as the German Bund, with 
no regard of different forms of governments. Even if he claimed that “undue importance was 
given to the topic”, he borrowed two compositions of words from the German language: the 
terms “Staatenbund” and “Bundesstaat” (Sidgwick 1903; Burgess, 2006). Although Sidgwick 
recognised that he was not interested in “discussing the various possible lines that may be 
drawn”, the former indicates a confederation of states, while the latter indicates a federal state. 
Sidgwick stated that both represent two different stages in the development of a process of 
federal state building. In the same pages Sidgwick wrote that in forming a union designed to 
be permanent, communities cease to be individually sovereign. This means that the extension 
of the sovereignty of the constituent communities may be a measure of any polity bearing 
federal elements, and could be utilised among federations or confederations, and by extension, 
any other kind of federal political system (Watts, 2008). Both Elazar (1987) and Watts (1993, 
2008), attempted a categorisation of federal political systems accordingly, with the 
combination “self-rule and shared-rule”, as will be further developed later.  
Friedrich, unlike Wheare before him, stressed the dimension of federalism as a dynamic 
process of federalisation (Friedrich, 1962), requiring the coexistence and interaction of 
different communities as autonomous entities (ibid.). This process can be seen both in a 
decentralising and in a centralising way or, as Preston King called them, as centralising and 
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decentralising federalisms (1982: 17-19). As Burgess highlighted, Friedrich’s understanding 
of federalism is that of a process-oriented model, that of federalism as a succession of steps 
(2012: 169).  
Achieving the final step, that of a federal state, means arriving at the final step of a 
process of state-building., Friedrich gave a good definition for a federal state coming to 
existence as 
any cohesive group possessing independence within the international order […] which 
constitutes a constituency for a government effectively ruling such a group and 
receiving from that group the acclamation which legitimises the government as part of 
the world order (Friedrich, 1962; Deutsch & Foltz, 1963).  
A process of state-building, specifically of a federal state-building could be summarised into 
this last sentence.  
Even though Friedrich’s contribution is very useful in understanding the fluidity and 
dynamism of federalism in the realities of Federal political systems, the main criticism and 
danger of Friedrich’s approach may be that federalism may be found even in situations and 
circumstances where federalism is not actually applicable or relevant, (Pentland, 1973: 153; 
Forsyth, 1981: 7; Burgess, 2012: 170), since Friedrich never accepted the “conventional 
distinctions between confederation and federation” (Burgess, 2012: 170). Another criticism 
that Friedrich faced was that, whereas he succeeded in making an important intellectual 
contribution in framing federalism as a dynamic phenomenon, and not as a fixed and static 
scheme, he failed in focusing on, and highlighting, the triggers and the causes of federalisation 
processes.  
Even though he might have failed in isolating and recognising the triggers leading to 
federalisation processes, his analysis described what could be a process, eventually leading, in 
its deepest and most advanced form, corresponding to state-building. This would accord with 
principles of power pooling and power-sharing, transfers of competences towards federal 
governments or subnational administrations, bargains among constituent units. i.e. a process of 
federal state-building, not through centralisation and assimilation by a central power (Tilly, 
1985), but through agreements and transfers of powers to mutually recognised authorities. The 
concept of federal state-building will be reviewed further on, since looking into the concept of 
state-building and, by extension and more specifically, that of federal state-building, is crucial 
to our analysis.  
That being said, what Friedrich (and, to an extent, Sidgwick before him) tried to assess 
were the dynamics and progression leading to the creation of a federal political system, both 
when talking about coming together federalism (as he did in his analysis of the European 
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Community, i.e. the passage from a system of sovereign states usually separate from each other 
to a community) and when analysing processes of decentralisation (i.e. passages from 
centralised administrations to more decentralised forms of government); for Friedrich, 
federalism was the process of creating a federal political system.  
While Friedrich focused on the process of territorial distribution of powers, where 
federalism, like Sidgwick’s federality, indicates and includes the spectrum of all the 
constitutional arrangements and international agreements that occur when many constituent 
units share a certain degree of sovereignty (Burgess, 2006; Law 2012), Elazar focused on 
power structures in federal political systems. Elazar’s words could be chosen for being among 
the most appropriate to describe the phenomenon of power sharing and federalisation.  
Federal principles are concerned with the combination of self-rule and shared rule. In 
the broadest sense, federalism involves the linking of individuals, groups, and polities 
in lasting but limited union in such a way as to provide for the energetic pursuit of 
common ends while maintaining the respective integrities of all parties. As a political 
principle, federalism has to do with the constitutional diffusion of power so that the 
constituting elements in a federal arrangement share in the processes of common policy 
making and administration by right, while the activities of the common government are 
conducted in such a way as to maintain their respective integrities. (Elazar, 1987: 5-6). 
Elazar, more specifically, had a covenantal approach to define federalism (Burgess, 
2012). Elazar was, in fact, particularly focused on highlighting how federalism related to the 
institutionalisation of a specific power relationship between political units. Elazar gave the 
scholarship one of the most successful and powerful definitions of federalism: the combination 
of “self-rule plus shared-rule”. He saw self-rule as political autonomy, with a separate self-
government of the constituent units (ibid: 184), while shared rule was seen as power-sharing 
at horizontal and vertical levels among different governments in the same state or community, 
with the purpose of achieving common goals, or to forge a common government (ibid.). This 
is also the reason why Elazar used not to compare federal systems to pyramids, but to a matrix 
of governments (Elazar, 1979), thus giving him the opportunity to highlight the flexibility and 
adaptability of the federal principle (Burgess, 2012). From this point of view, both Friedrich 
and Elazar shared the same conclusions on flexibility and dynamism of the concept of 
federalism, its development and application, and not just on federalism as a structure but as a 
process. What is more relevant to our analysis, and will be reviewed later, is Elazar’s attempt 
to apply this interpretation of federalism to an international dimension, where states combine 
their sovereignty through shared rule, in international and regional organisations, to achieve 
common goals on economic integration, security and human rights protection (Elazar, 1997). 
The EU was mentioned as the most prominent of these examples. Additionally, in the Treaty 
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of the European Union, some of the principles of its institutional architecture mirror those of 
“shared rule and self-rule” (Hrbek, 2015: 381). Such principles, as already mentioned, include 
the division of competences (TFUE 2009, Article 6), and more importantly the principle of 
subsidiarity and proportionality ( ibid., Article 5, Paragraph 1). 
Italian philosopher Mario Albertini gave a strong ideological background for federalist 
political activism, which served as an ideological drive for the European federalist movements 
in the 1960s and 1970s (Terranova, 2003), in addition to works like Altiero Spinelli’s 
Ventotene Manifesto (and his lesser known, but maybe even more important, Manifesto of 
European Federalists). During his life, Albertini made an important contribution to structuring 
and organising the political activity of the Federalist Movement in Italy, and at a European 
level. Albertini created a strong ideological background for federalism, where it stands as 
principle beyond the core principles of contemporary states like socialism, liberalism, and 
democracy. This vision of federalism was almost historicist. Spinelli pushed for achieving 
federation at the European level with the purpose of making the tragedy of WWII impossible 
to repeat, and to preserve European interests on the world stage, including overcoming the 
dichotomy between US-supported neoliberalism, and USSR-sponsored communism. 
Meanwhile, Albertini interpreted federalism as a tendency of every human society since the 
beginning of history, and gave a vision of federalism as an almost inevitable, ineluctable trend 
in human history. 
After WWII, Kenneth C. Wheare was the first scholar to analyse the existence and 
functioning of federal governments, and helped summarise the contributions of prior 
scholarship. His first contributions were published during the ravages of WWII, when he 
defined federalism as the “division of functions between coordinate authorities, not subordinate 
one to another” (Wheare, 1941). He provided as an example the case of the USA as a federal 
state, and in contrast, the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland as an example of devolved 
government (Burgess 2012). Wheare also described federal polities as basically unstable 
polities, needing not only written constitutions to avoid conflicts, but also a skilled political 
elite, to manage those conflicts constantly present within federal polities. His definition of 
federalism was very narrow, as in fact he compared systems to a very rigid benchmark of 
federalism that he used to define strict federalism (ibid.) Even if his analysis of federal systems 
was very rigid, so that many traditional federal systems would not qualify as fully federal in 
his analysis, Wheare’s contributions set the foundations for the development of federal theory 
and prepared the ground for further contributions. 
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In summary, federalism has been defined as a process (Friedrich, 1968), a normative 
principle (Wheare, 1964), as an ideology and trend in human history (Albertini, 1963; King, 
1982) and as a covenant, an agreement between peers (Elazar, 1987). Many scholars 
(Moravcsik, 1993; Marks, Hooghe & Blank 1996) still question applying federalism as a 
paradigm to anything else but federal and decentralised states in a strict sense, even if, as 
previously described, federalism is not only a feature of federal states. As elaborated, it is 
possible to apply the same categories to different political entities, namely international 
organisations and confederations, even at the risk of “finding federalism where there is none” 
(Pentland in Burgess, 2012: 156). By adopting a multi-dimensional vision of federalism as 
process, as normative principle and as covenant, federalism could include the whole spectrum 
of combinations of unity and diversity, of shared- and self-rule. In this case, even if the most 
developed and mature form of federal political system is the federation (and the ultimate goal 
of a federalist in the Hamiltonian or Spinellite sense), other developments of the application of 
federalism, such as confederations and international organisations must be included as one of 
the possible outcome of the application of federal principles to a specific number of territorial 
autonomies. This also implies that there might be different ideological and political reasons 
that could lead to the existence of confederal and intergovernmental/international 
arrangements.  
Nonetheless, it is important, at the same time, not to dismiss or ignore the context in 
which federalism is applied. Even though seeing federalism everywhere (Forsyth, 1981) might 
give the scholarship new elements for reflection, it must always be taken into consideration 
that federalism in the context of federal states is different from federalism in confederations. It 
must never be forgotten that, despite the absence of a univocal and universal definition of 
federalism, differences between federal political systems in terms of statehood and internal 
integration exist and have been proven.  
Following this pattern, Ronald Watts (2008: 1-27) gave a general overview of all 
federal political systems by classifying them based on their constitutional arrangements and 
their institutional structure, and by rehearsing a previous classification used by Elazar (1985: 
18). Watts defined them as a broad category, whereby there are multiple levels of government 
and a combination of shared rule (i.e. collaborative partnership through a common government) 
and self-rule (i.e. constituent units autonomy) of the single constituent units of government 
(Watts, 2008: 8). Three of them, as mentioned, will be taken into consideration: federations, 
confederations and international organisations (leagues). Federations represent the highest 
combination of unity and diversity within the same state. Confederations represent the highest 
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degree of unity and shared rule among diverse states, all retaining most of their self-rule. And, 
lastly, international organisations represent the first stage of federal political systems, where 
states share a basic form of shared rule through nothing other than the membership of the same 
organisation, and retain all of their self-rule. Naturally, in such a spectrum there are many other 
possible combinations and grey areas, and in the next chapters, I describe how these can coexist 
and codevelop inside the same federal political system, in this case the EU and the Eurozone. 
1.2.1 Federalism as comprehensive theory 
As already stated, in this thesis federalism is not exclusively identified with the movements 
(Pistone, 2008) and the ideology (Albertini, 1963) that support the creation of a European 
federation, such as the European Movement International and the Union of European 
Federalists. Although these represented and played a meaningful role in the analysis I am 
adopting, they are not the principal focus of this thesis; our interest is assessing federalism as 
a theory of European integration. Additionally, in this case, the categories described by Preston 
King (1982) will be applied and used in the framework. Therefore, although federalism could 
be both a centralising and a decentralising process, in this case it will be principally assessed 
as a process of increasing Europeanisation, and eventually as a transfer of competences to the 
European level.  
The first reason for the choice of federalism as interpretative method is rooted in a core 
assumption underlying this thesis: that the EU is a federal system (Elazar 1998; Burgess; 2000, 
Watts 2008; Keil & Bransden, 2015). The EU is a system of different states that decided to 
pool their sovereignty, and have accepted a process of political integration that could eventually 
become a full political union. Over the last decades, the EU has maintained both 
intergovernmental features and confederal features (Burgess, 2000), but more importantly it 
has developed federal-type institutions (ibid.). Although the latter are still to be completed, and 
remain far from the benchmarks of full federations, the EP was modelled after on federal 
parliament, the European Commission has developed similarly to an executive, and the 
European Court of Justice as a constitutional court. 
The second reason is that federal principles are also present in the configuration of the 
European Treaties (Treaty on the European Union, 2007). The preamble mentions the purpose 
of an “ever closer union” as a founding motivation for the establishment of the Union, alongside 
the principles of subsidiarity (Art. 5, Treaty on the European Union), and proportionality 
(ibid.). More specifically, these two represent the translation into constitutional principles of 
the concept of “shared-rule and self-rule” (Hrbek, 2015). Additionally, EU membership 
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requires that the states and the EU institutions respect certain principles, which are consistently 
part of the spirit of federal systems (Burgess, 2012: 19-20). Even the motto of the European 
Union, “United in diversity” is significantly coherent with the federal spirit of the EU (Burgess, 
2012), and is no different from other federal mottos like the US “E pluribus unum” or the Swiss 
“One for all, all for one”. Finally, the Treaty of the European Union highlights that the principle 
of sincere cooperation (Art. 4, par. 3), as well as full and mutual respect are the key principles 
that should drive the behaviour of the MS and the EU institutions.  
The third reason, as mentioned before, is the purpose of the EU. The European project 
is a federal one, which has a political union as its goal. This aspiration to create unity among 
different peoples within the same geographic area is part of the same normative principle, one 
of the cornerstones of federalism (Albertini, 1961; Burgess, 2006). In his meaningful 
contribution to federal studies, Thomas M. Franck (1968: 168-198) highlighted three levels of 
factors, and related goals, that could influence and determine the success or failure of a 
federation. Among the primary factors, Franck individuated ideological federalism, popular or 
élite charisma and supremacy of federal political values. Franck pointed out how these factors 
are functional to three goals: federation for its own sake, manifest destiny or national greatness. 
This level was described as essential for the success of a federation. This means that until there 
is a common will, and a common purpose to pursue and maintain unity, the Union will endure. 
Therefore, the “ever closer union” is not just a rhetorical and solemn introduction, but it 
represents the nature and the scope of the EU. Consequently, the support of national decision 
and policy makers, and the credibility of EU institutions, is also fundamental, as well as citizens 
support.  
The fourth reason lies in the behaviour of MS themselves. As signatories of the treaties, 
MS are their own masters, and can decide to what extent integration is possible. States which 
have joined the Community/Union have had to coexist within the configuration of the EU as a 
federal-type project. Some states have decided to embrace a more proactive approach, and were 
more willing to Europeanise most areas, and to move faster in integration (traditionally the 
Benelux countries). Others used their influence to redirect integration towards a different 
outcome or to water it down (the UK before Brexit, and more recently Poland and Hungary). 
Others, like Denmark and Sweden, are highly Europeanised and proactive in many areas, but 
still reject Europeanisation in some substantial areas, such as the adoption of the Euro. France 
has played both roles, as blocker and as proponent for more integration, in different historical 
phases. Likewise, over the last decades, at the European level and at the national/subnational 
level, political parties, lobbying groups, policy, law and opinion-makers have organised to 
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support or oppose this process. Adhesion to the EU and to European integration has 
increasingly become a political divide, like that between economic left and economic right, or 
social progressivism and social conservativism (Marks, 2000; Hooghe, 2018). The rise of 
nationalist, Eurosceptic forces on one side, but also of staunchly pro-European, federalist forces 
on the other, is no different from party dynamics and political cleavages in federal systems. In 
summary, though the dynamics might be very different and specific, what has happened in the 
European integration process is substantially no different, from a historical perspective, to what 
happened in other federal experiences in the past (Burgess, 2006). 
The fifth reason is a more teleological one; Federalism is an option. In this case, as has 
been highlighted by Albertini (1961) and Elazar (1995, 1998), human communities tend to 
create broader polities, since the first city states in early antiquity to national states in the 
modern era, and that globalisation, similarly, would have sparked the necessity for a new form 
of international governance and therefore for new confederal arrangements at continental and 
global level. However, this has proved to be not entirely the case. Although the necessity to 
address globalisation is evident, the rise of new nationalist waves not only in the USA, but also 
in China, India, and Russia, the lack of consensus of the reform of the United Nations, as well 
as the stalemates at the World Trade Organization (WTO) rounds, have led to renewed 
scepticism towards the possibility of a comprehensive reform of international governance. This 
proves that supranational federalism is a tendency, but not a deterministic process, especially 
when it lacks support from transnational groups and political elites, and might remain wishful 
thinking, even in the presence of economic and technological arguments in its favour 
(Albertini, 1985). This tendency is conditional on the existence of particular economic and 
political circumstances: a globalised economy, a cosmopolitan elite, the birth of the internet 
and the digital revolution, but these elements per se do not lead or cause supranational 
federalism. Likewise, the EU could become a full federation in the future, it could collapse, or 
it might stabilise and remain within its current legal framework.  
The sixth reason comes with the possibility of applying the principle of asymmetric 
federalism (Tarlton, 1965; Burgess 2006), i.e. the principle that, in the same federal system, 
the constituent units could have different obligations and different constitutional provisions. In 
this framework, the EU is a multi-speed system, that could be assessed as a form of asymmetric 
federal system. More specifically, the EU is an asymmetric federal system in which Euro MS 
and non-Euro MS have different obligations.  
These different innovations, introduced after the treaty of Maastricht, and more 
specifically after the start of the sovereign debt crisis in 2008, comprised the creation of the 
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European Financial Stability Facility, followed by the European Stability Mechanism, and then 
the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the EMU. These have sometimes 
widened the distance between Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries, so that the possibility of 
diversified integration was advocated on a number of occasions times by people from different 
environments: scholars, MEPs, ministers.  
Recently, declarations about the potential for a multi-speed Europe (Merkel, 2017; 
Macron, 2017), make clear that this is remains a possible outcome of EU integration 
(Verhofstadt Report, 2017; EU Commission White Paper, 2017). The recent declaration of the 
27 representatives of the MS in Rome on 25th March 2017, at the time of the celebration of the 
Treaty of Rome, represented a formalisation of a de facto situation, even though the eight 
remaining non-Eurozone countries remain sceptical or negative about this development. The 
declaration, in fact, states that the MS  
will act together, at different paces and intensity where necessary, while moving in the 
same direction, as we have done in the past, in line with the Treaties and keeping the 
door open to those who want to join later. Our Union is undivided and indivisible.  
Thus, giving the green light to the idea of different speeds of integration. 
Federalism is a paradigm that allows us to change our perspective, and to assess the EU 
integration process not only as a process of economic integration, but also of state-building 
(Keil & Bransden, 2015). The decision to apply this theory of European integration instead of 
others, derives from the specificities of the integration process as a federal project that I 
discussed earlier. In this framework, the importance of intergovernmental bargaining is not 
dismissed, but it will be encompassed and interpreted as part of the constitutional moment in 
the Treaty negotiations, along with functional spillovers in economic integration. Therefore, 
the dialectics between intergovernmentalism and federalism, as well as neofunctionalism and 
federalism should not be considered as an unsolvable argument between opposite visions and 
interpretations of the European integration, but in a complementary relation (ibid.).  
1.2.2 The choice of federalism: possible issues. 
The use of federalism as a paradigm for assessing European integration is subject to some 
limits. There is a risk, that federalism’s close focus on the normative principle of EU integration 
as a teleological process of state-building, and on the goal of European integration, could lead 
to not only dismissing intergovernmental dynamics, but also to interpreting some developments 
that are not necessarily addressed towards the political finalité of integration, but for instance 
more subject to low politics and intergovernmental interests. As we will see later in the thesis, 
this is the same criticism that authors applied to the federalist theory of Friedrich, that of 
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“finding federalism where there is none”. Essentially, the mistake that could be repeated is to 
give too much importance to elements that are indeed just wishful thinking, or just declaration 
of intents, with no actual follow up.  
Another mistake would be to underestimate the role of other elements, such as 
economic integration, while overestimating other state-type, constitutional aspects. Another 
risk would be to pick cases just to assess a specific outcome, and to apply categories of 
federalism to cases whereby these do not necessarily fit into the model. It risks becoming a 
tautological system or rather a self-fulfilling prophecy. Haas, for instance, strongly criticised 
some of the federalist thinkers for making strong assertions without providing enough evidence 
for their theory (Haas, 1967).  
As previously mentioned, another recurring critique, coming more specifically from 
advocates of liberal intergovernmentalism, is that federalism is not exactly a theory, but more 
an ideology that promotes a precise outcome of European integration (Moravcsik, 1998). So 
the aim in the thesis is to avoid these criticisms and biases, and to highlight a scientific and 
coherent approach for the assessment of the EU, and more specifically the Eurozone as a federal 
system, through a process of identifying the tendency towards unity and integration, and 
towards a split between pro-integration and anti-integration. Despite these risks, federalism has 
the advantage in giving European integration studies a new dynamic: i.e. assessing the process 
of European integration as a process of federal state-building. For instance, in the case of the 
Eurozone, a comprehensive federalist theory needs to assess this process as the creation of a 
smaller federal political system within the wider federal political system of the EU, or if the 
Eurozone is simply the avant-garde, a prototype of a the EU as federal political system and 
therefore, the most advanced form of supranational federal state-building.  
1.3 International organisations as the first stage of federalism  
International organisations (IOs) are at the first stage of federalism, and represent a form of 
federal political system in which there is a very low level of shared rule (Elazar 1987, 1998), 
while self-rule of the member states is overwhelmingly dominant. In fact, are, structurally, 
intergovernmental institutions. The IOs’ functioning is assured by a secretariat (Watts, 2008), 
whose traditional role was to prepare the schedule of the summits, prepare resolutions, reduce 
political divisions between different states, and work to bring negotiating positions closer. 
Indeed, most of the political bodies of the United Nations Organization (UNO) consist of 
skilled and experienced diplomats, as are those of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Additionally, MS provide the financial support for these organisations, since they do not have 
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any fiscal power. Whether federalism could be applied as a normative and ideological principle 
for IOs has been questioned, even though Friedrich (1968), Watts (2008), Elazar (1987, 1998) 
and Burgess (2004) all made strong cases for including these organisations in the definition of 
federal political systems. IOs are not created with the purpose of creating some form of new 
statehood, but have functional purposes, like the preservation of international peace and 
conflict prevention like the UN (UN Charter, 1945), or the development of international trade, 
like the WTO. For these forms of federal political systems, applying state-building as purpose 
is difficult. It is necessary to explain internationalism as a category, and its relationship with 
federalism, to justify the rationale behind the development of international organisations as 
federal political systems, other than federation or confederal solutions. 
IOs are the result of a long historical development. However, some authors might 
question that the first examples of IOs date back to the Congress of Vienna and the 
Metternichian systems of Congresses that aimed to reshape post-Napoleonic Europe. That first 
experiment of international cooperation through permanent cooperation was very weak, and 
showed all its limits just a few years later, in the early 1820s, with the outbreak of the first post-
Vienna revolutions, and movements for national freedom in Mexico, Latin America and in 
Europe. The cornerstone of this system of Congresses was a mixture of soft power, diplomatic 
convention and old bonds that still kept the old European dynasties and aristocracy together in 
a transnational elite. Other authors, for example Conforti (1979) consider these forms of 
agreements as nothing more than simple alliances and, since they lacked in any permanent 
structure, and as such cannot be compared to an IO. 
The development of a structured international community resumed with Woodrow 
Wilson’s Fourteen Points, as part of his aim towards establishing mechanisms for a long-lasting 
peace after WWI. During his speech to the US Senate on 10th July 1919, Wilson stated that  
The promises governments were making to one another about the way in which labor 
was to be dealt with, by law not only but in fact as well, would remain a mere humane 
thesis if there was to be no common tribunal of opinion and judgment to which liberal 
statesmen could resort for the influences which alone might secure their redemption. A 
league of free nations had become a practical necessity. Examine the treaty of peace and 
you will find that everywhere throughout its manifold provisions its framers have felt 
obliged to turn to the League of Nations as an indispensable instrumentality for the 
maintenance of the new order it has been their purpose to set up in the world,—the world 
of civilized men (Wilson, 1919). 
In this statement Wilson advanced the idea of a community of equals which the USA could 
have led towards a liberal model (although this never happened because the USA never joined 
the League of Nations), sharing common rules and the membership of a permanent 
organisation. Although, once it was set up, the League of Nations was quite far from Kant’s 
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proposal in Perpetual Peace and it eventually failed to create an enduring and solid system to 
prevent WWII, it represented the very first attempt to create an international community 
according to liberal internationalist principles. 
Internationalism, (commonly referred to as liberal internationalism), and federalism, 
find their common roots in the Grotian theory of International Relations, and in the Kantian 
theory of cosmopolitanism respectively. Scholars like Martin Wight (1991) and Hedley Bull 
(1977) described the study of International Relations as being based on three traditions: the 
Machiavellian/Hobbesian, the Grotian and the Kantian tradition. While the first and the third 
ones are, respectively, the foundations for realist and federalist interpretations of international 
theory, Grotius is the founder of liberal internationalist theory and the current tradition of 
international law. All these three traditions developed their own interpretation of the idea of 
shared sovereignty as mere cooperation among states. While realists dismissed cooperation 
among international states for being weak and subjected exclusively to the interest of the states, 
and federalists advocated for the creation of a more solid federal political system, less subject 
to vetoes and power policy of states, internationalists rejected the hypothesis of both. The same 
concept is applicable to the theory of pooled sovereignty, while Grotian and Kantian schools 
developed their own understanding on pooled sovereignty, the Hobbesian school dismissed it.  
In The Law of War and Peace, Grotius gave a meaningful contribution in the 
development of internationalism, and eventually had an important influence in Kant’s 
Perpetual Peace. Grotius argued for the existence of a spontaneous natural law in international 
relations, which flourishes inside a society of states (Bull, 1977), sharing some common moral 
and cultural elements. The society Grotius described was not an eternal battlefield where states 
fought each other constantly, but the place where its members adopted and developed common 
habits. Wight (1991) described the Grotian tradition as one based on rationality and 
pragmatism, in opposition to the pessimist Hobbesian/Machiavellian, and the optimistic and 
revolutionary Kantian interpretations. Therefore, raison d’état is not an absolute and limitless 
principle, but must coexist with the basic value of international society. The international 
system that Grotius proposed was a two-tier system, in which external and internal sovereignty 
are divided: the internal sovereignty is illimitable (Leamon, 1982), but external sovereignty 
ended where the others’ sovereignty began.  
By way of contrast, Kant ultimately unified these tiers in his theory. In Kantian theory, 
the republican principles pervaded every level of sovereignty, but similarly to Grotius, Kant 
asserted that any country should be set free to achieve its own republican government on its 
own, and therefore should remain independent within a federal and cosmopolitan framework. 
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Although Grotius did not exclude the possible emergence and creation of a supranational 
authority (Pound, 1952: 80), he asserted that the states cannot limit themselves through a 
supranational authority as individuals do, since they do not have the same needs individuals 
have. Consequently, a supranational authority would be just an entity of mere force (Leamon, 
1982: 83), but with neither any real polity, nor with a real citizenship below, and therefore 
doomed to fail. This element has remained central in the subsequent developments of 
internationalism, which tend to favour intergovernmental arrangements over transfers of 
sovereignty towards supranational authorities and excludes attempts to reproduce elements of 
statehood (Kant, 1795). 
In Perpetual Peace (1795), Kant set out how to establish permanent peace on a global 
scale. In his ‘Definitive Articles’ in Perpetual Peace (ibid.: 117-142), Kant stated the necessity 
to establish a supranational polity modelled on three levels of constitutions: constitutions at the 
national level governing relations among people within nations; a constitution at the 
supranational level setting the relations among states; and a constitution embodying the 
relations between states and individuals. Kant also stated that every country should be 
republican (i.e. in this context not republican as with a republican form of government, but 
simply non despotic and with a clear division of powers), and that the law of the nations should 
be founded on a federation of free states. Kant recognised that states were central on the world 
stage, and that federation was the most suitable model of polity. He also acknowledged that 
according to the general understanding of international law, states by no means desired to give 
up their “savage limitless freedom” (ibid.: 136) and yield to the coercion of public law. They 
refused to do what the individual has done. Therefore, since establishing a world republic was 
impossible, a federation of free and republican states became the only solution available to 
bring an enduring peace. Consequently, the federation becomes the negative substitute of a 
world republic. In Kant’s proposal, republican and federal ideas are strictly connected. 
However, Kant’s ideas of a federation of free republics was not new, almost a century 
earlier in 1677, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz advocated the existence of a Res Publica Christiana 
(Riley 1996: 111-12), founded on common religious and moral principles and based on a 
society of Christian nations. By contrast, the Kantian federation would have been a secular 
system, and potentially extendable to the whole world, whose foundational ideology was 
republicanism: i.e. a clear division of powers, and the liberal principle of tolerance and mutual 
respect. Kant’s proposal was much closer to Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s (Frey, 2012), which, 
nonetheless, was limited to Christian European nations only. 
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Although Kant, together with Hamilton, is generally considered as one of the main 
thinkers and founders of contemporary federalism, (Castaldi, 2014), he neither provided a 
comprehensive and clear definition of this federation of free states, nor a precise definition of 
its degree of federalism or statehood. This lack of definition allowed different interpretations 
of the role of the states and of the federal authorities. Undoubtedly, the model Kant presented 
is much more than a simple society of states or an alliance, by being at the same time a negative 
substitute of a single state. Although Kant has always received the plaudits of the academic 
world, the latter almost entirely ignored, or dismissed, his political thought during the 19th 
century.  
The goal of internationalism is the combination of the principle of national sovereignty, 
on one side, and creating an international community, on the other. Bull, (1977), whose theory 
found its roots in the Grotian tradition, (Cutler, 1991), was very critical of Hobbesian theories 
in international relations as well as Kantian cosmopolitanism, although he probably 
misunderstood the Kantian distinction between federation and republic (Hoffman, 1986). Bull 
(1977) stated that tolerance and mutual understanding were necessary in fostering the 
international society  
A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of 
certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they 
conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one 
another, and share in the working of common institutions (Bull: 1977: 12). 
Bull apparently did not explore any possible development towards any kind of supranational 
federalism, and somehow defended the system of sovereign states as being the most functional 
way to preserve international peace and its laws. In general, Bull's goal was to try to assess 
international coexistence. Far from realism, idealism and constructivism, Bull created his own 
theoretical framework, but to do so, he accepted international anarchy as a structural element. 
Contrary to Hobbes, he tried to identify fundamental institutions that regulate international 
coexistence (Great Powers, balance, war, international law, diplomacy). Like every social 
system has given rules, these fundamental institutions are the institutions of international 
coexistence. Nonetheless, he singled out some elements that are consistent with federal 
principles and communities: mutual respect of independence and sovereignty, preserving and 
enforcing peace, tolerance for diversity (Burgess, 2012) but dismissed the idea of a 
supranational polity. 
By recognising the importance of the states as international subjects, internationalism 
put its focus on them as the main actors of the global community. By contrast, the 
federalist/cosmopolitan stream traditionally put its focus on developing stronger IOs, aiming 
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to make them develop into closer federal systems, according to Watts’ definitions (2008: 10-
11). Kant proposed a model based on developing a federation of states sharing the same 
structure and the same ideology. The dynamics between IOs of MS and the way they are 
organised internationally are important: they are connected. Federalist and post-Kantian 
theorists, most recently David Held (1995), Jürgen Habermas (1998), Daniele Archibugi 
(2008) and Lucio Levi (2005), have supported the idea of creating a democratic framework for 
global governance, and more efficient forms of federalism to address globalisation and 
problems like global warming, international terrorism, and tax evasion.  
The Kantian idea of basic republican principles and supranational constitutionalism 
found a very limited place in the League of Nations. Wilson’s proposal had a Kantian basis, 
since it aimed at having a membership of national and liberal democratic states, but his proposal 
failed to address the issue of limiting sovereignty by sharing it through common institutions 
and legal enforcement mechanisms. Nonetheless, his proposal represented a first step in 
creating an international framework for enduring peace. 
By questioning the neorealist definition (Waltz, 1985), which describes international 
relations as anarchy, internationalism supports the idea of an international society, whose key 
actors are the states. Everything states do in international relations is not just for idealism, to 
create a more peaceful world, but mainly for self-interest. Internationalism recognises this but 
argues that international and perpetual peace is in the interest of all states, weaker and stronger 
alike. International peace is the best scenario for states to preserve their sovereignty and their 
welfare. Accordingly, sovereign states should act following a rational calculation of costs and 
benefits both in the long and in the short run. This rationality implies that long-term and high 
politics, (Hoffmann, 1995; Saurugger, 2014), prevail over short term and low interests, and 
political bargaining in IOs becomes the measure of influence and power of the member states, 
and hence the main decision-making moment in the international community. By recognising 
the importance of international society, advocates of internationalism also support the need to 
develop these elements. Internationalism used to support the development of IOs, of 
international law, as well as more interdependence between the members of the international 
community, and encouraged transnational initiatives. Therefore, internationalists adopt the 
Grotian tradition of international relations, while rejecting more universalist Kantian 
interpretations. Internationalism asserts and supports the existence of an international society 
based on moral principles, common values, mutual respect and prudence (Cutler, 1991), but 
even if it accepts very limited degrees of federalism, the acceptance of nation-states as main 
actors remains undisputed. It tends to discourage protectionism, since trade is regarded as one 
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of the main bonds among peoples and countries. In the last few years, international 
organisations and international law have tended to promote other kinds of actors beyond states: 
individual citizens, NGOs and multinational companies.  
Nonetheless, internationalism (in its liberal developments) tends to put people as well 
as states on the same level (Nye, 1992). Halliday (2008: 70), considering the socialist motto 
“proletarians of the world unite!”, wrote that the motto was about combining different national 
organisations, rather than forming a single, global one. The same could be said in regard to 
internationalism: it is not focused on forming a single polity, but rather on structuring different 
polities in a single forum, without creating any new form of polity.  
Similar tendencies could also be found within the Kantian and the post-Kantian 
traditions. On one hand, by accepting the role of states as main actors in international relations, 
and accepting the idea of global federation as unachievable, they abandon the cosmopolitan 
foundation of Kantianism, and adopt a more Grotian and constructivist approach. However, 
even if these traditions do not rule out that international society could develop in terms of 
federalism towards a closer model of federal system, they assert that federal experiences among 
states are more likely to happen among states which share certain common cultural elements, 
and a precise geographic location. On the other hand, international federalists since the end of 
WWII remained very critical of internationalism (Reves, 1947). Paradoxically, their criticism 
of internationalism is much closer to realism and Hobbesian theory. For federalists, the 
development of a world federation remains fundamental, because the anarchical international 
society is doomed to fail, since the governments would always put their national interest before 
humankind’s interest (Albertini, 1979), and because in a globalised economy, the markets need 
global laws (Levi, 2012). 
There are different reasons for such diverse opinions. The first is the lack of will within 
MS to limit their own sovereignty, as well as the difficulties in finding compromise among 
them. Specifically, in the case of the United Nations (UN), in its origins, the USA and USSR 
were both strongly exceptionalist and sovereignty-focused in their political agenda. Both 
presented themselves as the frontrunners of two incompatible ideological, political and 
economic systems. From its foundation, the UN became more and more a state-based system. 
The new countries born from the decolonialisation process tended to be protective of their 
sovereignty, and to be generally more sceptical about power-sharing, while new powers like 
Brazil, China, India, and post-Soviet Russia tended to develop and pursue their own agenda 
according to traditional forms of national interest. Consequently, internationalism could also 
be described as the highest degree achievable of cosmopolitan integration in a context of 
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different levels of economic development, diverse cultural and religious identities, forms of 
government and states, ideologies, and interests. Keohane and Nye (1977) questioned the idea 
that international anarchy necessarily implied the absence of institutions based on rules. 
Internationalist scholars and theorists refuse the trade-off between chaotic anarchy and 
supranational governance. The IOs like the United Nations or the World Trade Organization 
are essentially a product of this ordered and peaceful anarchy, made of intergovernmental 
relations and transnational links in terms of trade, cultural exchanges and NGOs initiatives.  
More specifically, from a dynamic and Fredrichian point of view, liberal 
internationalism and IOs are specific outcomes of federalism, and the result of different 
applications of shared rule and self-rule, a product of different specific purposes the MS have. 
Additionally, from the same point of view, federal theory may explain, in some very specific 
situations, the dynamics of international relations among sovereign states when it comes to 
economic, military and political integration at the regional level (Haas, 1958; Dosenrode, 
2007). As will be further explained in chapter 2, this implies that federalism still represents a 
valid methodology, not just for comparing different federal political systems, but also in 
explaining the integration process in the EU as well as other unions of states. When it comes 
to describing federalism as a stand-alone theory, this meets the criticisms of many scholars. 
Dosenrode, for instance (2010: 11) asserted that federalism might have at least a liberal and a 
realist branch: a liberal one, focused on the free will of member states to undertake a process 
of integration and federalisation, and a realist one, focused on the theory of federalism as a 
reaction to external coercion and enemies (Riker, 1964). Nonetheless, internationalism shares 
the same set of Kantian values of federalism in its stricter sense. Both prioritise peace and its 
conservation as their main purpose. Both share the idea of mutuality as a core principle for 
relations among political units, specifically when it comes to theories of horizontal federalism. 
Another main point is the mutual respect for each other’s independence and sovereignty. While 
realists assert the role of power as the main element in international relations, advocates of both 
federalism and internationalism, and of other looser forms of federal arrangements, assert the 
importance of equality and cooperation of actors within international relations.  
1.4 Confederations: the middle stage of federalism  
While being dismissed over the last decades as a hybrid form of government destined to either 
evolve towards full federation or to fall back to an interstate system (Forsyth, 1981; Watts, 
2008), the study of confederations has seen a comeback thanks to the development of the EU 
and the rising interest in supranational integration among other regional and macro-regional 
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organisations (Elazar, 1998). These include, for instance, the Association of East-Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the Andean Community 
(CAN), the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) and the African Union (AU). 
Confederalism, a term which describes a form of looser federal arrangements, and the ideology 
supporting it, represents an option for those countries seeking to develop more political and 
economic integration, and aiming at establishing a closer relationship inside a single 
organisation, but without giving significant sovereign powers to a “superior” authority (Elazar, 
1998; Watts, 2008). In confederations, the source of sovereignty remains in the hands of the 
MS. This does not mean that confederations cannot possess typical elements and symbols of 
sovereignty, and that they are strictly bound to a limited geographic dimension, and a common, 
ideological and cultural identity. Those elements make confederations closer to federal and 
national states. Switzerland developed its civic and national symbols in the Middle Ages and 
Early Modern Ages, while the Confederate States of America (CSA) had strong confederal 
symbols, which after the end of Civil War were adopted by some of the former Confederate 
States. Even now, the flags, the anthems, and the heraldry of the CSA are part of the regional 
identity of the states of the American South and unfortunately, they are very popular among 
American white supremacists. In the case of Germany, the confederal idea was linked to 
national identity and to the idea of unifying German-speaking communities under a single state. 
Although the institutions of the German Confederation (1815-1848 and 1850-1866) always 
remained weak, and subject to Austrian-Prussian dynamics, the German Confederation 
provided the framework for the creation of the German Customs Union (Zollverein) and later 
for the Prussian-led North German confederation.  
According to Watts, confederations  
occur where several pre-existing polities join together to form a common government 
for certain limited purposes […], but the common government is dependent upon the 
will of the constituent governments (2008: 10).  
Therefore, confederal governments have only indirect electoral legitimacy, and a limited fiscal 
base, as well as more limited rights of initiative in comparison to those of any federal 
government. Usually, their political agenda is set by the most influential and powerful members 
in terms of population, fiscal resources and military power. In many historical confederations, 
even though these were essentially military leagues, the military was only nominally under the 
control of the confederal government. Defence is shared with the MS, or is almost entirely 
under their control, depending on the constitutional arrangement. Historically, there were many 
cases of confederations of states: the most meaningful for this analysis are the United States of 
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America under the Articles of Confederation, the Swiss Confederation before the French 
invasion in 1798 and then from 1815 to 1848 under the Federal Treaty, the German 
Confederation, and the Confederate States of America.  
Federalism and confederalism have always been intertwined. As I will explain later in 
the thesis, for some authors (Elazar, 1998), confederal arrangements represent the only possible 
form of federalism between sovereign states, and as such confederations are the closest form 
of federal political system between constituent units which are unwilling or unable to fully and 
permanently pool the traditional functions of federal states. Confederalism also has a normative 
and ideological dimension distinguishing it from federalism: i.e. a form of constitutional 
arrangement, where confederal institutions are bound to the will of the constituent units and 
are functional to their interest, and therefore have no exclusive competences, limited in extent 
to that permitted by the member states. Confederations, and the confederal principles ruling 
them, might be interpreted as a stage in the middle of the spectrum in the development of 
statehood, standing between international organisations and federations. This implies that in 
the long term a confederation is always unstable: either it becomes a federation, or it collapses.  
History seems to suggest that this assertion is true. On one hand, the Republic of the Seven 
United Provinces became a unitary state under the hegemony of the House of Orange, while 
the Swiss Federal Government managed to remove veto power from cantons and implement 
federal civil law. The United States abandoned the Articles of Confederation in favour of the 
new federal constitution. In the Canadian experience, “the Confederation” means the process 
of federalisation of the federal dominion of Canada in 1867. On the other hand, the German 
Confederation ceased to exist because of internal competition between Austria and Prussia. 
Although its constitution and historical documents represent a model for understanding 
confederalism, the Confederate States of America ceased to exist after its defeat in the Civil 
War, and we will never know how it would have developed. However, some cases of confederal 
unions remain. Watts (2008: 55-56) showed these to be the United Arab Emirates and the EU. 
The former is the only successful case among the federal trials in the Arab world in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Applying Forsyth’s definition of union of states, these are “the intermediate stage 
between interstate and intrastate relations” (1981: 7).  
While nowadays scholars in federal studies agree that confederations and federations 
are different forms of federal political systems, the development of these definitions has been 
long subjected to historical accidents and different interpretations. It is possible to find the roots 
of this transformation over the last two centuries. Before the American Revolutionary War 
most political thinkers considered federalism and confederalism as synonymous (Burgess, 
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2006), and no one saw the need to mark a distinction between the two. The real dichotomy of 
“federalism vs. confederalism” emerged for the first time with the clash of ideas during the 
Philadelphia Convention and the Federalist vs. Antifederalists Debate in 1787-1788. In this 
debate Federalists opposed the Antifederalists’ arguments in favour of the new federal 
constitution and vice-versa. It is perhaps 1789 where we see a separation of confederalism from 
federalism (ibid.). The confrontation between Publius, on the one hand, and Brutus, the Farmer 
and the other writers on the other, was fundamental in shaping the different and distinct forms 
of government, and ideologies, that we now identify in federation and federalism on the one 
hand and confederation and confederalism on the other.  
1.4.1 The ideological foundations of confederations 
When Edmund Randolph opened the Federal Convention of 1787 in Philadelphia, certain 
weaknesses were immediately highlighted. These concerned the inability to secure the Union 
against external invasions, and the inability to enforce international agreements, as well as the 
lack of constitutional instruments to manage institutional crisis and quarrels between States 
(Madison, Larson & Winship, 2011). In addition, the lack of single legislation on trade and 
commerce, the impossibility for the Union to defend itself from the states, and the 
subordination of the Articles of Confederation to the constituent state constitutions (ibid.: 12-
14) were also discussed as some of the reasons of inefficiency. These elements weakened the 
Union and put its very existence in peril. The aim of the Federalists was to prevent any form 
of implosion, and the division of the United States into a system of sovereign states in 
competition and conflict among themselves, to prevent the fragmentation of North America, 
avoiding wars among sovereign republics, and to prevent any of these states from pursuing a 
hegemonic position over the others. Although their opponents shared the same purpose, to 
preserve the welfare and the internal peace of the Union, their visions on the future of the 
Confederation were completely different. 
In regard of the exchanges of opinion between Federalists and Antifederalists, Burgess 
(2006: 50), and Diamond (1961: 38-40) before him, wrote that this needed more accurate 
analysis. First of all, the positions among the ‘Antifederalists’1 were very heterogeneous. The 
opposition to the proposed Constitution was united on common elements, like an insistence on 
individual liberty, a support for the rights of states and their sovereignty, but there was not a 
 
1 This is a later label, coined many years after, which was based on their opposition to Hamilton. In reality, they 
were convinced federalists at the time, and they accused Hamilton of supporting the model of a unitary state for 
the US 
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common front in the position to oppose this plan with a counterproposal of the same magnitude.  
It is important to point out that not all the Antifederalists were assertive and unapologetic 
supporters of the Articles of Confederation, some  of them considered the Confederation a good 
form of government, whose Articles needed to be corrected in its most unclear or inefficient 
passages, while some others supported other proposals for a new US Constitution. Henry 
Patrick (1788) in a speech delivered to the Virginian ratifying convention, asserted that  
The Confederation, this despised government, merits, in my opinion, the highest 
encomium – it carried us through a long and dangerous war; it rendered us victorious in 
that bloody conflict with a powerful nation; it has secured us a territory greater than any 
European monarch possesses – and shall a government which has been thus strong and 
vigorous, be accused of imbecility, and abandoned for want of energy? 
Generally, the part most criticised by the same Antifederalists was the lack of common 
legislation in single policy areas, such as trade or naturalisation. In the antifederalist n.11 
Agrippa stated 
that Congress has not the sole power to regulate the intercourse between us and 
foreigners. Such a power extends not only to war and peace, but to trade and 
naturalization (Agrippa, 1787). 
The Antifederalists were aware of the weaknesses of the previous, confederal constitution, but 
were at the same time far more sceptical about the solution which Hamilton, Jay and Madison 
proposed. Similarly, some of them were aware that the failure of the Constitution could have 
led to the collapse of the Confederation.  
However, for the sake of argument, I will admit that the necessary consequence of 
rejecting or delaying the establishment of the new constitution would be the dissolution 
of the union, and the institution of even rival and inimical republics (The Centinel, 
1788).  
Diamond, for instance, stated that given the broadest definition of federalism, it was more a 
debate among federalists (1961, 38-40) supporting different visions and structures of the 
federation, than a debate between Federalists and Antifederalists. One of the authors of the 
Anti-federalist papers polemically used to describe himself as “Federalist”, in opposition to 
the others. The same purpose was represented by the “Federal Republican”, while another, the 
“Federal Farmer”, wrote that:  
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There are but two modes by which men are connected in society, the one which operates 
on individuals, this always has been, and ought still to be called, national government; 
the other which binds States and governments together […] this last has heretofore been 
denominated a league or confederacy. The term federalist is therefore improperly 
applied to themselves, by the friends and supporters of the proposed constitution. This 
abuse of language does not help the cause; every degree of imposition serves only to 
irritate, but can never convince. They are national men, and their opponents, or at least 
a great majority of them, are federal, in the only true and strict sense of the word (The 
Farmer, 1788).  
Some claim that this debate did not turn the United States from a league of states into a 
federation, but merely led the USA to dismiss an inefficient federal constitution in order to 
adopt a more efficient model (Wheare, 1963). Before the debate, Hamilton himself had used 
the terms federalism and federation in regard to the previous Articles of Confederation 
especially in the first Federalist Papers (Morison, 1925).  
Indeed, the same definition of “Antifederalists” was firstly applied by the Federalists to 
those who opposed the Constitution. The Farmer clearly stated the position of the 
Antifederalist faction in those years: the only true federation was one where all the constituent 
units remain sovereign in a bond, which is called a League or Confederacy. Federalism, as the 
solution supported by Publius, was not actually federalism, but a form of centralisation. The 
Farmer assertively stated that it was a debate between national men supporting the new 
constitution and federal men opposing it (The Farmer, 1788).  
A first differentiation of terminology, from the Antifederalist side, is contained in the 
Paper no. 18, where Old Whig (1787) described the new constitution as despotic and later stated  
that a republican government can exist only in a narrow territory. But a confederacy of 
different republics has, in many instances, existed and flourished for a long time 
together. [...] A confederacy of republics must be the establishment in America, or we 
must cease altogether to retain the republican form of government (Old Whig, 1787). 
In paper no. 40 the author a Farmer and a Planter highlighted the essential point of the 
ideology of confederalism  
What right had they to say, We, the people? My political curiosity, exclusive of my 
anxious solicitude for the public welfare, leads me to ask: Who authorized them to speak 
the language of, We, the people, instead of, We, the states? States are the characteristics 
and the soul of a confederation. If the states be not the agents of this compact, it must 
be one great, consolidated, national government, of the people of all the states (A Farmer 
and a Planter, 1788). 
After a heated debate, the State of New York  adopted the Federal Constitution, as did in the 
end all the other twelve states, and the Federalists, under the leadership of James Madison, 
managed to accommodate some of the points which made the Antifederalists more sceptical 
and critical about the institutional framework. The Bill of Rights represented a big concession 
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from the Federalist side towards Antifederalist demands. After the approval of the Constitution, 
many Antifederalists like James Monroe and Thomas Jefferson accepted the new constitutional 
framework, thus legitimising the federal institutions, but opposed the policies of the newly-
founded Federalist Party, while the most radical decided to withdraw from political activity or 
to continue at state level.  
The Antifederalists also had to accept the new Constitution for another reason: their 
inability to propose an alternative to the federal proposal. There were many disagreements on 
the way the Articles of Confederation could be amended, and on the future of the United States 
as a national entity. This lack of initiative and unity on the side of the antifederalists was the 
major element which allowed the Federalists to win the debate and shape American institutions. 
The victory of Hamilton, Madison and their followers was crucial in reshaping the terminology 
of federalism as we use it today.  
From this debate it is possible to define the first elements of the ideology and theory of 
confederalism: in this framework the confederal government is not sovereign, but is an agent 
of the governments, and therefore should be subordinated to the will of the confederated states 
(Wheare, 1963). For instance, while the federation has its own autonomous source of 
legitimacy and its own sovereignty, a confederation is defined as a union of sovereign states; 
its sovereignty is based on the will of the constituent units and therefore depends on the 
extension of the powers that these decide to concede to the confederal government (Forsyth, 
1981). The confederal government has no legitimacy by itself, but its legitimacy comes from 
the constituent units and relies on them (Watts, 2008). While in a federal system both federal 
and constituent units are sovereign at the same time, the constituent units are the sole 
depositaries of sovereignty in a confederation. This model of confederal governance was still 
quite popular among many Americans, even after the federal Constitution came into force 
(Calhoun, 1828), and only the military defeat of the Confederates in the Civil War weakened 
the supporters of this proposition.  
By contrast, the innovation of the Federalists was to create a new framework, which 
would give the new federation a chance to endure. It was not a league that the Federalists 
wanted to achieve, but a new and different form of federal government – within a democratic 
framework. 
It is possible to find further developments of the theory of confederations in the age of 
the war of secession in the US. The Preamble of the Constitution of the Confederate States of 
America stated that:  
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We, the people of the Confederate States, each State acting in its sovereign and 
independent character, in order to form a permanent federal government, establish 
justice, insure domestic tranquillity (CSA Constitution, 1861).  
The phrasing of the Preamble still contains an unclear distinction between federation and 
confederation, while the name of the same political entity was closely linked to the idea of a 
looser union of states, the preamble asked for the creation of a federal government. This 
Preamble somehow sounds very close to Article 2 of the Articles of Confederation:  
Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, 
jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the 
United States, in Congress assembled (CSA Constitution, 1861)  
but with a significant change: the commitment to the creation of a federal government. It is the 
reading of the whole text of the constitution which gives us a full understanding of it.  
Except for the Preamble, the Constitution of the Confederate States of America was 
apparently very similar to that of the Constitution of the United States of America (Currie, 
2004), but the Preamble gave the text a very different meaning. The Supreme Court of the CSA 
never came to life, due to the outcome of the war, so we will never know how the Confederate 
Constitution would have been implemented by the Confederate Supreme Court. Currie (2004: 
1266-1268) suggested that, at first sight, the structure of the Constitution is proof that the 
Confederates considered the federal form suitable for their own interests, but they just wanted 
a Southerner Federation with Southerner economic policies and the preservation of slavery.  
Therefore, the Civil War was not a conflict between Confederates and Federates, but 
between federalists with a different ideology, and political and economic agenda. This means 
that confederation, as a form of government, was already outdated among the Confederates, 
while it remained as a form of ideology. In contrast, in the words of Jefferson Davis, during 
his inaugural speech as first and only president of the Confederate States of America, the major 
reason for the conflict was the restoration of the legitimacy of the Rights of the States against 
the Union (Davis, 1861). Alexander Stephens, Vice-President under Jefferson Davis, explained 
the reasons of the war and the foundations of confederal theory:  
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That [The cause of the war] was the assumption, on the part of the federal authorities, 
that the people of the several states were, as you say, citizens of the United States, and 
owed allegiance to the Federal government as the absolute sovereign power over the 
whole country, consolidated into one nation. […] It grew out of different and directly 
opposite views as to the nature of the government of the United States and where, under 
our system, ultimate sovereign power or paramount authority properly resides.[…] On 
the part of these States, which had allied themselves in a common cause, it was 
maintained and carried on purely in defence of this great right, [of withdrawing from 
the Union] claimed by them, of state sovereignty and self-government, which they with 
their associates had achieved in their common struggle with Great Britain, under the 
Declaration of 1776, and which in their judgement lay at the foundation of the whole 
structure of American free institutions (1870: 28).  
Anson D. Morse (1887: 470-493), who gave a general overview of the causes of the Civil War 
some years after its conclusion, stated that, while the North considered the Union as a whole, 
single, national sovereignty, the South was composed of “independent sovereign states” which 
for “the sake of a better attainment of common interests” had created in the Constitution strictly 
limited delegations of powers to the federal government, which they could revoke at their will. 
For instance, while being a member of the Union, the states retained “their original sovereignty 
unimpaired”. Therefore, they had the same right to withdraw from the Union as any European 
country to withdraw from any league or alliance. 
The American case is not the only example of confederations developing into 
federations after a strong confrontation between supporters of a more centralised form of 
federal arrangement, and a looser one. The other important case of a confederation that turned 
into a federation is that of Switzerland; the development of Swiss confederation into a 
federation. The first Swiss Federal Charter, signed in 1291, asserted that  
in every case each community has promised to succour the other when necessary, at its 
own expense, as far as needed in order to withstand the attacks of evil-doers, and to 
avenge injuries; to this end they have sworn a solemn oath to keep this without guile, 
and to renew by these presents the ancient form of the league, also confirmed by an oath 
(Swiss Federal Charter, 1291).  
Some years later, in 1370 six cantons, signed the Pfaffenbrief, in it the cantons considered 
themselves to be a single unit: the Eidgenossenschaft (Jackson, 1908).  
Switzerland is the European example of transition from being a league of cantons to a 
federal state. In a similar way to North America in the 1860s, Switzerland became, in the 1840s, 
the field of confrontation between the supporters of the sovereignty of the cantons and the 
supporters of federal authority. This conflict, which eventually led to the Sonderbund War, 
started over disputes regarding the role of the Church and of the Catholic clergy in cantonal 
politics. In this debate, the Catholic cantons acted against the progressive ones, in defence of 
the old privileges of the Church. Soon it was no longer a conflict over the role of Jesuits in 
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education, but whether the Eidgenossenschaft could continue to exist as a single political entity 
(Forsyth, 1981). 
Disagreements regarding the future of the Swiss political system arose just after the 
defeat of Napoleon. Two different coalitions of Cantons supported different draft 
Constitutions, respectively led by Zurich and Berne, one modelled more on the Helvetic 
Republic, the other on the pre-Napoleonic Confederation. The intervention of the Great Powers 
prevented a civil war from breaking out, and compelled the two factions to reach a compromise. 
The Federal Treaty was therefore a solution, which combined the demands of the cantons 
supporting a complete reversion to the status quo ante, with those cantons supporting the 
institutional innovations introduced by Napoleon in Switzerland.  
The Federal Treaty defined the Swiss political system as a Bund, a league of sovereign 
cantons. The confederal authority remained responsible for the army. As such, the only policies 
that were implemented at the federal level were security and defence.  
It is worth remembering that the Old Eidgenossenschaft faced many threats to its 
existence throughout the centuries. During the 16th and 17th centuries, the cantons had to settle 
many peace agreements between themselves, and eventually made a first attempt to establish 
a single defence system through the Defensionales of Wyl and Baden (Domeisen, 1978), thus 
gradually neutralising interreligious conflicts and preventing the involvement of Switzerland 
in the Thirty Years’ War. This was the reason why both the Great Powers, and the Swiss 
representatives in the Federal Diet, prohibited in the Federal Treaty any alliance among cantons 
against the others. Article 6 of the Federal Treaty clearly stated that: “Cantons may not forge 
coalitions amongst themselves that are harmful to the Federal Treaty or the rights of the other 
cantons” (Swiss Federal Treaty, 1815). Once the secret Sonderbund pact was discovered, the 
separatists openly acted against the treaty. That argument was very favourable to the Swiss 
federal authorities in their reaction against the Sonderbund, thus preventing any external 
intervention by conservative powers in support of the secessionist cantons. 
While on one hand the Federal Treaty could be considered a good example of a 
confederal framework, in which the confederal authority was limited to a single policy area, 
the new framework which emerged after the Sonderbund, can however, be considered a 
federation. 
The Swiss federal constitution of 1848 stated that the people of the 22 sovereign cantons 
of Switzerland, united through the present union, collectively constituted the Swiss 
Confederation. Article III stated that  
   
 
52 
 
the Cantons are sovereign, so far as their sovereignty is not limited by the Federal 
Constitution, and accordingly they exercise all rights which are not delegated to the 
Federal power (Swiss Federal Constitution, 1848).  
In this constitution, the independent sovereignty of the federal authority is recognised, whereas 
in the Federal Treaty of 1815 that was not stated. In the Federal Treaty sovereignty is applied 
in regard to the cantons. The passage of the Eidgenossenschaft from a confederal structure to 
a federal one was made possible by limiting the sovereignty of the cantons, while recognising 
a distinct and limited sovereignty of the federal government.  
The Federal Constitution of 1848 was a fundamental step in limiting the role of cantons 
in the military, and the usage of Cantonal Militias. From 1848 onwards the federal government 
became the sole legitimate user of military power, and the sole representative of the Swiss 
nation.  
Another step towards the federalisation of Switzerland was the Federal Constitution of 
1874. Article 3 stated that “The Cantons are sovereign insofar as their sovereignty is not limited 
by the Federal Constitution and, as such, exercise all rights which are not entrusted to the 
federal power” (Swiss Federal Constitution, 1874). This represented a clear step towards the 
federalisation of Switzerland. Later, in the Article 6 regarding the cantonal constitutions, the 
constitution asserted that “The Cantons are bound to request the Confederation to guarantee 
their constitutions.” 
The final and definitive step towards the federalisation of Switzerland was represented 
by the entry into force of the Swiss Civil Code in 1907, unifying the different legal systems in 
the federal cantons, and ending the legal fragmentation of the federation. Switzerland remained 
a confederation, but in name only; it maintained the ancient official name of Eidgenossenschaft 
and its latin translation of Confoederatio Helvetica, but is a federation in all its developments 
and with its own particularities. 
Following the Swiss, German and American experiences, the understanding of the 
differences between confederation (Staatenbund) and federation (Bundesstaat) was finally 
developed in the last decades of the 19th century. As already discerned, Sidgwick mentioned 
the two terms in his masterwork (1903), as two different expressions of federalism (or 
federality, as he defined it). He was not alone in investigating the American, Swiss and German 
confederal experiences. Forsyth found that Tocqueville and his followers (1981: 136) played a 
meaningful role in developing the study of federations and confederations in Europe during the 
19th century. In Democracy in America Tocqueville was able to introduce the developments of 
American federalism to a European audience, thus sparking a debate in the academic world.  
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The study of federalism and federations as separate political systems was met with interest, as 
well as some resistance, among European scholars. Max von Seydel asserted that, since 
sovereignty was considered indivisible, federal states did not actually exist (1893: 17), with on 
the one hand only unitary states and on the other confederations. Therefore, according to von 
Seydel’s interpretation federations represented a hybrid category that did not stand up to fact-
checking. His theory about the lack of difference between the unitary state and federal state, 
and the confederation as a separate body, had been proved erroneous, but has had some limited 
success in the academic world at the time. Scholars like Le Fur and Haenel (Forsyth, 1981: 
138) accepted that federations were closer to unitary states than to confederations. Le Fur, for 
instance, insisted that federations shared the same federal elements as confederations and gave 
this definition of confederations: “An organisation of sovereign states in which the central 
power has its own legal personality and permanent organs” (Le Fur, 1896). In this way, Le Fur 
highlighted the presence of a form of central government, permanent organs and legal 
personality as the main element, which distinguished confederations from alliances. At the 
same time, Le Fur stated that confederations, in the same way as leagues, have no common 
people to represent, and no single polity, but each state represented its own people; 
confederations do not have their own citizenship (ibid.). Other points Le Fur highlighted were 
the ultimate rights of the states to secede, or nullify the confederal government. Le Fur also 
stated that in a confederal system, confederal institutions have, or should have, an external 
sovereignty, but stated that internal sovereignty belongs to its members. Therefore, confederal 
executive institutions rely on the cooperation of their states to implement their decisions and 
legal acts. Le Fur stated that in confederal systems, a federal judicial organ would be necessary 
to settle disputes, but they are adjunct elements, not essential (Forsyth: 141). In a final 
comment, Le Fur asserted that confederations were not permanent states, and that they were 
doomed to either become full federal states or to collapse.  
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Figure 2 Confederations according to Forsyth (1981) 
Some decades later Carl Schmitt (1965: 369), argued that the common element in 
confederations and federations is the “duty” to settle every dispute through  legal processes. 
So, confederalism shares with federalism the presence of some shared-rule and self-rule, and 
the concept of sovereignty pooling. However, the fact that the confederal government is 
somehow subject to the will of the MS, and has limited sovereignty, makes confederations a 
different, specific outcome of the process of federal-state building. In this framework 
confederalism, as a different normative and ideological principle, represents the kind of 
federalism that those constituent units, which want to be more integrated among themselves 
and have closer bonds and federal arrangements, but are still unwilling or unable to form a 
state, are able and willing to embrace.  
Currently, other than Switzerland, that keeps “Confederation” as official definition 
even if, as argued, is a federation in all but name, (Burgess, 2006) another country maintains 
strong confederal elements in its structure. Although the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is now 
considered a federal country, it is one of the existing federal systems that maintained strong 
confederal elements and has a very recent confederal history. In the UAE the decisional powers 
still belong to the most powerful emirates, Abu Dhabi and Dubai, which exercise a veto power 
over the other member Emirates, over the federal authorities, and especially inside the Federal 
Supreme Council, which is made up of the rulers of the member emirates and is the supreme 
organism of the UAE. According to the UAE Constitution, The Council retains supreme control 
over all the affairs in general, appoints the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union 
and decides on defence and foreign affairs. Inside the Federal Council Abu Dhabi and Dubai 
play a dominant role, which could in some ways be compared to France and Germany in the 
EU. Disagreements between the two emirates led to a delay in the merger of their own armies, 
and the full creation of a UAE army had to wait until the 1990s. Although a federation by name, 
the democratic process inside the UAE remains very weak. One half of the National Council 
is appointed, by the rulers of each emirate, while the other half is indirectly elected by their 
own college. The lack of internal democracy, as well as the strong intergovernmental structure 
of the Supreme Council, are two elements that make the UAE a federation with strong 
confederal elements, a hybrid system (Watts, 2008) if not the only surviving confederation. At 
the same time, the history of the UAE might be highlighted as an interesting example of federal 
state-building and development from a pure confederal framework, to a federal one, even 
though confederal, intergovernmental elements still remain strong.  
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Additionally, many scholars (Church and Dardanelli, 2005) agree that the EU is the 
federal political system that had gone furthest in adopting the main characteristics of a 
confederal system. However, as I discuss in the thesis, there are enough federal elements so 
that this assessment is not entirely applicable to the current framework of the EU, and it is even 
less applicable to the Eurozone.  
1.5 Federations: the final stage of federal state-building 
Federations represent the ultimate stage in the spectrum of Federal political systems. 
Federations are the closest to the model of unitary state and the most distant from the model of 
international organisations. Federations may seem the most developed, mature and complete 
form of federal political system, and represent the institutional application of what Wheare 
(1963) defined as strict federalism, which in its turn is the most structured development in the 
idea of shared rule, whose final outcome is a creating a federal polity together with the polities 
of the constituent members.  
As already mentioned, many scholars have given different definitions of federalism. 
Friedrich defined federalism as  
the process of federalising a political community, that is to say, the process by which a 
number of separate political communities enter into arrangements for working out 
solutions [...] on joint problems, and conversely, also the process by which a unitary 
political community becomes differentiated into a federally organized whole. Federal 
relations are fluctuating relations in the very nature of things (Friedrich, 1968: 7).  
Wheare defined it as a method of dividing the power across central and regional governments, 
so that every level of government is in its own sphere “co-ordinate and independent” (Wheare, 
1963). Hamilton and Madison, as highlighted before, were among the first to use the word 
federalism to advocate the existence of a sovereign federal power and sovereign constituent 
units, both with different competences. There is no exclusive definition of federalism, but there 
is an overwhelming consensus on the fact that federalism advocates the establishment of non-
centralised polities, while accommodating the autonomy and diversity of their constituent 
units.  
Although the roots of federalism as normative principle date back to the Middle Ages 
and medieval forms of territorial autonomy and territorial leagues (the Swiss federal pact was 
one of those, others were the Hanseatic League, the Veronese and Lombard Leagues in 
Northern Italy), the ideology of federalism had its first codifications during the European 
Renaissance and the early Modern Age. Francesco Guicciardini (1540), Johannes Althusius 
(1603), Samuel von Pufendorf (1672), and Abbé de Saint-Pierre (1713) made significant 
contributions in developing the main elements of federal theory, but it was thanks to Kant 
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(1795), and Hamilton, Madison & Jay’s Federalist Papers (1788) and their influence, that this 
developed into the current theories of federalism. The study of federalism and federal systems 
thrived in Europe, and especially in the Anglo-Saxon world, during the second half of the 19th 
century. Supranational and continental federalism enjoyed a renaissance, especially in Britain, 
whose political thinkers and policy makers had to deal with the enormous dimensions of the 
Empire (Roy Smith, 1921). Federalism was applied in the development of Canada (1867) and 
Australia (1901), and meanwhile federalist proposals met with interest from British politicians, 
intellectuals, and policy makers, interested in new forms of governance for their vast Empire. 
The Imperial Federal League was founded in 1884, with the purpose of advocating a reform of 
the Empire, modelling it on the Dominion of Canada and transforming it into a global, Anglo-
Saxon federation (Burgess, 1995) 
Interest in federalism as a peace-resolution and peace-keeping tool had four different 
phases of development. The first one dates back to the period between WWI and WWII. This 
age gave birth to the League of Nations, to Aristide Briand’s proposal for a European 
federation, the creation of the Federal Union group in Britain (Mayne, Pinder & Roberts, 1990), 
and Count Kalergi’s Paneuropa movement in the German speaking countries. This period saw 
the birth of Federal Union in the UK, the first syndicate of intellectuals to study and advocate 
for federalism (Lothian, 1935). The second phase started with the birth of new movements that 
called for the unification of Europe in the post-WWII period, the start of the integration process, 
the birth of think-tanks like the World Federalist Movement (Lent, 1955; Baratta, 1989, 1999) 
but also with the birth of the United Nations and its Charter (Baratta, 1987; 2004). The third 
phase emerged with the end of the colonial era in the 1960s, with the rise of conflicts in post-
Colonial states, and the search for new institutional and political instruments to manage highly 
divided societies and political units. The fourth phase dates to the collapse of Post-communist 
systems, and the necessity to manage conflicts and ethnic diversities in those countries that 
emerged from the fall of the Soviet Union and its satellites. 
The end of the Cold War represented a period of renewed interest for federalism as an 
instrument to share decision-making, governmental functions and also for developing 
supranational bodies. The failures of the United Nations to cope with the Bosnian and Rwandan 
crises in the 1990s, and the progressive changes in the post-Cold War situation, sparked a 
debate about the need to reform the United Nations towards becoming a more inclusive, 
efficient and accountable structure. The same debate affected the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), especially when it came to its role in the Former Yugoslavia and in the 
‘war on terror’. Most recently, the introduction of the Euro, the introduction of the Treaty of 
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Lisbon, and the turmoil of the Eurozone sparked heated discussions about the future of the EU 
and the application of asymmetrical federal principles. This thesis will indeed focus on this 
topic. In addition to the sovereign debt crisis and the governance of the single currency, the 
debate on differentiated integration and enhanced cooperation has re-emerged with regard to 
the migrant crisis, and the demand for a different management of the Schengen area as well as 
the demands for different degrees of EU integration. Other than Brexit, the rise of nationalist 
forces is deepening the debate between those who oppose European federalism and further 
integration (and indeed support a rollback of integration), and those supporting it.  
According to Watts’ definition, federations are “compound polities, combining strong 
constituent units and a strong general government” (2008: 10). Watts stated that 27 countries 
met the criteria for a functioning federation. All the federations taken into consideration, not 
only by Watts, but also by scholars like Burgess and Kincaid, have some of these points in 
common. Firstly, at least two levels of government exist, each with its own independent and 
democratically elected parliament or assembly and head of government, and each with its own 
competences. Secondly, following the Schmitt definition of federal bond, a Constitutional 
Federal Court whose decisions are binding shall exist, or the federation must have a system or 
another institution playing the same role as the Constitutional Court, as the case is in 
Switzerland or Ethiopia. In a federation, each level of government has its own democratic and 
fiscal legitimacy. Additionally, although fiscal autonomy of constituent units is a fundamental 
principle of federations, federal authorities apply redistributive policies between constituent 
units. Thirdly, traditional elements of sovereignty, like defence and foreign policy, are 
performed at federal level. Similarly, monetary policies are carried out by a single, 
autonomous, central bank on the federal level. Indeed, the competences and roles of federal 
governments and constituent units are distributed according to their Constitution.  
Lastly, an extensive and close-knit civic, cultural, and even national identity must exist 
in order to increase the chances for a compound and complex polity like a federation to succeed. 
Burgess used to call this “the federal spirit” (2006, 2012) and explained it as the “bonds that 
unite the political community – the reconciliation of individual and collective needs that bind 
the political community” (2006: 113). According to Law, (2012: 114) it is possible to draw a 
distinction between a federal state and a federal union according to the degree of unity of the 
peoples of the constituent member states, i.e. if there is a single demos or many demoi 
(Nikolaidis, 2013). Despite this differentiation, a federation survives when civic, federal 
identity, exceeds and integrates ethno-national distinctions.  
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Federations are systems of polities. Some argue that in confederations, the existence of 
the confederal polity depends on the will of any single MS of the confederation. Conversely, 
in federations the existence of the federal polity is not a product of the will of the constituent 
units in the same way as in other looser forms of federal political systems. Federal governments 
and civil services have an agency that does not depend on the will of the MS. While any country 
has the right to withdraw from an international organisation or a confederal system, secession 
is not permitted in many existing federations, with the only exceptions of Ethiopia and Saint 
Kitts and Nevis and, despite the absence of specific provisions in the Constitution, Canada. In 
the particular case of Canada, the Supreme Court in 1998 ruled that unilateral secession was 
illegal except in the case of a referendum agreed by all parties. The Clarity Act of 2000 settled 
the procedure regulating secessions of Canadian provinces. It has also been argued that a 
Canton might secede from Switzerland simply on the basis of constitutional amendments. In 
the United States, the 1869 Supreme Court case of Texas v White declared unilateral secession 
illegal; secession was only allowed in the case of revolution or by the consent of all parties. 
This then undermines the claim that federations are distinguishable from confederations on the 
ability of states to leave.  
Putting aside its contested classification, the EU contains a withdrawal clause, Article 
50, allowing states to withdraw, even unilaterally, from the Union. Single polities, whether MS 
or other constituent units, do not cease to exist in federations, but co-exist with the federal 
polity, and state sovereignty. The latter comes to life because of a voluntary act by constituent 
units, but from the moment the federal polity is born, both have their own dynamics, 
interactions, and developments. In a federal constitution, both levels are sovereign, each in its 
own field. Both levels of government have their own electoral base and source of legitimacy. 
Generally, in federations, the source of legitimacy is two-fold: the whole electoral body of 
citizens, which elects the lower house and the federal president in presidential federal systems, 
e.g. the USA and Brazil, and the constituent units which appoint or elect the representatives in 
their own upper house. In federations, the federal government has an internal and external 
sovereignty and has the corresponding mechanisms to exert it. Similarly, the MS have their 
own internal sovereignty and their external sovereignty, as much as is envisioned by the 
constitution.  
In many federations, asymmetries are a recurrent element (Stepan, 1999). As will be 
further discussed in chapter II, asymmetries occur when one or more constituent units condition 
relations with the other constituent units or the entire federal structure (Watts, 2008: 121), 
because these prevail, or have significant differences in terms of geographic size, gross 
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domestic product (GDP) and fiscal revenues, or population. In international relations 
asymmetries have always existed. Similarly, political and constitutional asymmetries exist in 
international organisations and confederations. In the United Nations, the five permanent 
members of the Security Council, by retaining veto power and permanent membership, 
represent a constitutional asymmetry. For instance, in international organisations countries 
with more resources, diplomatic prestige, soft and hard power will probably obtain more in 
diplomatic negotiations, and in conditioning the decisions of international organisations. 
Despite having a confederal government which should represent, and guarantee, all members, 
in confederations major constituent units can exercise a hegemonic role and in the end direct 
the decisions of authorities, in the same way to what happens in international organisations. 
Even though constituent members retain high degrees of autonomy, federations have a 
constitutional role to provide redistributive policies and cope with internal asymmetries. The 
supremacy of federal law, the autonomy of the federal budget and taxation, as well as 
democratic legitimacy, all offer federal authorities constitutional tools to limit the autonomy of 
constituent units. Nonetheless, many federal systems have developed forms of constitutional 
asymmetries, for example, Quebec’s status in the Canadian federation. Watts highlighted other 
cases of asymmetric federations: India, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Malaysia, Belgium Comoros 
and Saint Kitts and Nevis (Watts, 2008).  
Diverse cultural and ethnic elements are most likely to trigger asymmetrical relations 
in federal systems. Again, Quebec falls in this class of case studies, with special specific 
arrangements guaranteeing a greater autonomy and protected cultural rights relative to the rest 
of the country (Gagnon and Laforest, 1993; Gagnon 2004). Bosnia-Herzegovina is actually 
divided into two entities, the Bosnian federation and the Republika Srpska of Bosnia. Belgium 
is divided into three different regions, and three different communities (i.e. language areas) 
with different linguistic backgrounds. Asymmetrical arrangements in federations have 
intrinsically a double outcome. Although they are a tool for settling internal issues and 
managing potential conflicts due to ethnic diversity, and gaps in economics and population, 
and have succeeded in accommodating separatist pressures and differences within federal 
systems (Watts, 2008: 130), in the long run they could also become a destructive force and lead 
to major dysfunctions. By adding elements of variable geometry or variable speed, the federal 
institutional framework becomes more complex. But in some cases in which federations have 
major difficulties in developing a consensus and the “federal spirit” (Burgess, 2012), and in 
which constituent states manifest different political agendas, this remain an alternative to 
collapse. 
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From an institutional perspective, confederations and international organisations are 
generally considered to be more vulnerable, and more fragile, than federations. This is because 
unlike federations, they have fewer elements of sovereignty and statehood, but federations, like 
any other federal political system, might suffer from the same pathologies that may lead to the 
collapse of the former. In the last century many federations have come to life and then expired. 
Some may qualify as collapsed federations, like Yugoslavia (2003), Czechoslovakia (1993), 
the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic (1991), Nonetheless, there are some elements that 
challenge such a statement. First, these types of federations did not qualify as federal; these 
cases, especially the Soviet Union, but also Tito’s Yugoslavia, were federal only by name. In 
fact, they were authoritarian systems, single party governments with no political pluralism, 
which did not develop intergovernmental relations as in a functional federal system. The 
absence of true territorial autonomy, of political pluralism, and of democracy, are all reasons 
why we should qualify these systems as non-federal or only formally federal. The relationship 
between the federal system and party allegiance was so strong that, in these cases, when the 
communist regimes collapsed the federations collapsed as well, and reverted to different 
sovereign states. The systems lacked the democratic requirement that is fundamental for the 
existence of federalism, and in the end these federations were more an example of “putting 
together federalism” (Stepan, 1999).  
In other cases, countries like Cameroon (1972) or, the United States of Indonesia 
(1950), reverted to unitary states after short federal phases, mostly because of the emergence 
of dictatorships for whom federalism was an obstacle to their agenda. The Democratic Republic 
of Congo (1967) never managed to federalise, since it immediately fell prey to civil wars. The 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1963), the West Indies Federation (1962) (Etzioni, 
2001), as well as the French Federations of West Africa and Equatorial Africa, undertook their 
development during the colonial era, but ceased to exist shortly after their independence. 
Pakistan faced a major crisis with the secession of East Pakistan (Bangladesh), while Singapore 
represents the only example of expulsion of a federative unit from the federation (Franck, 
1968).  
Franck (1968), Watts (2007), as well as other scholars (Burgess, 2012), highlighted that 
federations may fail because of a lack of political consensus and federal citizenship, i.e. the 
lack of a federal demos, the inconsistency and unsustainability of the federal structure, the 
inability to cope with internal asymmetries (Tarlton, 1968), and the lack of a federal culture 
and spirit (Burgess, 2012). The cases of the failure of the Soviet Union (and Yugoslavia) to 
develop a functional, federal structure, which could survive the fall of communism and the 
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dismissal of federalism in countries after authoritarian takeovers, are taken as a proof that 
democracy and federalism are inseparable. 
At the same time federalism and federations represent two different concepts, even if 
they are strictly related. Here, as King argued, ‘although there may be federalism without 
federation, there can be no federation without some matching variety of federalism’ (1982: 76). 
As King went on to argue, any federation without federal principles would simply cease to 
exist as a federation, and move into the category of unitary or devolved states (depending on 
whether some form of concession of local autonomy is given), without necessarily dismissing 
its democratic principles. Unlike federations, federalism is also a normative principle that may 
have applications other than organising the government of a federal state. The case of the EU, 
as it will discussed in the next chapters, but also the case of other international organisations 
and regional organisations, as well as older confederations, prove that there are different forms 
of federal arrangements underpinning the relationship between member states and among a 
single authority and the MS, even if the polity they form together is not a state, or a state in 
traditional sense. The case of the EU as “federalism without federation” has already been 
argued by Burgess (Burgess, 2009; Hrbek, 2015). Similarly, cases like Spain or Italy prove that 
federalism can exist or coexist inside the same state even if the state is formally non-federal 
(Palermo & Woelk, 2007). This thesis will not cover Spain, Italy or other cases, but just 
mentioning them is sufficient to demonstrate the notion of federalism without federation. More 
specifically, federalism is present in the Eurozone’s governance, as will be analysed in chapter 
IV, after a process of development that it is that of federal state-building.  
1.6 The concept of federal state-building 
The federal political systems reviewed and analysed above represent potential outcomes of 
different federal arrangements. Federal principles, under different circumstances, purposes, 
actors and ideological backgrounds give different outcomes, even if they might be all framed 
as processes of federal state-building; these end up at diverse destinations, or may be 
interrupted or abandoned by their proponents. As previously mentioned, federal state-building 
is a process of creation of states based on federal principles (Keil, 2012, 2013; Keil & Bransden, 
2015; Kincaid, 2019). This differs from simple state-building, or rather this could be defined 
as a subcategory of state-building; federal state-building specifically refers to processes of 
state-building that are based on the application of federalism as a normative, constitutional and 
administrative principle and, more specifically, that emerges as a tool for peace-making.  
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In instances of state-building, researchers consider the dynamics of the creation of a 
state’s structures, administrative bodies, law-making and law enforcement, security and 
defence and economic development, in a specific territorial unit (Tilly, 1985; Linz, 1993). 
Sometimes, these units can be the result of a very long process or newly created after a conflict 
(Fukuyama, 2004; O’ Dwyer, 2014). Recently, the concept of state-building has become tightly 
bound with the notion of nation-building (Fukuyama, 2004), which is instead the process of 
the creation of a body of subjects or citizens, sharing a common identity and a shared loyalty 
towards the state, which are bound together by belonging to a common, shared identity and 
common elements. Those elements can be a common language and literature, common religion 
or spirituality, common traditions, and a common constitutional identity and political 
traditions. These two concepts have become so intertwined that the term nation-building has 
frequently been wrongly used by journalists and politicians (Ashcroft, 1995: Bush, 2003, 
Feldman 2004) as a synonym for state-building. This misunderstanding is typical of the 
traditional Western and European mindset, that links the existence and legitimacy of the state 
to the existence of a nation underpinning it. This is specifically true for the European tradition 
of the nation-state, where state-building and nation-building coincided. Nevertheless, even if 
they are mistakenly used in an interchangeable way, these two concepts are not interchangeable 
(Linz, 1993; Hippler 2005; von Bogdandy et al. 2005; Goldsmith 2007; Scott 2007), and it is 
very important to highlight the difference between the two terms. State-building is about 
building and establishing or  
restoring and rebuilding [specifically after a conflict] the institutions and apparatus of 
the state, for example the bureaucracy. By contrast, ‘nation-building’ also refers to the 
creation of a cultural identity that relates to the particular territory of the state (Scott, 
2007: 3).  
As mentioned before, despite having different meanings, nation-building and state-building 
have been so inseparable in the European and western experience (Tilly, 1975; Linz, 1993), 
that it even seems beyond question that the success of one by necessity relies on the success of 
the other.  
However, as I will explain, this is not always the case, especially when it comes to 
multi-national states (which are not being investigated in this thesis) or, in this case, that of a 
supranational federal political system, a union, representing the case of the creation of state 
elements at the supranational level. Multi-national states represent the greatest exception to the 
entanglement between state-building and nation-building. In fact state-building might be a 
strategic path to ensure a successful nation-building process, and vice-versa a form of shared 
identity binding together the same group of people in a specific geographic area can make the 
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process of State-building successful; Indeed, in the absence of a single and coherent ‘feeling’ 
of nationhood, the process of state-building might be more difficult, and therefore require to 
be separate from the concept of nation-building (ibid.). 
The concept of state-building, and its difference with nation-building, already existed 
in the 19th century, emerging from the debates on the Italian (d’Azeglio, 1867; Capri, 1878;) 
and German unification cases, and then with the emergence of new states in the years after. 
More recently, in the post-WWII context, state-building was linked to the process of rebuilding 
the administrative structures in the former Axis countries and other occupied territories (Ghani, 
Lockhart & Karnahan, 2005; Ghani & Lockhart, 2008; Varisco, 2012). The great wave of 
colonial emancipation in the 1960s and 1970s added a significant number of new states into 
the international scenario. 
 These new states emerged during the Cold War, with both the USA and the USSR 
aiming at establishing and supporting friendly regimes, often modelled after capitalist (but not 
always liberal democratic) or communist (and totalitarian) principles. State-building became 
popular again with the fall of the Soviet bloc, with the emergence of new states from the ashes 
of that world, and the establishment of new regimes and new wave of liberal-democratic 
revolutions in many formerly authoritarian states. The last wave of state-building attempts was 
started in Iraq and Afghanistan, during Bush’s ‘War on Terror’; currently attempts for agreeing 
new constitutional arrangements are under discussion for Syria, Libya and Yemen, always 
under tremendous difficulty, and with more and more likelihood of failure than success. 
Some scholars have sought to define the process of state-building in a scientific and 
methodological way. Tilly (1975) took the historical experience of the European nation-state 
as a benchmark for describing the process of state-building. Tilly explained that, traditionally, 
the process of state-building in Europe was violent, and it proceeded in four steps, that he 
summarised in the following order: war-making, state-making,  protection and extraction. For 
war-making, Tilly defined the process as the elimination or neutralisation of potential external 
rivals; for state making, the process entailed the elimination or neutralisation of rivals inside a 
state’s own territory; and for protection, the process of elimination or neutralisation of the 
enemies of client states or allies. In addition to these first three activities, the state must be in a 
condition to pursue the last step, extraction, the capability and capacity to carry out the three 
activities, by raising taxes, imposing internal order, conscripting troops and soldiers and 
maintaining a standing army. Tilly defined the state as  
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An organization which controls the population occupying a definite territory is a state 
in so far as; (1) it is differentiated from other organizations operating in the same 
territory; (2) it is autonomous; (3) it is centralized and (4) its divisions are formally 
coordinated with one another (Tilly, 1975: 70).  
Nevertheless, as this thesis will demonstrate further, Tilly’s description has some limitations. 
Additionally, his description of state-making is that of a violent process, going hand in hand 
with war-making (Leander, 2003) and for this reason, it cannot be applied to processes started 
in different ways and in different historical circumstances. 
In fact, even if Tilly’s analysis might be particularly true for describing how European 
national states were formed from the Middle Ages until the 20th century, a broad spectrum of 
cases of state-building exists. Linz (1993: 355) not only clarified the difference between nation-
building and state-building, but also gave a broader definition of it: in reality, given that a state 
does not always correspond to a nation and vice-versa, it would be more appropriate to talk 
about the “United States Organisation”, rather than “United Nations Organisation”, as states, 
and not nations are the actual actors on the international stage. The European experience is 
peculiar, because in most cases, the process of state building matched that of nation-building 
or, as Linz (ibid.: 356) reminds us, the process of nation-building only came about after the 
process of state-building was concluded. By contrast, the equivalence between state-building 
and nation-building is not necessarily true for all cases of state-building, and as Linz explained 
(ibid.: 359), the modern, liberal state is based on citizenship, on rights and duties, and loyalty 
to the constitutional system, but not always emotional identification like language, religion or 
values, even if these elements are still present and still play an important role in nation-states. 
The national identity is an internal, psychological element, whereas the state can exist “on the 
basis of external conformity with its rule” (ibid.: 360). 
Another strong challenge to the equivalence attributed to nation and state-building came 
not just from scholars like Linz, but also, as previously mentioned, from the case of the new 
countries emerging from the collapse of European colonial empires, and after the collapse of 
the Soviet bloc (Linz & Stepan, 1996). In these cases, the gap between the concept of state-
building and that of nation-building was traditionally greater, or it was even developed through 
a transposition of Western cultures onto local cultures. Additionally, in cases where multiple 
ethnic groups coexisted within the same state boundaries, the connection between nation-
building and state-building represented more of a source of tension than an element of cohesion 
and legitimacy. In these cases, decoupling nationhood and statehood, and distinguishing 
between an ethnic nationhood and a constitutional, civic nationhood represented the only way 
forward to avoid internal conflicts and preserve the territorial integrity of the new-born states.  
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It is in this framework that attempts of federal state-building were made. Countries like 
Ethiopia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq, and Nepal faced a process of state-building, frequently 
under the guidance of the international community. Other countries, like Nigeria, are still 
undergoing a process of federal state-building and stabilisation, even if sixty years have passed 
since their independence. Another case, Mexico is still finding a balance in its federalisation 
process. In Europe, Belgium represents a case of federalisation, and subsequent transformation 
into a binational country. For some authors, notably Mark Berger and Heloise Weber, this 
almost seems to suggest a contradiction between the process of nation and state-building on 
the one hand, and the coming into existence of a globalised transnational order since the 1980s 
(Berger & Weber 2006: 202-203). Although it is true that over the last decades, there was an 
attempt to roll back the role of the state (Thatcher, 1988), and to let market forces drive the 
process of globalisation, it is also true that there has never been so many states now, there has 
never been so much demand for a democratisation of globalisation, for a return of the role of 
the state (as expressed by the nationalist movements emerged in the 2010s), and there have 
never been so many regional initiative for regional integration, not just in Europe but also 
elsewhere, constantly aiming at reproducing, at the regional, supranational level, core elements 
of traditional states: internal free movement, internal security, currency union and the rule of 
law, just to mention some elements. 
In conclusion, processes of federal state-building are not just cases of the constitutional 
reconstruction of a country after conflict. This definition would be limiting. The category of 
state-building might also include federalisation and the development of federal states. As this 
chapter has explained, what happened in the United States or in Switzerland, and also in Canada 
or other existing federal states, can be qualified as processes of federal state-building. In this 
context, federal state-building refers to all processes of creation or rebuilding the institutions 
and the apparatus of a state according to the principles of shared-rule and self-rule (Elazar, 
1987), joint action and self-government (King, 1982). For these reasons, it is reasonable to 
demonstrate that the process of European integration is exactly a process of federal state-
building which is currently going on at supranational level, as Friedrich, and Etzioni years later 
have argued.  
From this point of view, the creation of the European Communities in the 1950s, and 
their merger into the EU with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, might represent a case of federal 
state-building (Pinder, 1996; Keil & Bransden, 2015), not in a top-down approach and in the 
framework of previously existing polities, but as a bottom-up approach, where previously 
existing states, constantly in competition and emerging from the ashes of WWII, decided to 
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come together in a form of federal association. As I will explain, the process of European 
integration challenges these approaches, and represents an attempt to recreate at the 
supranational level the core elements of traditional, federal states. The most advanced of these 
elements is the case of EMU. The EU qualifies as a case of federal state-building, since it is a 
process of creation of a political system designed along the principle of “unity in diversity”, 
which is typical of federal political systems.  
I am conscious of the fact that many authors have failed to make this leap, and indeed 
are still uncomfortable, for ontological or methodological reasons, to apply the paradigms of 
state-building to a process of transnational integration. Notwithstanding this scepticism, this 
thesis aims to demonstrate that the paradigm of state-building, especially federal state-building, 
can be applied to a reality like Europe after WWII. European integration was more than just a 
process to reconcile different communities, living in the same region (in this case a sub-
continent) and sharing common tragedies and experiences and a common history, despite 
cultural or ethnic differences. As we will see from the founding documents of the European 
Community, European integration is a process of creation of elements of statehood, and all the 
institutions that are typical of a state: an administrative body, a single supreme court, a single 
market and a single currency, a supranational parliament, elements that, as Burgess (2000) 
highlighted, are typical elements of traditional federal states. In this process, the EMU is the 
most mature example of federal state-building in the EU.  
The main controversy, nevertheless, and the main obstacle for the adoption of the 
paradigm of federal state-building might be found in the nature of sovereignty. Sovereignty has 
a specific importance in this analysis. Without this dividing line of sovereignty, any form of 
federation, whether a “weak federation” (Moravcsik, 2001) or “loose federation” (Wallace, 
1996) would merely constitute a confederation. Law (2012) stated that federations should not 
be considered as a single and uniform model, but should be divided into two categories: federal 
unions of states and federal states, with the former having fewer elements of statehood than the 
latter. It seems that such a distinction could be both politically and legally valid, especially 
since the Federal German Constitutional Court asserted the existence of a Staatenverbund in 
its evaluation of the EU (German Constitutional Court, 2009), i.e. a more united form of 
confederation that, at the same time, is not yet a federal state. In this framework, the stage of 
the “federal union of states”, instead of being a distinct intermediate stage, should be 
considered either a confederation with more evident elements of statehood, or a form of 
federation on its own, if it already has some form of federal sovereignty.  
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By contrast, this analysis should include the idea that sovereignty, as the non-
traditionalist, post-Westphalian theories of sovereignty assert, does not necessarily remain 
anchored to the traditional Bodinian vision. Again, as a matter of fact, a form of state-building 
at the supranational level, including many national groups, might necessarily develop different 
forms of sovereignty and statehood. They are still forms of sovereignty and statehood, even if 
they do not match the traditional benchmark. As such, even if it might be true that the EU is a 
form of “federalism without federation” (Bomberg, 2008), it is also true that, if federalism is 
also federal state-building in a dynamic sense, the EU is a federal political system under 
construction. For this reason it is important to prove if the EU and the Eurozone are two 
different form of federal political systems, or rather two different steps in the same process of 
federal state-building, with the hypothesis that the Eurozone, following the concept of a Core 
Europe, after the introduction of the Euro and the changes due to managing the sovereign debt 
crisis, reflects a model of federalism that is closer to that of federal states, thus, making the 
Eurozone a more advanced stage of federalism and federal state-building inside the EU.  
In conclusion, state-building and nation-building are different definitions, that should 
not be confused or used in an interchangeable way. The term ‘state-building’ has become more 
and more popular for describing a process of reconstruction of constitutional orders and 
administrative apparatuses in post-conflict realities, especially when it comes to states 
emerging from colonial experiences or from civil wars, or foreign military occupations. 
Nevertheless, this definition is not complete, since it leaves out the process of formation of the 
modern state in Europe. Those processes are in fact not only processes of nation-building, but 
state-building. In this case, federal state-building deserves a specific, distinct, definition, as a 
sub-category of state-building. In fact, the definition of federal state-building refers to a process 
of state-building modelled on the principles of combining self-rule of subnational communities 
and shared rule through a central, federal government. Federal state-building is applied to those 
realities, where territorial autonomy of specific ethnic or cultural groups within a state must be 
granted, while preserving and promoting the territorial integrity of the polity. That being said, 
it is also crucial to have a closer look at the triggers and reasons that spark the beginning of 
processes of federal state-building, and lead to different outcomes in the spectrum of federal 
political systems.  
1.7 The origins of federalism 
In his work “Comparative federalism”, Burgess (2006: 76) distinguished between the concepts 
of the origins of federalism and the formation of federalism. According to Burgess, and as 
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previously highlighted, federalism originates for two reasons: security and defence on the one 
hand, economic and commercial on the other, with security and defence historically playing a 
major role (Riker, 1964; Forsyth; 1981; Burgess, 2006). Consequently, Burgess individuated 
two models, two archetypes for the process of federal state-building: the archetype of the 
Custom Union, Zollverein, and that of the Military Union, Kriegsverein. Therefore, a coming-
together federation can start and develop through one of these paths or both. It might be argued 
that the EU falls into the case of a federal union which emerged through the economic path. 
The military integration of the Union is in fact a more recent process and it comes after a long 
hiatus, after the plans for the European Defence Community were wrecked in the 1950s.  
As previously mentioned, together with those two archetypes, there are two ways for 
federations to be created. One model is normally referred to as “coming together federalism” 
(Stepan, 1999); this is a process of federal state-building, where the constituent units develop 
from a state of separateness to a being bound within an overall constitutional arrangement. In 
Elazar’s words, it is a passage from a state where there is just self-rule, to a state where there 
is self-rule and shared-rule, or using King’s definitions, it is a display of “centralising 
federalism.”  The second, opposite process, is called “holding together federalism” (ibid.), and 
this is the division of powers between a government on the one hand, and other constituent 
units on the other, sometimes occurring in a process of transfer of competences or devolution, 
with the purpose of maintaining the unity of the state, especially when economic, cultural, 
ethnic or simply just geographic diversities happens to exist inside the same territorial unit. 
Again, in Elazar’s terminology, ‘holding-together federalism’ means the passage from one 
rule/shared rule to the coexistence of shared rule and self-rule, while King defined the process 
in holding-together federations as decentralising federalism. In this case, and as already 
highlighted throughout this chapter, this thesis treats the “coming-together” side of federalism 
rather than the “holding together” one.  
There are different theories on the origins of federalism, that are in some way linked 
with the existing theories of European integration.. Riker’s theory on the origins of 
federationshas a connection with intergovernmental theories, since a grand-bargain among 
constituent units represent the starting point of federations. . Similarly, it is impossible to 
disconnect neofunctionalism from federalism since, especially in the European case, 
Dosenrode (2010), links Riker’s and David McKay’s (2010: 15) theory of origins of federations 
to a realist branch, whereas he associates Burgess and Elazar to a liberal theory on the origins 
of federalism. In this conceptual interpretation, the “realist” explanation is essentially linked to 
defence, power politics and security, whereas the “liberal” explanation aims at pointing to trust, 
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mutual agreement, shared cultural elements, as well as economic development as the main 
elements behind the origins of federalism. As the thesis will assess further, Riker’s excessive 
focus on defence was strongly criticised, even if his theory of federal bargain remains important 
in the federalist analysis (Elazar, 1987, 1998; Burgess, 2006; 2012). At the same time, we can 
find a sort of incremental (Pinder, 1985) or gradual federalism (Albertini 1977a; Pinder 1986, 
1993, 1997, 2000; Castaldi, 2004), that has been, over the years, associated with 
neofunctionalism.  
The idea that the uniting of Europe could only come through a grand bargain between 
MS is as old as the idea of European integration, and emerges in the federalist literature itself. 
In fact, the Schuman declaration is about a grand bargain between MS on pooling coal and 
steel production. The mutual consent of constituent states is a key element of Kant’s Eternal 
Peace. The covenantal element of Elazar’s definition of federalism (1987) underlines the 
importance of mutual trust and shared-rule as key elements of federalism. Nevertheless, in the 
case of European integration, federalism and intergovernmentalism have sometime been 
considered to be in opposite positions. Spinelli himself, in his second federalist manifesto The 
Manifesto of the European Federalists, (1957) attacked the pro-Europeanism of governments 
as a form of fake federalism, where integration was seen as nothing more than an instrument 
of MS to serve their self-interest.  
In the federalist literature of the 1960s, a landmark contribution in assessing the 
federalist outcome of intergovernmental agreements was made by Riker. Among the many 
research topics he tackled during his academic life, Riker also dealt with the topic of the origins 
and development of federalism and federations (Riker, 1964). This theory, that represented an 
important contribution for relaunching the debate on the origins of federations at the time, was 
later criticised by many authors (Burgess, 2006; 2012). In his theory, Riker explained that 
federations originated from a grand bargain between constituent governments, and that such 
arrangements were mainly driven by military and security concerns. Riker’s analysis, as I 
mentioned, was strongly criticised for being too focused on security and military expansionism 
as sole reasons behind a successful development of a coming together federation. Whereas 
Riker’s theory was based on a very specific hypothesis, he was one of the first political 
scientists who made an attempt to explain why federations emerge and manage to survive, and 
develop a consistent theory. Nonetheless, his explanation is not satisfactory; even if mutual 
defence might represent a very strong drive for unity, it is not the only one, and perhaps not 
even the strongest (Burgess, 2012). 
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There are some pre-existing conditions for a looser federal political system, like a 
league or a confederation, to become a federation (Riker, 1964; Burgess, 2006). Riker 
compared eighteen successful federal states and nine cases of failed cases, and he made two 
hypotheses for the success of a federation. The first hypothesis is for a grand federal bargain, 
which occurs when its political class, or a constituent part of it, agrees to give up some 
independence in return for territorial expansion, sometimes with the purpose of anticipating or 
preventing external military or diplomatic threats. The second hypothesis is that this occurs 
when the political establishment, or one of its constituent parts, accepts a loss of independence 
for the sake of the union due to external threats or risks of aggression.  
In both cases, Riker put his focus on military and security concerns as the main driving 
force behind the success of a federation. Riker put all his focus on expansionism, the will of 
the federal polity to extend its borders beyond the original one, and defence against external 
enemies; but dismissed notions like common interests (as a reductionist fallacy) or common 
values (as an ideological fallacy), (Volden, 2014), as insufficient conditions for the successful 
development of a federation. In reaction, most of the scholars working on federalism and 
federations have rejected Riker’s conclusions, and shown that other reasons existed (King, 
1982; Davis, 1979). For instance, Birch (1966) proved further grounds for the success of a 
federation: first, ‘the desire to deter internal threats and the willingness to have them deterred’ 
(Burgess, 2006: 78). Another criticism is that Riker essentially based his theory on the US 
experience, by focusing on the expansion towards the West and the need to protect the USA 
from Britain and other European powers in the first decades of the young republic, and then 
the Axis and the Soviet Union in the 20th century (Riker’s analysis was limited to the timeframe 
1786-1964, the year of publication of the book), but failed to broaden his analysis. The EU, 
(Volden, 2004), in fact represents a strong antithesis to Riker’s theory, both because economic 
integration represented the main driver (McKay, 1996: 2004), and secondly because, as McKay 
pointed out, the EU emerged in the absence of, and thanks to the lack of, an external or internal 
threat (Burgess, 2000). The case of the EU instead is proof enough that freedom of circulation, 
economic interdependence, and common values are elements that might lead to a federal 
outcome as well. 
However, as already demonstrated, and as will be analysed further in chapter III, 
Riker’s conditions were not satisfied in the case of the EU. The project of a defence community 
failed in 1954 with the rejection of the Treaty on the defence community, to leave the stage to 
NATO and the Western European Union, a watered-down version of the previously planned 
European Defence Community. This situation continued until 2017 with the activation of 
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Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). By contrast, the fact that the EU, despite its 
weaknesses and dysfunctionalities, managed to emerge as an economic union with a 
supranational citizenship and institutions mirroring federal ones, represents a strong challenge 
to Riker’s hypothesis (Burgess, 2006) As previously mentioned, even though Riker maintained 
a focus on military and defence concerns as the main driving forces behind the origins of 
federations, the driver of economic purpose is actually very important in the origins of the 
USA. The United States of America represents a case of economic union and mutualisation of 
war debts, right from the very beginning of the American federal experience. Hamilton, the 
founding father of the new republic and front-runner of the Federalist Party, pushed for a strong 
and close economic union, through the mutualisation of war debts, the creation of a federal 
treasury, nation-wide trade agreements, and, last but not least, the creation of a central bank 
(Einaudi, 1945; Chernow, 2004). Therefore, as already assessed by other authors, like McKay 
and Burgess, Riker’s analysis in the end does not match the historical facts.  
Therefore, there is not only a military drive behind the emergence of confederations 
and federations, but a system of many elements. Mutual defence and security is one of these, 
but not the only, driving one, as Riker’s analysis might suggest.  
As Burgess underlined, in his same theory Riker argued that the act of coming together 
(Stepan, 1999) remains a ‘political bargain’ (Burgess, 2006: 49, 176). By contrast, Burgess 
highlighted that coming together federalism is much more than a simple bargain between 
constituent units. Coming together federalism is in fact “also based upon mutual recognition, 
tolerance, respect, obligation and responsibility” (ibid.: 49). Drawing from this, we can see that 
the intergovernmental aspects of European integration, and in a broader sense of federal state-
building, go beyond a mere intergovernmental dimension. It has deeper aspects, reaching down 
to both political and economic roots, but also a narrative and value-driven dimension. This is 
the reason why a more holistic approach for studying the origins and development of 
federations and federal political systems should be embraced. 
As mentioned, Riker’s theory on the origins of federations is in some ways akin to 
Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmental theory. Despite all its limits and later additions, Riker 
tried to explain the birth of federations as an outcome of intergovernmental bargains. For this 
reason, we can compare Riker’s theory on the origins of federations to other theories explaining 
European integration as the result of intergovernmental agreements. Here, we can give a federal 
perspective to intergovernmentalism in the process of federal state-building of the Eurozone 
and the EU.  
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In relation to Riker’s theory, liberal intergovernmentalism starts from a similar 
hypothesis, the grand bargain, but extends its own horizons, because it does not limit the 
intergovernmental bargain to specific reasons. In fact, liberal intergovernmentalism explains 
that integration occurs when states agree on it, after they calculate their domestic political 
preferences in relation to the need of further integration, thus, freeing the idea of the bargain 
from the constrictions of Riker’s theory. The main difference, however, is that Riker’s 
approach starts from the hypothesis that the outcome of the bargain is the creation of a federal 
state, whereas in liberal intergovernmentalism, the federal outcome is not always considered 
to be the final outcome (most times it is not, partly because the optimisation of national, 
Member States’ self-interest is considered the final goal). Even if liberal intergovernmentalism 
might be seen in strong competition with federalism (Ash, 2002; Topal, 2017), in a teleological 
and ontological perspective, (if we consider the Union merely as an international organisation 
where countries uses integration to maximise their own benefits and not as a starting point to 
achieve federalisation), in terms of federal state-building there is a connection between liberal 
intergovernmentalism and Riker’s theory on the origin of federations.  
In terms of coming together federalism and federal state-building, Riker’s theory on the 
origins of federations gives us a perspective on the importance and the role of the 
intergovernmental bargain in the process of federal-state building, and on the fact that mutual 
agreement among constituent states remains a core element for a successful federal state-
building.  
WhileRiker’s theory of bargains explains EU integration through intergovernmental 
dynamics that somehow touches intergovernmental theories, incremental or gradual federalism 
explains the building of Europe as succession of small steps that could eventually lead to the 
birth of a federation (Pinder 1985), In a way, this is close to the ideas behind neofunctionalism 
(Castaldi, 2007). Neofunctionalism explains the integration as a result of a process of spillover. 
Additionally, in situations of crisis, under conditions of highly developed interdependence, and 
in the presence of a solid supranational civil service, supranational organisations are capable 
of asserting a supranational interest (Albertini, 1999; Schmitter 2005: 258), in a process that 
could be described, by quoting Monnet, of federalism as ‘the only answer to a state of crisis’ 
(Monnet, 1974). It is indeed Jean Monnet the political figure, whose initiatives are mostly 
associated with a gradual and incremental, step by step federalisation of Europe (Pinder, 1985), 
first with some specific policy areas like economics and then, gradually involving more and 
more areas (with the exception of the initiative for the European Defence Community, defined 
by Monnet himself as a shortcut (Monnet, 1978: 343, Castaldi, 2007: 17) 
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Neofunctionalism was born as a theory of European integration almost simultaneously 
with the beginning of the European Community system. Since then, neofunctionalism has 
experienced difference phases in which it became neglected even by its own promoters (Haas, 
1954), but enjoyed a renaissance in the 1980s and 1990s, with the new phases of European 
integration that evolved from the Single European Act of 1986, and then with the 1991 Treaty 
of Maastricht. Monnet had always insisted that the European Community was a “supranational, 
in other words a federal institution” (Mason, 1955: 123). In other words, the architect of Europe 
always stressed the importance of assessing the ECSC and the EEC as a federal project (Haas, 
2004: 34).  
Haas played a major role in assessing neofunctionalism as an EU integration theory, 
and in drawing the lines of what was later called the “Monnet-method” and whose guidelines 
can be found in the Schuman Declaration  
Europe will not be made at once, nor according to a single master plan of construction. 
It will be built by concrete achievements, which create de facto dependence, mutual 
interests and the desire for common action (Schuman, 1950).  
While Mitrany, the father of functionalist theory in the interwar period, was very critical 
towards both pre-determined targets (Mitrany, 1965), and the application of federalism to vast 
and diversified regions, like continents and macro regions, Haas adopted a different 
interpretation of neofunctionalism, not least because the European Communities, under 
Monnet’s political and intellectual guidance, represented the application of sectorial integration 
within a specific geographic area, so consistently different from Mitrany’s approach who, by 
contrast, advocated a mere sectorial approach (Mitrany, 1965). 
Haas stated at the beginning of his monumental The Uniting of Europe that his purpose 
was to distance himself from both those realist theories that fetishised power (2004: xiv), and 
at the same time the refusal of Kantian idealism, based on the concept that it was as unnecessary 
as it was naïve. This is also the first point of conflict between federalism and neofunctionalism 
as interpreted by Haas. So much so that Haas puts functionalism and incrementalism in 
opposition to federalism and comprehensive planning (ibid.: xv). Haas explained how 
Sandholtz, Stone, Sweet and Fligstein, “applied a more open-ended variable than original 
Neofunctionalism” (2004: xx), and accepts their points. Although this could introduce more 
flexibility in the neofunctionalist paradigm, the rejection of federalism as process and purpose 
would ultimately lead to a misunderstanding. The Monnet method was only one of the ways 
for creating the condition of European unity, and therefore of a federal polity, and although it 
can be assessed otherwise, in this case it will be assessed in its original, federal meaning. Other 
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interpretations of European neofunctionalism would be misleading, at least when applied to 
the European context after the creation of the Community. Therefore, instead of removing the 
federal state as final outcome of European integration, neofunctionalism can be incorporated 
into federalism under the banner of gradual and incremental federalism because regional 
economic integration is interpreted as a process of the creation of a new, supranational polity.  
In the current formulation of neofunctionalism, from an ontological point of view, 
federalism remains “state-centric”, since it is more focused on the “state-building” dimension, 
while neofunctionalism identifies a “community-model” (Burgess, 2000: 37), which aims to 
create a form of supranational union. Although this ontological difference is the main 
distinction between federalism and neofunctionalism, the two do not conflict. Both the 
“Spinelli Method” and the “Monnet Method” should be considered as two complementary 
pathways in the same process: the first as the pursuit of constitutional moments in supranational 
institutions (Glencross, 2009), the second as the process of functional spillover through the 
transfer of responsibilities at the supranational level, and consequently the empowerment of a 
related civil service. Dosenrode (2014) suggests that the main argument is that while federalism 
is more focused on classic constitutional moments, as happened in the USA, Canada and other 
classic federations, neofunctionalism focuses on slow transfers of sovereignty and economic 
processes. Nonetheless, this is the reason why a comprehensive theory of federalism should 
include neofunctionalism as a paradigm in the process of federal state-building. Although Haas 
himself, and Schmitter after him (2005) posited that neofunctionalism does not necessarily set 
a precise outcome of the integration process, or rather that the outcome can change on the basis 
of political will and shifting conditions, neofunctionalism has adopted many elements of 
federalism, while federalism does not exclude neofunctionalism. Spillover, and incremental 
steps through economic integration, are normally understood to be necessary steps towards any 
form of supranational union, however they do “not fully explain the process of political 
integration” (Mutimer, 1989: 100-101). Neofunctionalism explains dynamics that allowed the 
EU institutions to pursue a major role in economic integration, but it does not explain the 
political reason. As Tranholm-Mikkelsen highlighted (1991: 16), the Delors Commission 
applied neofunctionalist instruments to pursue a federalist agenda; and so did Monnet in the 
creation of the ECSC. Creating a single market was not a purpose per se, but a necessary step 
toward the creation of the “Ever-closer Union.”  
For these reasons, neofunctionalism is not going to be dismissed in this thesis. It will 
be considered as part of federalism. In this perspective, spillover, and incremental transfers of 
competences, will be considered as part of a long-lasting constitutional evolution of the EU 
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towards a federal union. By following this conceptualisation, we can avoid the classic 
misunderstanding of the dichotomy between “incremental federalism” (Pinder, 1986: 41-54) 
and Spinelli’s “Hamiltonian” federalism. 
In the perspective of federal state-building, incremental federalism  represents a strategy 
to pool resources and governmental functions in a pragmatic way, creating the conditions for 
further advancements in constitutional terms, when political conditions or willpower are 
missing (Albertini, 1977).  
Federalism is not a static concept, similarly federalism is not a static moment, but a 
dynamic process of state-building. It is, in the words of Burgess “both a dynamic process and 
a goal to be attained” (Burgess, 2000: 28). If I could make this comparison, federalism is not a 
single picture but a film. We could analyse just one film frame, but it would be a mistake to 
just consider that single piece alone, while ignoring the entire film. The model that I am 
adopting is that of federalism as a dynamic combination of shared-rule and self-rule, on the 
one hand and federal spirit on the other hand, that might have a centralising trend (i.e., coming 
together federalism) or a decentralising one (holding together federalism). In the case a 
supranational scenario as much as in a regional system, the process of federal state-building 
starts from the absence of shared-rule; i.e a system of states to a federation (the difference 
between union of states or a federal state is not relevant) and this is determined by the quality 
of the federal spirit and the combination of shared-rule and self-rule.  
More specifically, the success or failure of a process of federal state-building depends 
on different factors. A strong political willpower by the political élite and the consent of citizens 
are important in determining the survival or the collapse of a federal system. Similarly, 
common interests and cultural and economic similarities might play a meaningful role in 
determining whether a federation will thrive. More generally, there should be a common 
ground that, for pragmatic or ideal reasons, fosters the desire for unity. 
When a common national background is missing, other elements might play a 
significant role. Michael Burgess (2012), when describing the federal spirit made a list of 
different values and principles that make the existence and the success of a federation possible. 
It is a moral dimension, encompassing human dignity, liberty, equality, justice, empathy, 
tolerance, recognition and respect. 
From a constitutional point of view, this translates into autonomy, partnership, self-
determination, comity, loyalty, unity in diversity, entrenchment, and mutuality (Burgess, 
2012). This is why federations can survive: thanks to a form of “civic (or liberal) nationalism”. 
Under such a model, national features are not shaped by ethnic or cultural elements, but by the 
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rational adoption of a set of civic (or liberal) values on a voluntary basis. Attachment to a set 
of constitutional values that shape the character of its citizenship – i.e. constitutional patriotism 
– is also a factor that allows federations to thrive. 
As previously mentioned, when it comes to policy areas, two are the traditional 
archetypes of union: that of security, military union and that of an economic union. 
Nevertheless, other more recent policy areas, like for instance health, energy, climate policies 
might as well represent archetypes for a form of supranational state-building and likewise, 
these processes might not go ahead simultaneously. Should the EU ever become a federation, 
its success would depend on the ability to combine the principle of “unity in diversity” with 
some of the traditional characters of statehood. As I will demonstrate later, despite some 
difficulties and flaws, the process of monetary integration represents the most successful case 
of this process. 
1.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I aimed at reviewing the most important and relevant definitions of 
federalism. The purpose of this chapter was that of linking the concept of federalism with that 
of state-building, and highlight how federalism can indeed be a form of state-building, in which 
the core guiding principles are shared rule and self-rule (Elazar, 1987) and in which federalism 
is the core ideological and normative principle of the constitutional order. Some scholars fail 
to agree on a single definition of federalism, and even if there is a consensus on what federalism 
is, there are many different perspectives on federalism among them. Some authors like Elazar 
(1987) gave broader definitions, while Wheare (1960) originally opted for more restrictive one. 
By adopting an interpretation of federalism as a dynamic and multi-dimensional principle, as 
discussed in Friedrich (1969), it is possible to have a broader spectrum of its different degrees 
of the application of federalism: i.e. a broad spectrum of different federal political systems 
(Sidgwick, 1903; Elazar, 1987; Watts, 2007; Law, 2012; Fabbrini, 2015). Although the 
application of federal arrangements may not necessarily lead to the establishment of a 
federation as outcome (King, 1982), and may lead to failures or develop into different forms 
of federal political systems, the prospect of a European Federation was the long-term objective 
of European integration, as witnessed by the founding documents of the European 
Communities and the Treaty of the European Union. The thesis highlights that, under different 
circumstances, the outcome of this process might have been different. International 
organisations, confederations and federations are three archetypes of federal political systems, 
but federalism is a lively, dynamic process, and especially when it comes to the case of the EU 
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and the Eurozone, we will see elements of statehood typical of federal states coexist with 
elements of confederations. This will be assessed in chapter III.  
The chapter then investigated the process of state-building and its relationship with 
federalism. I highlighted that federal state-building is a specific category of state-building, 
where federalism is the core principle behind it. Moreover I showed how approaches of federal 
state-building were applied in many post-war realities, like Ethiopia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(Keil & Alber, 2020), and can be applied to a process of supranational political integration like 
the EU (Keil & Bransden, 2015). The process of European integration, with the building of a 
Union resembling a state in its institutional configuration, represents a process of federal state-
building. This will be further analysed in Chapter III. To proceed towards this direction, I also 
needed to highlight how necessary it is to separate the concept of state-building from that of 
nation-building.  
As we have seen so far, there are different elements that may be crucial for the 
successful development of a federal political system into a federation. Some elements might 
go under the realist definition: i.e. security and defence. Other go under the liberal definition: 
economic welfare, strong commitment towards unity by the political elite, a strong sense of 
community by the citizens of the constituent units, transcending national or subnational 
identities, common cultural and political elements overcoming the differences (Franck, 1968, 
Burgess, 2006; 2012) This means that a political elite underpinning the federal political system 
for strong reasons, which may be economic interest, external and internal security, a sense of 
common identity or a combination of both, is fundamental to the existence and success of the 
federal state-building process. Nonetheless, this element per se is not enough. Sometimes, 
economic and political differences might be too hard to overcome, even if in the presence of 
common cultural interests. Every federation’s failure is a history per se, but all federations’ 
failure have some common patterns. (Franck, 1968: Etzioni, 2001) Sometimes, the reason may 
be the lack of true, proper federalism, excessive cultural differences, and political preferences. 
Above all, the lack of mutual trust, common kinship among members of a political elite are 
crucial elements for causing the failure of a federal arrangement. This implies that both realist 
and liberal schools are right, and that successful developments towards a federation, requires 
both a pragmatic and an idealistic dimension.  
In summary, federations may emerge because of different movements: 1) the presence 
of mutual agreement between the constituent units: a grand bargain representing a 
constitutional moment. This path was described by Riker, and is stated by the liberal 
intergovernmental theory; 2) a long, progressive development, that occurs by pooling some 
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states’ functions, in a process of gradual federalism which has been described in the 
neofunctionalist theory as a process of spillovers. . This process is also believed to create strong 
economic interdependence, to such an extent that an increase of political interdependence is a 
natural result. Political interdependence may end up in tighter, closer forms of federal political 
systems, so that interdependence by spillover might be an important component of federal 
state-building. This implies that federalism per se does not exclude elements of either 
neofunctionalism or liberal intergovernmentalism. More specifically, federalism is to some 
extent deeply embedded with both, but for different reasons. When it comes to 
neofunctionalism, this theory explains a process that could eventually lead to a formation of a 
supranational union, through spillover, functional and incremental changes. Similarly, 
intergovernmental dynamics, especially when it comes to treaty negotiations and bargaining, 
can be framed as a part of intergovernmental bargaining in a federal context. This leads us to 
the conclusion that liberal intergovernmentalism could be applied within the context of a 
federal political system. 
In the next chapters, I will also mention that, like other examples of federations or 
federal political systems (and unitary states), the EU is subject to centrifugal forces or internal 
dysfunctionalities, that may prevent their success (Bryce, 1901). Therefore, the EU may 
experience failures and disintegrative tendencies, like many other previous examples of 
existing and failed attempts of a federal political system (Franck, 1968). Since the outset the 
ECSC, the EEC,  and finally the EU underwent many developments, which will be assessed in 
the light of federal state-building. They represent, at a supranational level, the same pattern that 
was pursued in other federal systems and federations under different circumstances. As 
explained, this thesis aims to prove this by tracing the main similarities and patterns in the EU 
and more deeply in the Eurozone governance, thus comparing those institutions and pieces of 
legislation to the processes which occurred in other federal political systems. 
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2 Chapter II. The EU as federal political system 
2.1 Introduction 
As I discussed in chapter I, federal political systems are all those forms of political 
arrangements involving a combination of self-rule and shared rule (Elazar, 1987). Depending 
on the nature of this combination, and on the nature of the federal arrangements, it is possible 
to classify a federal political system (Elazar, 1987, Watts, 2007). As argued in the previous 
chapter there are mainly three types of federal political systems: international organisations, 
confederations, and federations (Elazar and Watts mention others, but they are not relevant for 
our research). As introduced in chapter I, not all forms of federal arrangements are designed 
with the intention of establishing a federation, and not all processes of federal state-building 
are successful in achieving the creation of a federal state.  
This thesis argues that the process of European integration is a process of federal state-
building. By contrast, even if this process is far from being over and still ongoing, the EU is 
not a state (Hix 2005). Many authors have identified the many aspects relating the EU to 
international organisations. Other authors (Forsyth, 1981; Elazar, 1998; Dardanelli & Church, 
2012) have made the case for the EU as a confederation of states. Currently, revisiting or 
repeating their argument is not relevant for the development of this thesis. The EU does indeed 
have elements typical of international organisations (especially in the least Europeanised policy 
areas), and a generally high level of confederalism, given the dominant role of the Council in 
many policy areas and the limits to institutions like the Commission and the Parliament. This 
having been said, the goal of this thesis is to highlight the coexisting elements of federalism, 
to help us build the discussion on the role of the single currency as an element of federal state-
building and on the elements of internal asymmetrical federalism. Consequently, this thesis 
will consider the elements relating the EU to the archetype of federations.  
Nevertheless, the category of federation will not be applied tout court to the EU. I make 
the choice not to apply the definition of federation directly, given the fact that the EU is not a 
state, and statehood, as explained in chapter I, is the principal feature of a federation. Therefore, 
it is un-controversial to state that the EU is a federal political system, encompassing elements 
from international organisations, confederations and federations. All these elements coexist 
within the EU. By quoting King, Burgess (2000: 28) described the EU as a system based on 
federalism, but without being a federation. Some scholars have applied the definition of the EU 
as a third kind, tertium genus, situated somewhere between a federal political system, like 
confederations and federations, on the one hand, and an international organisation, in the sense 
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of an international organisation with more federal characteristics, on the other (Hix, 2005). 
Additionally, the definition given by the German Federal Constitutional Court in its historic 
“Lissabon Urteil” (German Constitutional Court, 2009) is perhaps even more relevant. By 
introducing the definition of “Staatenverbund”, the Court pointed to the model of a middle 
step between a confederation and a federation that could fit in the definition of federalities 
(Sidgwick, 1903) and federal political systems (Watts, 2007). With the use of the word 
Staatenverbund, the Court implied the existence of a closer and stronger version of the 
Staatenbund; a form of federal political system, with a federation-type structure, but in which 
sovereignty and democratic legitimacy belong to the constituent MS, unlike traditional 
federations. In the German Court’s understanding, the Union becomes sovereign in areas 
agreed by the MS through the treaties. However, in the approach adopted in this thesis, 
introducing a third, intermediate model is not helpful, it does not add anything new to the 
analysis, but introduces more confusion where this is not necessary. By contrast, this chapter 
will simply highlight the areas were the process of federalisation, federal state-building, has 
been strongest and I will therefore review why these elements qualify the EU as a federal 
political system moving increasingly towards the benchmark of a federation in many areas, and 
therefore demonstrate why the case of federal state-building applies to the EU.  
In the next section, I consider the elements that make the EU comparable to a federal 
state. In the second part of the chapter, I will introduce the definition of asymmetrical 
federalism and explain why this is applicable to the case of the Eurozone.  
2.1.1 Union as purpose and principle of subsidiarity  
The first element that points towards the idea of European integration as a process of 
federalisation (Laursen, 2016) i.e. federal state-building, is contained in the preamble of the 
Treaty of the European Union. The preamble states that the MS are  
resolved to continue the process of creating an ever-closer union among the peoples of 
Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen in accordance 
with the principle of subsidiarity (TEU, 2007).  
In this paragraph, two typical elements of federal political systems are expressed: the pursuit 
of unity and the principle of subsidiarity. In addition to that, the “official” motto of the EU 
(which was planned to be an official symbol in the text of the EU Constitution), (Proposal for 
a Constitution of the European Union, 2003) and later into a side declaration in the EU Treaties 
(EU Treaties, 2007) is “united in diversity”, that in a way mirrors other federal states’ mottos.  
Principles of federalism are not directly stated in the Treaty, neither is federalism 
mentioned as form of governance of the Union. As a matter of fact, the concept of federalism 
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as core principle behind European integration and the preamble of the European Treaty have 
been a controversial issue for a while (Corbett, 1992; Laursen, 2016). In fact, an attempt to 
introduce the adjective “federal” or “federative” in the treaty was considered during the drafting 
of the treaty of Maastricht, but was never finalised, due to the opposition by different MS: 
Portugal, Denmark and especially the United Kingdom. In that case, the two first drafts of the 
EU stated that the treaty aimed at being the start of a “process gradually leading to a Union 
with federal goal” (Laursen & Vanhoonacker 1992: 358; Corbett, 1992; Laursen 2016). An 
attempt was made again with the writing of the Constitutional Treaty in 2003, where the first 
draft of the preamble stated that certain common competences should be administered on a 
federal basis (European Convention 2003a; Laursen, 2016), but again was later dismissed by 
some MS (Laursen 2016). This was proof that federalism had become the “F-word” of 
European integration; this was especially the case in some countries, and some mainstream 
media, where the word had been toxified and turned into a synonym for extreme centralisation 
and assimilation (Burgess, 2014; Laursen 2016). The final version of the Treaty of Lisbon, an 
amended version of the Constitutional Treaty, states that competences are conferred according 
to a principle of subsidiarity and performed with respect to the principle of proportionality 
(Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2008). Nevertheless, the current 
preamble, stating the purpose of integration as the pursuit of “an ever closer union of peoples” 
is in line with the purpose of federalism and, even if it does not explicitly express a federative 
principle or a federal form of government (or governance, in the case of the EU), as federal 
principles of the Union, principles like subsidiarity and proportionality are, philosophically 
speaking, at the core of federalism (Aroney, 2016), so the EU was defined by Majone as  
“cryptofederalist order” (2009: 72). 
It could be argued that the preamble is not a federalist text. By contrast, the EU Treaty 
clause “Ever closer Union of peoples” (Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 
2008) highlights the fact there are many peoples, not one European people, while the US 
constitution simply states the people, and therefore this is more a hint of the confederal 
configuration of the EU. By contrast, the sentence, per se, is not dissimilar from other 
constitutional sources from other federal systems. The principle of “ever closer union” 
represents the idea of a form of solidarity, closeness, unity among different peoples of Europe. 
Therefore, even if the wording suggests that the EU will remain in any case divided, the clause 
indicates a precise destination of the process. Classically, in other federal constitutions there 
are clauses referring to unity or solidarity. In the constitution of the United States of America, 
its iconic preamble states that “We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more 
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perfect Union” (US Constitution, 1787), which later constituted a benchmark and a model for 
other similar preambles in federal constitutions. The Swiss constitution (Swiss Federal 
Constitution, 1999) states that the Swiss people and the cantons are resolute to renovate their 
union (bund), suggesting that the Cantons (the constituent units) and the Swiss people as 
national body are both a source of legitimacy. The Canadian Constitution assesses the will of 
its provinces to create a federally united Dominion under the British crown. The Indian 
constitution, in the first article, instead states its nature as a Union of States (Constitution of 
India, 1947). Unity and solidarity are common features of most federal constitutional treaties; 
the EU is no exception, it follows a longstanding, prior tradition. Although it does not imply 
the existence of a common demos, it highlights the will of different peoples to create a union, 
thus providing more arguments to those theories attesting that the EU is more a body of demoi 
(Nikolaidis, 2012). By contrast, even if the signatories of the treaties are the MS, a union of the 
peoples, and not of the States, is the objective of the treaties 
The principle of subsidiarity in the EU, as contained in the Preamble, and in the text 
(Article 7 TEU, 2007) is strictly linked to the federal principle (Aroney, 2015). In a way, it 
seems axiomatic since it represents the most rational principle for allocating powers in a federal 
framework (ibid.). Althusius, the father of federalism expressly used the latin word subsidia to 
talk about the requirement of government to satisfy (Althusius, 1603, 1932; Endo, 1995). 
Nevertheless, it is the Catholic Church that developed the concept of subsidiarity in the form 
that I currently use (Endo, 1995). In his Encyclical of 1931, “on the reconstruction of social 
order,” Pope Pius XI, in a veiled opposition to the centralisation and authoritarianism of the 
fascist regime in power at the time in Italy, advocated for a more graduated political order in 
observance of the principle of subsidiarity (Pope Pius XI, 1931), where citizens and local 
governments had the chance to decide on matters that were more relevant to them, but less 
relevant to the central government. This principle, which is at the core of federal systems and 
is in accord with a principle of shared rule, is the reason why we could consider the principle 
of subsidiarity as a less politicised term to replace federalism (Laursen, 2016). The formulation 
can in fact be read in two different ways. It can be read as a way to limit the role of the Union 
and to avoid an enlargement of its competences, but at the same time it could be read as a way 
to increase the area of action of the Union in other contexts. Nevertheless, in either 
interpretation subsidiarity remains a core principle of federalism, thus confirming the fact that 
federalism is a polymorphic concept (Lépine, 2012), that can mean both a decentralising and a 
centralising trend (King, 1982; Stepan, 1999). Therefore, even if the Treaties are not federalist 
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in their wording, they have a federal content as though the authors, like Delors before and 
Giscard d’Estaing after, wanted the text to be federal in all but name (Laursen, 2016). 
Other than the symbolism, the main potential objection that could be made is that the 
importance of the Preamble is overstated, and that it is merely a symbolic paragraph, with no 
practical effect. For instance, former UK Prime Minister David Cameron was criticised for 
demanding a specific exemption from this part of the preamble, during his renegotiation of the 
terms of the UK’s membership of the EU. Nevertheless, in international law, the teleological 
approach or alternatively the purposivism is one of the three interpretational criteria of 
international treaties (the other two are the objective and the subjective criteria) (Conforti, 
2008, 2018 ), as in the International Convention of Vienna on Treaty Law. Therefore, from a 
legal point of view, even if the MS or the European Institutions do not actively pursue a closer 
union, the active pursuit of union in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity should 
continue to be the guiding principle of the Membership and the guiding principle of the union.  
2.1.2 The role of the European Court of Justice 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) represented, and still represents, one of the main engines 
of European integration. It played a major role in shaping the primacy of EU law and in 
removing many of the legal barriers that prevented the formation of a common legal 
framework, which were necessary to prepare an integrated internal market and the subsequent 
phases of integration.  
By adopting and applying the theory of implicit powers (Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union, 2007: article 352) using the US Supreme Court as a yardstick, the ECJ 
established EU law as we now know it, by issuing a series of historic rulings, Costa v Enel, 
(ECJ, Case 6/64) and Simmenthal II, (ECJ, Case 106/77) which affirmed the primacy of 
European legislation. Others, like Van Gend En Loos (Case 26/62; ECJ, 1962) and Cassis de 
Dijon (Case 120/78 ECJ, 1978) were among those cases that made the creation of a single 
market possible, and led states to accept common standards for the internal market. These 
decisions were also known as part of “negative integration”, because of the focus on removing 
the legal obstacles to the creation and implementation of an integrated European single market. 
Some (Vesterdorf, 2006) went further to argue that the ECJ is not just a constitutional court, 
since it not only intervenes on “constitutional” issues, but also on issues related to the internal 
market and free movement, like a functional, international court.  
However, even though it has such distinctive features, the ECJ proved to be one of the 
legal federators of the European integration process and, with its intervention, asserted not only 
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its own role in the European integration process, but also in laying down the foundations of the 
EU’s legal system. Additionally, even if the ECJ’s features do not perfectly reflect the 
characteristics of a constitutional court, it proved to have more elements akin to those of a 
constitutional court than those of an international court. More specifically, because unlike 
many international courts, whose judgements are generally non-binding or lacking the 
sufficient instruments to have them enforced, the ECJ managed to assert its own role and have 
the proper enforcement instruments.  
However, the ECJ still retains an intergovernmental/internationalist configuration, since its 
judges are appointed by MS’ governments (TFUE, 273), and since each MS is entitled to one, 
there are currently 27 judges. This fact reflects that the judges of the ECJ come from a 
confederal/intergovernmental source, unlike the US Supreme Court Justices, whose 
appointment comes from the President of the United States (POTUS), and then have to be 
passed by the US Congress, so that the legitimacy of the members of the court comes from a 
federal source. Elsewhere, the same procedure occurs for the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court, 
while in the case of the Canadian Supreme court, its Justices are appointed by the Governor 
General of Canada, after the advice of the Prime Minister. In this last case, a criterion of 
territoriality in the appointment of justices must additionally be respected. These differences 
with other federal, last resort courts highlight the intergovernmental origins of the ECJ. 
However, even though the ECJ has retained some intergovernmental elements, there is a wide 
consensus on affirming that it has played the same role as a federal, supreme court. Its activism 
and its role, especially after the Lisbon Treaty, have been increasingly confirmed.  
2.1.3 The European Parliament  
Among all the institutions, the EP is the one which mostly reflects a federal structure, even if 
among its main flaws, it does not have the powers to initiate law-making processes. It 
underwent a very long development since its origins in 1952. It was established as an assembly 
in the ECSC treaty, and even if it was designed to be directly elected since its foundation, it 
became a directly elected chamber only in the mid 1970s, with the first direct elections in 1979 
(Hoskyns & Newman, 2000). Despite lacking the right of initiative that other federal 
parliaments enjoy, the EP is directly elected by EU citizens and composed of 751 members, 
including its president. As such, all EU citizens, with criteria set by their respective country of 
residence, are eligible to vote, or indeed stand for election as MEPs. This characteristic makes 
the EP one of the first supranational, democratically elected parliaments in the world. Indeed, 
when compared to other regional organisations, the EP is the only directly elected supranational 
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parliament. When it comes to apportionment, its features are very close to those of other federal 
lower houses, like, among others, the US House of Representatives. 
In most federal parliaments, apportionment is calculated according to the population of 
the constituent units, for instance Argentina, Brazil, Canada, USA (US Constitution, Article I, 
section 2, Clause 3). As such, the US House of Representatives has 435 members, with a 
proportion based on the population of each state, as measured by the national census. As a 
result of this mechanism, the most populous state, California, has a right to 53 members, while 
the smallest states are guaranteed 1 seat. The same happens in other federations. The Indian 
Lower House (Lok Sabha), has a state and territory-based representation, with Uttar Pradesh 
having 80 members and 1 for territories and smallest states (Constitution of India, Part V, 
article 81). In the Canadian House of Commons Ontario has 121 members out of 338, while 
Prince Edward Island, the smallest province has only 4; territories are entitled to 1 member 
(Constitution of Canada, articles 51 and 51A). Again, Malaysian states and federal territories 
composition varies from 26 seats for Johor, the most populous state, to 1 for the Federal 
territories of Putrajaya and Labuan (Constitution of Malaysia, article 46). In this specific case, 
electoral constituencies are designed as part of each respective state, therefore they always 
follow states’ boundaries. Similarly, in the EP, the division of representatives is made on MS 
population basis, according to a criterion of proportional digression, in a range between 96 and 
6 MEPs (Article 14 (2), Treaty of the European Union). In the case of the EU, Germany has 
the highest numbers in terms of MEPs, 96, while Cyprus, Estonia, Luxembourg and Malta, the 
smallest of the Member States, each have 6 MEPs. This composition could be considered 
disproportional, since it tends to over-represent smaller countries and under-represent major 
countries. Nonetheless, the division of MEPs between MS according to these principles is no 
different from what happens in other full and mature federations, and it is part of a federal 
political discourse, aiming at giving a proper representation to all territories. 
Additionally, the repartition of MEPs within the EP does not follow national divisions, 
but the political and ideological affiliation of their parties (Rules of procedure of the EP, 2009). 
In fact, the internal rules of the Parliament are designed so that any party which manages to 
have its MEPs elected must affiliate to a group, which traditionally shares the same ideological 
background, in order to achieve more funding, more space and time in debates and more 
influence (for instance when it comes to chairing committees or drafting reports) (McElroy & 
Benoit 2010; Bressanelli 2012). Since the foundation of the EP as a directly elected institution, 
national parties have created political parties at the European level, that are actually 
confederations of national parties (Thorlakson, 2005; Fox, 2019), and play a major role in EP 
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funding and represent a place for Europeanisation and socialisation for national leaders, 
Commissioners and members of the Council. However, unlike mature and full federations, 
where party ideology and affiliation and federal identity are very strong, it is not uncommon 
for MEPs to prioritise national interests over party interests and ideological affiliations. 
Additionally, the political parties at the European level are still very confederal in their 
structure, so that the party secretariats are in many ways subject to major parties’ decisions 
(Hix, Kreppel, & Noury, 2003 ; Thorlakson, 2005).  
Nonetheless, among the EU’s supranational institutions, the EP has played its role as a 
form of federaliser (Albertini, 1979) of the EU, first under the drive of Spinelli during the first 
legislature of the EP, in which he managed to direct the EP towards a role of constituent 
assembly (Graglia, 2008). Although Spinelli’s proposal for a Treaty of the European Union 
failed to collect the necessary support from the European Council (ibid.), since its origins the 
EP has shown its capability to be one of the main supranational institutions, and one of the 
main advocates of European integration. Although it still has a relatively limited role, its 
powers and role have dramatically increased since its first direct election.  
2.1.4 EU Bicameralism and Council of the European Union  
The Council of the European Union (henceforth the Council) has developed a similar role to 
that of a federal senate, but it is not a proper senate in the traditional sense. Indeed, unlike 
traditional upper houses, it does not have permanent representatives or senators. Its members 
are in fact ministers of MS’ national governments; the Council has 10 different configurations, 
and the ministers of MS’ governments represent them in their specific field. Consequently, the 
ministers of the MS’ governments can be considered as the senators of the EU. Each country 
has a ratio, according to its population (Article 238 TFUE), so that the votes in the Council are 
weighted, thus making the Council very different from other federal institutions like the US, 
the Brazilian, or the Argentinian Senate. In fact, all these federal upper houses have the same 
numbers of senators for each state, 2 in the case of the US Senate, and in the case of the elected 
senators in the Russian Council, and 3 in the case of the Argentinian and Brazilian Senates. 
The votes are not weighted on the basis of the population, but per capita, so that the vote of a 
senator from the least populous constituent unit is “more powerful” and more representative 
than one from the most populous units.  Nevertheless, the fact that the vote is weighted 
according to the population and not “per capita”, does not differentiate the Council from other 
federal upper houses, like for instance the German and the Austrian Federal Councils 
(Bundesrat). In fact, party affiliation to political parties at the European level, and party 
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ideology, are still today relatively weak, since EU ministers vote and decide according to their 
domestic government’s position.  
The prevalence of the Council in many areas is still very significant. In the areas of 
general affairs, and security and foreign policy, unanimous voting is still required. In all the 
others, the Qualified Voting Majority has made this bicameral process smoother and more 
democratic, but the fact that the Council requires higher and more qualified majorities, for 
instance 55% of the Member States and 65% of the population, still tips the balance of powers 
towards to the Council, since it requires meeting two qualified and higher thresholds than a 
simple majority (Passarelli and Barr, 2009). In this way, the law-making process is designed 
so that the Conciliation Committees play a major role in reducing divergences between the EP 
and the Council and therefore in the success of this, although this means that the EP constantly 
has to accept the Council’s position. This dynamic limits the role of the EP, and boosts the role 
of the Council (ibid.). 
2.1.5 The single market as federal element  
Laursen (2016: 266) defined the elements of EU federalism by their degree, ranging from the 
most federalised to the least: the single market, trade policy, economic and monetary union, 
foreign and security policy and then the military. He defined the single market as one of the 
minimum competences of a federal system, and in the case of the EU, one of the most 
Europeanised, i.e. one of the most federalised. If we take a closer look to the TFEU, the 
functioning of the single market is one of the EU’s shared competences. By contrast 
competition policy was conferred as an exclusive competence to the EU. At the same time, the 
single market was one of the objectives and fell within the scope of the TEU; as Wallace and 
Young observed many years ago, the single market remains the main point of reference for the 
study of European integration (Wallace & Young, 1996). 
As I will mention again in chapter III, the single market originated in the Single 
European Act and, together with the three-phase plan for the adoption of the single currency, 
remains one of the main achievements of the Delors Presidency of the European Commission 
(Burgess, 2000). Some of its elements already featured in the Treaty of European Union 
proposed, unsuccessfully, by Spinelli and the EP in 1984 (Graglia, 2008). The single market 
was defined ‘as an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital is ensured’ a definition that can be normally described as the 
standard in a federation and in any state: i.e. analogous to a single market that exists in a unitary 
state (Burgess, 2000; Laursen 2016). Sandholtz and Zysman defined the creation of the single 
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market as almost a reboot, a restart of the pursuit of the construction of Europe (Sandholtz & 
Zysman, 1994; Burgess 2000). The case of the single, internal market has been described by 
many authors as strong evidence in favour of a neofunctionalist paradigm as grand theory.  
However, this premise was challenged by Hoffman and Moravcsik, with the latter 
focussing on the role of the Council, and MS’ interests, as the main driver behind the single 
market. By contrast, the unification of the European market for goods and services into a single 
internal market can be claimed as a success for federalist-minded forces, which was made 
possible in a very specific period. Burgess (2000:173-177) highlighted how the elites of the 
main European countries, and even Arthur Cockfield, the British civil servant tasked with the 
role of European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services and who drafted the 
architecture of the single market, were all sympathetic towards the cause of European unity 
(ibid.). As mentioned before, the focus of this thesis is not to engage in the unending fight 
between neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. The emergence of the single market has 
been claimed by supporters of neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik) as 
proof of their theory. As already argued by Burgess (ibid.:178) it is impossible to deny an 
intergovernmental drive and interest, and dismissing the teleologic, federalist drive is wrong as 
well. Especially because the internal market was not simply a milestone in a federalist agenda 
(and the federalist literature is full of advocacy for a single market), but because a uniform, and 
unified internal market is a recurring element in the archetype of a modern state As for 
neofunctionalist literature, the single market was going to be a major source of spillovers, in 
the federalist literature the single market was expected to be one of the main drivers for the 
European political unity. The emergence of a single market was also used as one of the main 
arguments in favour of the introduction of a single currency, in line with the idea of one 
currency, one market (Mongelli 2009).  
Like for the case of the single currency, the unification of the internal market (or more 
correctly, markets), has been a lengthy process, which essentially proceeded simultaneously 
with the creation of the modern state, especially in continental Europe, where this process also 
meant the end of all the internal barriers, like internal taxation and diversity in standards, which 
represented relics from the feudal era. The removal of internal barriers was an argument during 
the birth of the United States, where Hamilton and the Federalist Party especially displayed an 
interest in this direction, as well as in building an economy which could rival existing powers 
(Hamilton, 1791). Even if there are some areas of the internal market which still need to be 
Europeanised, like the capital markets (ECB 2018; European Commission, 2019) one thing we 
can confidently state is that the paradigm “one currency, one market, one Union” was, and still, 
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remains valid. Currently, the internal market remains one of the most Europeanised areas. 
These elements go in favour of interpreting the creation of a single market as an important 
element of supranational, federal state-building.  
The single, internal market is in a way also a result of the action of the ECJ, and it is 
perhaps the functional area where the action of the ECJ had the most impact. Judgements like 
Costa vs Enel or Cassis de Dijon were not only the “federalist” judgements of the ECJ which 
established the primacy of EC, then EU Law, but also are the judgements that provided the 
legal foundations for creating the single market. 
The single market remains however fragmented in some areas. When it comes to capital 
and financial markets, Europeanisation has remained very limited, thus impacting on the usage 
of the Euro as an alternative to the US Dollar, and also affecting the attractiveness of the EU 
financial markets compared to other markets (European Commission, 2019). 
As previously mentioned, the unification of the markets is part of the archetype of a 
Custom union, one of the two models reviewed in chapter I for coming together federalism. 
The internal market is the internal dimension, whereas the trade policy is the external 
dimension.  
2.1.6 Common Commercial Policy as a federal element 
The common commercial policy (CCP), also known as EU trade policy, is one of the exclusive 
competences of the EU (TFEU, 2007), and is mentioned as one of the core functions of 
federation in Laursen, (2016: 266). The CCP of the EU represent the external dimension of the 
single market, and represents a corollary to the customs union, which is mentioned as another 
of the exclusive competences of the EU. It could be said that, in terms of sovereignty, the 
internal market represents an internal display of sovereignty, whereas the CCP is a display of 
external sovereignty (Krasner, 2006a). In the foundation of the United States, the capability to 
trade with foreign powers as a single entity was one of the main points of the federalist agenda. 
Additionally, the capability to trade, and to undersign trade deals as a single entity, is still part 
of the archetype of a coming together federation via a customs union. 
In the last few years (Euractiv, 2020), the Commission has been tasked with negotiating 
many ambitious trade agreements (we could mention CETA with Canada, JEFTA with Japan 
or the controversial, and currently suspended, negotiations for the TTIP with the USA). As a 
result, the EU has succeeded in agreeing many of these partnerships, and recently, more 
demands have been made on the Commission to use this negotiating power to incentivise third 
countries to adopt European standards (a move that is, by contrast, sharply criticised for other 
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reasons). More recently, ambitious plans have been made to use trade policy as a way to 
promote the role of the Euro as an international currency (EU Commission, 2020). As a result 
of this Europeanisation of trade policies, EU MS are represented as a single block at the WTO, 
where the EU has it is own representation; indeed, the WTO is one of the few international 
organisations of which the EU is a full member.  
It might be said that the unified external trade has in fact improved the chances of 
political union, and it is not a case that this led some to state the EU is “an economic giant, but 
a political dwarf” (Eyskens, 2010), thus, implying that were the EU managed to achieve some 
sort of unity, in the internal market and in trade policy (and in monetary policy), the EU 
managed to become an important player, unlike the other areas, were integration remained 
more fragmented. This was possible partly because since 1970, decisions in the area of CCP 
have been taken by qualified majority. Additionally, the ECJ declared the CCP to be an 
exclusive competence of the EC in 1975 (ECJ: opinion 1/75; Devuyst, 2011) and gave a more 
comprehensive interpretation to Art. 113 of the Treaty of the Rome with opinion 1/78 (Devuyst, 
2011), which gave a non-restrictive definition of the areas to be included in the CCP. By 
contrast, it was the ECJ itself that put a brake on including additional, new, sectorial areas in 
another opinion in 1994. After a long development, with the Constitutional Treaty in 2003 and 
later with the Treaty of Lisbon, the issue has been solved. Only decisions regarding three 
specific types of goods and services: trade in services, the commercial aspects of intellectual 
property, and foreign direct investments, require MS’ unanimity votes.  
Thanks to these developments, a Europeanisation and integration of trade policies has 
been possible, thus making this area one of the closest to the model of a federal state. It is not 
just the case that the EU is now recognised as a heavyweight in international trade, drawing 
both praise and criticism. In fact, the CCP is an example of an optimal model of 
Europeanisation of foreign policy and security that the MS should achieve.  
2.1.7 The European Monetary Union and the single currency  
Above all, after the areas like the single market and the CCP, the it is the Euro that makes the 
EU, and especially the Eurozone, closer to a full federation than any other element. The 
monetary policy of the MS whose currency is the Euro in one of the exclusive competences of 
the EU. Currency, and the idea of statehood, have been bound together since the birth of the 
first polities in civilisation. Since then, although the concept of currency has developed 
significantly, currency has become more and more widely identified with the traditional 
symbols of state authority, and also, ultimately a national symbol (Solway, 2015), since it 
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represented one of the first public goods granted by the state, together with defence and security 
and legal system. Money has an essential importance in the economic life of a community of 
people, since it is, in its basic definition, a unit of account, a store of value, and medium of 
exchange (Meltzer & Friedman, 2001). Essentially, in human history trade arose, developed, 
and thrived because of the existence of money. At the same time, as coins replaced 
commodities as unit of account (Rubin, 1929), in the first polities in Greece and Anatolia, the 
very first examples of coins had symbols on their sides.  
This started when, according to Herodotus, Croesus, King of Lydia first issued metallic 
coins throughout the 7th century BC (Wormell, 1963). Almost every Greek city-state had its 
own coinage, each bearing the symbols of the city: legendary figures and heroes, patron gods, 
animals and, in case of monarchies like Macedonia and the Hellenic Kingdoms,  rulers and 
kings (Sear, 1978). The Romans adopted the same practice when they switched from 
commodities and metal bullion to coins, with firstly Roman Gentes,2 and subsequently 
Emperors, using coins to celebrate themselves as rulers, their achievements and conquests, the 
values they wanted to promote, and ultimately the might of Rome (Sear, 2000). When, after 
the dark ages, trade, exchanges, and investments started thriving again in Western Europe, 
medieval polities simply followed the same path. In the history of modern Europe, state 
authorities put effort and resources into rationalising their currency, and in taking direct control 
of money supplies, ultimately leading to single, standardised, currencies inside state boundaries 
and having a precious metal (gold or silver or both in case of bimetallic systems) to guarantee 
the currency’s market value. Today, the correlation between statehood and currency is so 
rooted in the mindset, that it is considered normal for every country to have its own currency, 
and generally it is considered an exception to the rule that a country might rely on another 
country’s currency and does not issue their own (like today Montenegro and Kosovo do with 
the Euro and Ecuador does with the US Dollar).  
 Because of the depth and strength of this mindset, adopting a single currency has not 
only macroeconomic and legal implications, but is also a matter of symbols of national and 
state identity. This process is considered ultimately to have boosted trade relationships, internal 
markets and therefore to have played a consistent role in economic development in the last few 
centuries. Therefore, the Euro is not only an instrument for ensuring and boosting the internal 
market and removing exchange and speculative risks from the EU’s single market. Because of 
 
2 I.e. Roman families who were playing a leading role during the Republican Era. Members of notable gentes 
normally underwent a career in politics and in the army (Cursus honorum) 
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the importance that the currency has as national symbol and instrument for trade, the Euro itself 
is a symbol of European identity and one of the milestones of European integration. Currently, 
apart from Germany, Austria and Belgium, which are bound to the Euro itself, all federal states 
have monetary policies as a federal competence, and all of them are currency unions. In the 
case of these three federal states, monetary policy has been Europeanised, but the terms of the 
membership come from these countries, derived from their decision to join the Euro.  
The introduction of the single currency in the Treaty of Maastricht has been a landmark 
in European integration history, not only for the currency itself, but also for the developments 
it sparked in the European integration process. After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, 
the EEC states had struggled to limit the effects of inflation and to set, and maintain, mutual 
exchange rates between themselves. The Euro was also the ultimate and definite solution to 
resolve currency instability in Europe, since the first European Monetary System proved to be 
insufficient to stabilise it (Padoa-Schioppa, 1992), notably after the speculative attacks in 1992 
on some of the main EC currencies. From this point of view, even if in a very different context, 
the creation of the Euro was similar to similar interventions to unify and standardise currency 
supply. One of the clearest examples of this type of effort was the creation of the Federal 
Reserve Bank in 1913, to stabilise money supply in the US market and avoid a recurrence of 
crises like the one in 1907. The Federal Reserve was originally born as a federation of 12 
regional banks, which were then turned into the regional branches of the Federal Reserve 
System (Meltzer, 2003). 
The introduction of the Euro caused the first divides between MS in terms of the depth 
of integration, with firstly the British opt-out over the adoption of the Euro, followed by the 
Danish opt-out after the first rejection of the Treaty of Maastricht. The typologies of these opt-
outs are different, since Denmark, although not being in the Euro, is bound to the conditions of 
ERM II. After the UK’s departure from the EU, Denmark remains the sole exception, all the 
other MS are legally obliged to adopt the Euro. Accordingly, the Euro has contributed to an 
increased divergence between those countries committed to pursuing a more comprehensive 
process of economic and political integration and those which are not (MacShane, 2016).  
A central role is played by the ECB, which represents the Eurozone, with the purpose 
of defining and pursuing the monetary policy of the Union, and has a consultative role, stated 
in the treaties, for any EU decision regarding EMU. The European treaties guarantee the 
independence of the ECB (Statute of the ECB, chapter III, article 7), allowing it to pursue the 
object of its statute without interference from MS. Furthermore, the architecture of the 
Eurozone has some federal characteristics. The executive body of the ECB is the Executive 
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Board, which manages day by day decisions, while the decisions of monetary policies are taken 
in the Governing Council (Article 10, Statutes of ECB and ESCB). All presidents of MS’ 
national central banks, both Euro and non-Euro, take part in the General Council, which has an 
advisory role: it contributes to the collection of statistical information; the preparation of the 
ECB's annual report; the establishment of the necessary rules for standardising the accounting 
and reporting of operations undertaken by the National Central Banks of the European System 
of Central Banks; the taking of measures related to the establishment of the basis for the ECB's 
capital subscription other than those laid down in the Treaty; the laying-down of the conditions 
of employment of the members of staff of the ECB; and is designed to assist in the preparation 
of further enlargements of the Euro area (Article 46). As such, the role of the General Council 
is mostly consultative, and related to residual issues related to EU monetary policy. 
Additionally, this institution is designed to be temporary, since once all countries in the EU 
have joined the Euro, the Board will be dissolved to leave just the Governing Council. 
Since the start of the crisis, the governance of the Eurozone has developed and changed 
dramatically. The sovereign debt crisis and the need to convey certainty about the solidity and 
integrity of the single currency led to the introduction what could be considered as the first 
steps towards a fiscal union. It is in this historical perspective that the new recent additions to 
EMU governance should be framed: notably the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), as well as the aforementioned reports. 
The ECB played the role of a federaliser, especially in the deepest phase of the 
economic crisis (Fiorentini & Montani, 2014). By declaring that the ECB was ‘going to do 
whatever it takes to preserve the Euro’ (Draghi, 2012), and guarantee the unity of the Eurozone, 
the ECB asserted and affirmed its own role. The actions that ECB took to fight the lack of trust 
within the markets, including quantitative easing, demonstrated its new role, whose activism 
even met with opposition or scepticism from its most important member, Germany, and the 
German Federal Bank. 
The EMU has still not reached the same degree of completeness as a full fiscal union. 
In recent years, some MEPs (Böge-Berès, Bresso-Brook, & Verhofstadt, 2017) have focused 
on the importance of completing and enhancing European monetary governance. The Böge-
Berès Report focused on building a fiscal capacity for the Eurozone. Unlike the former, the 
Bresso-Brok Report has a more comprehensive approach, as it focuses on fostering Eurozone 
integration and political integration while remaining within the current treaty structure. The 
Verhofstadt Report is, however, the most far-reaching of the three reports; this report, as 
approved by the EP, focuses on formalising two kinds of membership: for those countries 
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joining the single market only, and for those committed to political and economic union. For 
the latter, the single currency is a necessary requirement. From this point of view, the Eurozone 
is a federal core for any future steps of the EU. However, the departure of the United Kingdom 
has perhaps diminished the interest in such arrangements. Additionally, no country is interested 
in treaty change, even less in such an overhaul. Nevertheless, the presence of non-Euro member 
states remains an element of asymmetry. It is not merely a case that the MS currently most 
resistant to the adoption of the Euro are those which are most sceptical about further 
integration; resistance to the Euro can be either from a liberal-nationalist point of view (like 
Sweden or Denmark), or from an authoritarian-nationalist point of view (like Hungary). 
Nevertheless, the Euro has been a contentious issue. First, even if more scepticism has 
mounted over the single currency, and has been adopted by populists of all over Europe as 
scapegoat for poor economic performance, it has been proven that the costs of leaving the 
Eurozone overwhelms the benefits, whereas the possible benefits of leaving remain largely 
unknown and unproven. On the contrary, it is this lack of an available exit strategy that has 
boosted progress in the governance of the Eurozone. Although a complete reform of the 
Eurozone remains still to be completed, in the fiscal union and the reform of own resources 
and fiscal capacity, and although some economists still argue about the economic sustainability 
of the Euro, the single currency has proved to be, despite many critical issues, one of the main 
federalising drivers of the Union, and one of the main federalised areas of the EU, measured 
against traditional benchmarks of statehood (Laursen & others, 2016) 
2.2 Asymmetrical federalism in the EU: Eurozone (EU-19) and non-Euro 
MS 
2.2.1 Definition of asymmetrical federalism 
Currently, out of 27 MS, 19 have adopted the Euro as their national currency (European Central 
Bank, 2019), and 8 countries are still not in the Eurozone. Among these, Denmark has had its 
currency pegged to the Euro for decades now, but has not adopted the Euro, and after the 
departure of the United Kingdom is the only country that retains an opt-out. Bulgaria and 
Croatia, two of the most recent MS, have recently been admitted in the ERM II, and are 
expected to become full Members of the EMU in the next two years or more. The case of non-
Eurozone MS represents the most prominent, but not the only, case of asymmetrical federalism 
in the EU, since non-Euro MS are not bound to follow and comply with the same legal 
obligations as the Euro MS. In this framework, it is possible to make a case about asymmetrical 
federalism in the EU. Asymmetric federalism is a form of federalism in which the constituent 
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members of any federal system have different obligations and rights. This asymmetry can occur 
horizontally, i.e. “among constituent units” and vertically, i.e. “between them individually and 
the federation as a whole” (Burgess, 2006: 209). Burgess described that asymmetries could be 
de facto or de jure (ibid: 217). The de facto asymmetries are the result of structural 
characteristics of constituent units, such as  
economic differences, population, political power, administrative skills, wealth, 
economic development, climatic conditions, predominance of either urban or rural 
interests, social structure, traditions, or relative geographic location (Duchacek, 1970: 
280). 
For these reasons, de facto asymmetries are a natural feature of federations, and more generally 
all federal systems, thus affecting political dynamics even within federations based on 
symmetrical federalism. Throughout federations there are many cases of de facto asymmetrical 
federalism. For instance, one case is the Brazilian states of the South-East Region, namely, 
Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, since they account for about 40% of Brazilian 
population and 60% of Brazilian GDP, while the poorest regions of the north are chronically 
reliant on federal resources (Selcher, 1998). In the case of Canada, Ontario alone represents 
about 40% of national GDP (Statistics Canada, 2016). Sometimes, some de facto asymmetries 
can become de jure through specific constitutional provisions (Burgess, 2006). The presence 
of asymmetries is not a symptom of a dysfunctional or chaotic federation, just evidence that 
there are greater diversities. At the same time symmetry does not necessarily mean harmony 
(ibid.: 220-221).  
De jure asymmetric federalism is a result of the accommodation of political demands 
from specific constituent units, with the purpose of guaranteeing peace within the federation, 
reducing the pressure of secessionist movements, and safeguarding the territorial integrity of 
the polity (Kymlicka, 1998; Obydenkova, 2005; McGarry & O'Leary, 2009; Roeder, 2009). 
Indeed, some forms of non-federal polities, (i.e. unitary states) may apply forms of asymmetric 
federalism, while not being a federal country. This suggests that de jure asymmetrical 
federalism can be used as a tool for managing territorial autonomy and therefore, as a peace-
making instrument. Some de facto situations may require constitutional arrangements based on 
asymmetrical federalism: different cultural, ethnic and linguistic backgrounds (as, for instance, 
the case of the status of Quebec in Canada, the status of Kurdistan in Iraq, the cases of South 
Tyrol, Friuli Venezia Giulia and Val d’Aosta in Italy, the Åland Islands in Finland, Catalonia, 
Galicia and Basque Countries in Spain); geographic peculiarities (like the Canadian territories 
of Yukon, the North-East territories and Nunavut, or the islands of Sardinia and Sicily in Italy, 
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Madeira and the Azores in Portugal, Canary islands in Spain); legal issues (Quebec has a civil 
law system, while the rest of Canada relies on common law); and sharp economic differences.  
In some cases, these elements are mixed. For instance, not only has Catalonia a different 
linguistic tradition, but also it is the most significant Spanish region in terms of economic 
weight together with Madrid, since its GDP alone accounts for 20% of the Spanish economy 
(Datos Macros de Espana, 2016). In Italy, the region of Sardinia not only is geographically 
isolated from the rest of the Italian peninsula but has developed a very strong regional identity 
and language (Mazzette, 1992, Hepburn, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 3 Relationship between de facto and de jure asymmetries 
More specifically, among the cases of non-federal states, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the UK 
(Requejo, 2011) have incorporated forms of de jure asymmetrical federalism in their 
constitutional architecture. The United Kingdom has devolved powers to Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland (Mitchell, 2003), resulting in three devolved legislatures and three forms of 
asymmetrical federalism in the form of a devolutionary state (Bogdanor, 2001; Jeffery & 
Wincott, 2006; Keil & Anderson 2017). Spain itself is an asymmetrical federal system, since 
its constitutional framework recognises specific levels of autonomy for its regions 
(Constitution of the Kingdom of Spain, 1978). Formally, Spain is not a federation, but has 
made provisions to accommodate demands of regions whose economy and national/linguistic 
identity differ from the rest of the country, and formally recognises the status of three regional 
De facto 
asymmetries 
De jure 
asymmetries 
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languages in additional to Spanish: Catalan, Basque and Galician (ibid.). Italy, though it is not 
a federal country, accepted some form of asymmetrical federalism when it comes to its regions 
with special status (regioni a statuto speciale), whose status differs from the remaining 
ordinary regions (regioni a statuto ordinario) (Constitution of the Italian Republic, 1947). In 
the Italian case, the special regions have a full form of asymmetrical federalism, while the 
ordinary regions status is more comparable to a devolved system, so that while the former have 
enhanced autonomy, the autonomy of the latter depends on the central government in Rome 
(Palermo, 2012), resulting in an asymmetric, devolutionary federal system (Palermo & Woelk, 
2007). Similarly, though it is a unitary republic, Portugal has a special regional status for the 
Island of Madeira and the Azores archipelago (Keating, 1998; Loughlin, 2001; Hough & 
Jeffery, 2006; Swenden, 2006; Marks, Hooghe, & Schakel, 2008; Ruel, 2015a), whose 
autonomy is granted in the Portuguese Constitution. (Article 235, 2°, Constitution of the 
Portuguese Republic, 1976) 
2.2.2 Differentiated integration and asymmetrical federalism 
The EU is an asymmetrical system, with de facto and de jure elements, (this because there are 
some MS, that have retained some form of differentiation, or opt-outs, that are incorporated in 
the treaties). Additionally, there is not only one asymmetry, but there are many. The reasons 
for these asymmetries stem from the intergovernmental nature of the EU, and by diversities 
between MS. The fact that any MS can integrate some areas, and decide not to participate in 
other European policies is per se a source of asymmetries. The inherent nature of these 
asymmetries is both horizontal and vertical; horizontal (Hooghe & Marks, 2016), since these 
affect an MS’ own obligations towards the other MS, and vertical, since this concerns their 
relationship with the European supranational institutions as well. 
The concept of multi-speed integration, or differentiation, in the EU is closely 
connected with asymmetrical federalism (Freudlsperger, 2019). Normally, what is referred to 
as asymmetric federalism for fully fledged and recognised federations is defined as 
differentiated integration for the EU, since, semantically, there is a general lack of consensus 
to apply the same terminology used for federal states to multilevel or composite polities like 
the EU. In the approach I adopted, however, the point is specifically that of removing this 
barrier. Hooghe & Marks (2016), for instance, applied a reverse approach, and stated that forms 
of asymmetrical integration are indeed forms of differentiated integration. 
Differentiated integration has been individuated as an approach (Schimmelfennig, 
2012) to accommodate diversity, (Agranoff 1999a; Palermo 2007; Zuber 2011, Freudlsperger, 
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2019) especially in a hybrid polity like the EU, where many political preferences co-exist. The 
opt-outs are indeed a form of de jure asymmetrical system; the result of interstate bargaining, 
deriving from the opposition of single MS to Europeanise some specific areas, or, stated in 
neofunctionalist terms, are the consequence of insufficient spillover. Thus, a de jure asymmetry 
could be the result of a previously existing de facto asymmetry. For instance, a de facto 
asymmetry in the EU is due to the gap in terms of regional disparities between the most and 
the least developed areas of the EU. This situation led EU policy makers to tackle this disparity 
with the instruments of the Cohesion Fund.  
Since de jure asymmetries equate to opt-outs, in the EU there are five different 
asymmetries: the Schengen Area, the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), EMU, 
Common Security and Defence Policy, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. In this 
framework, the Core Europe (Fischer, 2004) is the group of countries which are full members 
of the EMU and fully participate in all the European policies.  
With the sole exception of Ireland, which has an opt-out from Schengen with the 
possibility of opting in, members of the EMU do not have other opt-outs and therefore it seems 
reasonable to draw the conclusion that they display more integration (Mongelli & Vega, 2006), 
at least in terms of juridical obligations. They are part of a symmetric federal system, unlike 
the non-Euro MS. The latter, though they are obliged to adopt the Euro (with the sole exception 
of Denmark), are not bound to the same obligations that full Euro MS need to adopt, such as 
the Fiscal Compact, the provisions for the ESM (Treaty establishing the European Stability 
Mechanism, 2012) and those regarding the European Banking Union, i.e. the Single Resolution 
Mechanism and the Single Supervisory Mechanism.  
If the Eurozone represents the quintessential case of de jure symmetrical federalism 
inside the EU, on the opposite end of the spectrum the UK’s membership of the EU before 
Brexit represented the quintessential case of asymmetric federalism. With its opt-outs from the 
EU single currency, AFSJ and Charter of Fundamental Rights (Adler-Nissen, 2009) together 
with its systemic hostility towards the concept of political integration, the United Kingdom had 
a very asymmetrical relationship with the EU. This form of detached, asymmetrical federalism 
culminated in the vote of the 23rd of June 2016 and the Brexit process. Another specific case is 
that of Denmark, which participates in the Schengen area on an intergovernmental basis and is 
Member of the ERM II, but is not part of the Eurozone, and has opt-outs from both Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the AFSJ. 
 Schengen  EFSJ Eurozone Charter of fundamental Rights CSDP 
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Austria Y Y Y Y Y 
Belgium Y Y Y Y Y 
Bulgaria C C C Y Y 
Croatia C Y C Y Y 
Cyprus C Y Y Y Y 
Czech Republic Y Y C Y Y 
Denmark Y O O + Y O 
Estonia Y Y Y Y Y 
Finland Y Y Y Y Y 
France Y Y Y Y Y 
Germany Y Y Y Y Y 
Greece Y Y Y Y Y 
Hungary Y Y C Y Y 
Ireland O O Y Y Y 
Italy Y Y Y Y Y 
Latvia Y Y Y Y Y 
Lithuania Y Y Y Y Y 
Luxemburg Y Y Y Y Y 
Malta Y Y Y Y Y 
Netherlands Y Y Y Y Y 
Poland Y Y C O Y 
Portugal Y Y Y Y Y 
Romania C C C Y Y 
Slovakia Y Y Y Y Y 
Slovenia Y Y Y Y Y 
Spain Y Y Y Y Y 
Sweden Y Y C Y Y 
UK O O O O Y 
C: Candidate, O: Opt-out, Y: Full Member + Denmark member of ERM II 
 
Figure 4 Asymmetry in the EU - Excluding ESM  
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Eurozone  Fiscal Compact ESM Single 
Resolution 
Mechanism 
Single 
Supervisory 
mechanism 
Euro Plus 
Pact 
Austria Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Belgium Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bulgaria C Y Y C N Y 
Croatia C N N C N N 
Cyprus Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Czech Republic C N N C N N 
Denmark O Y N Y N Y 
Estonia Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Finland Y Y Y Y Y Y 
France Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Germany Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Greece Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Hungary C Y N Y N N 
Ireland Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Italy Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Latvia Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Lithuania Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Luxemburg Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Malta Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Netherlands Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Poland C Y N C  Y 
Portugal Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Romania C Y N Y  Y 
Slovakia Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Slovenia Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Spain Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Sweden C Y N N  N 
UK O N N N  N 
Y: Full Member; O: Not member with opt-out; N: Not member; C: Candidate, signatory or ratification ongoing 
Figure 5 Asymmetry in the EU – Currency  
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2.3 The Eurozone as the federal core of the European Union 
As previously discussed, one of the aims of this thesis is to explore whether the EU and the 
Eurozone have different degrees of integration and that, by applying federal theory, they 
represent two different cases of federal political system. The Eurozone derives from the EU, 
and has its raison d’être within the Union, so that the former is inseparable from the latter. 
Nonetheless, the Eurozone is different, and it is possible to put forward a hypothesis that it 
represents a different case of federal political system. Pinder (1996) and Burgess (2000, 2006, 
2012) offered a framework for assessing the EU as a federal political system and were among 
the first to apply comparative federalism to the EU. By contrast, after the fresh developments 
of the EU and after the sovereign debt crisis, the assessment made by these authors should be 
updated, by focusing specifically on the Eurozone as the Federal Core of the EU, i.e. those 
member states displaying a higher level of integration, and more federalism in terms of a higher 
degree of federal state-building.  
EU integration theory has made recent steps towards different directions. In the last 
years, much attention has been paid to populist and Eurosceptic movements (Pirro & Taggart, 
2018), to assessing the process of politicisation of the EU institutions. as well as to elaborating 
some form of “Disintegration theory” (Coman & Crespy, 2019; Scheller & Eppler, 2014; Jones, 
2018) to explain cases in which EU integration reverses, or seems to reverse. Although these 
new steps into the field of EU studies are important, the aim of this thesis is to assess to what 
extent the latest developments in Euro governance can be understood as a form of creation of 
a statehood, as a form of ‘core Europe’ or Avant-Garde as advocated by Jacques Delors 
(Delors, 2001).  
The concept of core Europe is not recent. In 1994 German Minister for Finances, 
Wolfgang Schäuble (Lamers, et.al., 1994; Loth, 2016) pointed out the idea of core Europe (lit. 
Kerneuropa), based on Germany and France, sharing more genuine federal features. 
Previously, Delors had launched the idea of an “Avant-garde”, which he proposed again in a 
speech in 2001 (Delors, 2001). Though this idea was dismissed in subsequent negotiations, the 
Eurozone is a de-facto core Europe: a restricted area, sharing more developed features of state-
building, which has faced some dramatic changes over the last few years.  
Since 2008, the rift between Euro and non-Euro MS has grown significantly. 
Additionally, more EU senior representatives and policy makers have developed proposals for 
a diversified and strengthened Eurozone governance. French President Emmanuel Macron and 
Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany stated the importance of a comprehensive integration 
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of the Eurozone and a reform of EU (Merkel & Macron 2019). The European Commission, by 
the end of May 2017, had published a paper with proposals for completing Eurozone 
governance, ‘the Reflection Paper on deepening the Economic and Monetary Union’, 
(European Commission, 2017)’. As of today, after the UK withdrawal from the EU, the 
Eurozone alone accounts for 77% of the EU population (it was 67% before Brexit) and 
approximately 85% of EU GDP after the UK left (it was 71% before Brexit occurred), including 
the founding MS of the EEC and four of the five main European economies. 
As it will be analysed deeper in Chapter IV, membership of the Eurozone demands 
more and greater commitments than membership of the EU. For instance, Eurozone 
membership requires MS to respect the “convergence criteria” (Article 140(1) TFEU), and the 
EU-wide initiatives like the “European Semester” and the related legislation called “the six 
packs”. Indeed, in the last years, the MS of the Eurozone also underwent a process of further 
integration, primarily to win back trust from the markets to overcome the effects of the 
sovereign debt crisis. This led to the establishment of the ‘Fiscal Compact’, formally The 
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the European Union. This treaty was 
signed outside the framework of the European Treaties, but relies on the European legal system 
and is structured to be included inside the European Treaties. The Banking Union was another 
action to restore the composure of financial markets in the EU, which was jeopardised in the 
crisis, and aims to restart capital flows inside the Union. This initiative, as described in the 
2012 report “Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union” (van Rompuy et al., 2012) 
was considered as a step towards creating a more robust, comprehensive, economic union. In 
the document, three stages were considered, not only to complete the banking union, but to 
create a proper fiscal and economic union, and ultimately a reform of the political governance 
of the EU institutions in a more democratic and accountable form. More steps regarding the 
establishment of a fiscal union are described in the “Five Presidents” Report (2015), which is, 
to some extent, more cautious and less ambitious than the earlier report. Like the 2012 report, 
this later paper concentrates on completing the Banking Union and laying the foundations for 
the fiscal union. However, unlike the former, it is more cautious on the chapter regarding 
political accountability, which only vaguely asserts the need to make the EU and national 
parliaments more responsible, and the commitment to Europeanise the Fiscal Compact. 
There are a number of reasons why the Eurozone could be defined as a strengthened, 
symmetrical federal system inside the EU. First, the degree of integration that the Eurozone 
states have is superior to any other supranational, economic union. Some of the features of the 
Eurozone are already similar to other federations, even without having a full integration of 
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capital markets, financial transfers and fiscal resources as happens in other federal states. The 
ECB provides the management of the single currency and its monetary policies, according to 
its statute (art. 3, Protocol on the European System of Central Banks and of the European 
Central Bank). So, the ECB represents the Euro area, and is responsible for delivering its 
monetary policies according to the targets set in its statute. Therefore, the ECB is, among all 
the institutions, the one that most represents the European, supranational interest, sometimes 
against the interest of MS. 
Second, membership in the Eurozone requires what is considered as part of the “federal 
spirit” (Burgess, 2012), namely the acceptance by states of the loss of their currency as a 
national symbol, and as a tool for political intervention in monetary policy. Sharing a currency 
not only means Europeanising a state’s currency but, as the crisis and the ratification of the 
Fiscal Compact demonstrated, also accepting a common fiscal discipline in order to create 
mutual trust between MS. The sovereign debt crisis in the EU was primarily a crisis of trust 
(Roth, 2015), beginning with the revelation of the false accounting in the Greek budgets, and 
followed by the first refusal of Germany and other countries’ policy-makers to step into the 
rescue. The introduction of the Fiscal Compact should be considered as an attempt to restore 
that trust and consensus among MS on fiscal discipline, which is necessary to build any further 
development in terms of fiscal and budgetary integration, and ultimately a reform of the 
political governance of the area. Similarly, the Single Resolution Mechanism and the Banking 
Union are attempts to restore mutual confidence in the banking and financial sector in Europe.  
Third, in the case of the Eurozone, the Euro sparked a series of neofunctional spillovers 
(Schimmelfennig, 2014) that prepared the ground for further integration that otherwise would 
perhaps have been unlikely. As a matter of fact, a report from the EP, ‘The Verhofstadt Report’ 
(Verhofstadt, 2017) highlighted the necessity for differentiating EU governance and deepening 
economic integration for the Euro area. More specifically, in the Verhofstadt Report, the Euro-
countries were considered to be eligible full members of a two tier-structured EU, in which the 
full Eurozone members were automatically bound to political integration, unlike those outside 
the Eurozone. More recently, President Macron highlighted the centrality of the Eurozone as a 
cornerstone for further integration, advocating a full fiscal integration of the Euro area 
(Macron, 2017). This is because the Euro is not just an economic project; despite calls from 
some parts of the political spectrum for a looser governance of the EU, when it comes to 
Eurozone integration, the Euro has led to increasing unity and supervision from European 
institutions. In liberal-intergovernmental terms, the relationship between France and Germany, 
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and additionally, the credibility of the ECB and the European institutions, will continue to be 
the cornerstone of integration. 
Nevertheless, the Eurozone is not yet a federation, but it is more likely to move in the 
direction of greater symmetrical federalism, at least on fiscal and monetary issues. Currently, 
the Eurozone is more likely to develop those characters of statehood that distinguish federations 
from all other federal political systems, than the EU as a whole unit. This implies that, although 
the EU would not become a state in the traditional meaning, the Eurozone could become, in 
the area of economic and monetary issues, very close to a federation, if not the first, actual case 
of a supranational federation. To some extent, the Eurozone, even if it does not have a 
government in the traditional sense, already displays some of the characters of sovereignty. 
This has enormous implications on the question of sovereignty. By using the four-dimensional 
definition by Stephen Krasner (2011: 6-12) the Eurozone has a domestic sovereignty and an 
external sovereignty. The ECB is not only independent in pursuing its monetary policy, but it 
has its own representation in many international forums. This might imply that the Eurozone 
is domestically and externally sovereign, and it is also becoming a player on the international 
stage, even though its governance does not match the concept of classical sovereignty.  
Schmitt (2005) defined the concept of sovereignty as strictly interconnected with the 
state of exception, so that the sovereign is the authority who decides on the state of exception. 
According to this vision, the ECB managed to assert its role as sovereign during the most 
agitated days of the European sovereign debt crisis. By doing so, some argue that the ECB 
seized powers from the EU, and went beyond its legal limits. Others argue that the ECB did 
not grab any power, but acted within its legal framework, so that the ECB was simply operating 
within its limit and pursuing its duties, which implies the preservation of Euro, in order to fulfil 
the conditions for monetary stability as the statutes of the ECB require. In summary, the ECB 
acted within the theory of implicit powers, exerted a form of sovereignty and behaved like a 
traditional central bank, as if the Eurozone were a state. Before the crisis, this role was 
contested, with some economists and policy makers disagreeing (Bibow, 2007; Auer, 2014; 
Sinn, 2018; ) on whether the ECB had either the capability or the capacity to do so. It is a matter 
of fact that the ECB has become more and more assertive in international forums, this was 
recognised not only under the presidencies of Wim Duisberg and Jean-Claude Trichet, but 
especially and more importantly under the Draghi presidency, so that the ECB is now 
considered the centre of world monetary policies, just like the Federal Reserve. In effect, Art. 
28 of the Statute of the European Central Bank gives the ECB single external representation 
(Consolidated version of the ECB Statute, 2010); as such the ECB is sovereign, thus supporting 
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the case for assessing the Eurozone as a federal political system that has already some of the 
characters of statehood, even though it has no government in the traditional sense. However, 
even though this role for the ECB as single representative of the Eurozone is resisted to some 
extent by the main Eurozone countries, it is a matter of fact that the role of ECB in coordinating 
the position of Euro MS, this making the case for uniting external representation even greater 
(Giovannini, et al., 2012). Naturally, this increased political role of Eurozone institutions 
cannot remain as it is. This would necessarily lead to a review of current EU governance, which 
would perhaps involve more control and overview from the EP, and the Commission 
increasingly playing the role of a traditional government, especially as a political counterpart 
of the ECB; on the other hand, it will increase the activism of the Eurogroup as the 
intergovernmental counterpart (Puetter, 2014; 2016; Conceição-Heldt, 2016) to both the ECB 
and the Commission. 
Currently, the Eurozone is a currency union without fiscal transfers and without an ad 
hoc budget, although some proposals like the Budgetary Instrument were made (even though 
the post-Covid 19 policies made all of these obsolete). The budget concerns the entire EU, not 
only the Eurozone and, after the departure of the United Kingdom, Denmark will retain the 
only remaining opt-out from Euro adoption, although it is Member of the ERM II, and thus a 
de facto Euro country. It is not clear how long the EU will continue with this division, but it is 
a matter of fact that the dynamic of the Eurozone will affect the dynamics of the entire EU, and 
therefore an assessment of the Eurozone as a federal political system within another federal 
system should be done.  
In the area of federal studies, the difference between the EU as a whole and the 
Eurozone was highlighted for the first time in the 1990s, with the proposal and ratification of 
the Treaty of Maastricht. John Pinder (1996) argued that the EMU was one of the steps towards 
the federal project, together with the single market. The EMU could have been the pillar for a 
federal union, since this could have resulted in an enhanced and more comprehensive role for 
supranational intuitions in the EU, and in the end to political union. The documents of the 
Union of European Federalists in the same decade (UEF resolution on Single Currency, 1996; 
Devesa, 2018), highlighted the role of economic and monetary integration as a necessary step, 
but not enough in its own right, towards a federal union. Since the start of the crisis, the most 
significant steps in terms of integration were those regarding the Eurozone, shaping the main 
aspects of the currency union. Since the beginning of the crisis, the Eurozone has developed 
and increased its degree of federalism, and much more so than the EU as a whole. Again, the 
implication here is to make a case for assessing the EU and the Eurozone separately, as two 
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different dynamics, and rates, of integration, as well considering these as different forms of 
federalism. 
Some (Verheugen, 2012; Cooper, 2017) would question the need to treat the EU and 
the Eurozone as two different cases. This objection is based on the fact that the legal framework 
of the EU is single and non-separable. Even intergovernmental Euro-focused Treaties, which 
currently sit outside the framework of the Treaties, i.e. the Fiscal Compact, must be 
incorporated into the European Treaties (as re-asserted in the Five Presidents’ Report). 
Additionally, MEPs from both non-Euro and Eurozone MS have the right to vote on Euro-
related issues, so that within the EP there is a form of “West Lothian Question”, that should be 
addressed via a “Eurozone votes for Eurozone laws” treaty change. Although these objections 
are consistent, there are other elements that require us to decouple the Eurozone from the EU, 
at least according to federal theory.  
For instance, I must consider the growing role of the Eurogroup, which only includes 
Euro MS, as well as the role of its presidency. The role of this institution has developed so 
extensively that it currently overshadows that of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council 
(ECOFIN) where, unlike in the EP, ministers of non-Euro MS are already prevented from 
voting on single currency related issues. Therefore, part of the objection is substantiated, since 
the Euro is legally the currency of the Union and all 27 MS are legally obliged to join the 
Eurozone, with the exception of Denmark. This is because the architecture of the Eurozone, 
and that of the EU, are conceived to be, in the future, a whole single unity. This would suggest 
that any assessment of the EU and the Eurozone should therefore be done simultaneously, 
especially as the case of the Eurozone has developed inside the EU.  
As a counter-argument, I argue that from the outset of the crisis in 2008, the Eurozone 
and EU have represented two different cases within the same supranational framework, but 
politically and economically, the Eurozone is now more closely integrated than the EU as a 
whole. As I have established, the EU is an asymmetric form of supranational federalism, with 
areas where intergovernmental and confederal elements still prevail. Membership of the single 
currency, on the other hand, is a symmetric form of supranational federalism, wherein the 
intergovernmental and confederal elements are relatively weaker, and Europeanisation is 
stronger. Therefore, assessing the Eurozone as a separate, distinct federal system is necessary 
to understand how the entire EU might evolve as a federal system. Additionally, although there 
is still scepticism among some political representatives about the concept of multi-speed 
Europe, some of the Eastern European countries in the Visegrad group seem to not entirely 
support the process of integration. This might also imply that instead of a multi-speed system, 
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the EU could be a de facto, multi-tier system, in which some states, even if they are legally 
bound to the principle of Ever closer Union, pursue other targets (Rogers, 2017). Based on 
these considerations, the Eurozone should be assessed as a federal system by itself, both in the 
context of a multispeed/multi-tier EU in which it would become the formal framework of the 
Union, and also in the case where the Eurozone actually includes all its 27 MS.  
Therefore, investigating the case of the Eurozone should help federal scholars to assess 
what happened in terms of differentiated integration, how supranational federalism in Europe 
developed in the last years, and how it can be understood. 
The development of the Eurozone as a federation-style federal political system is also 
likely to change the architecture of the entire EU in the future. It is a matter of fact that this 
process could potentially change the structure of the EU budget, and from a more 
neofunctionalist point of view, trigger spill-overs in other meaningful areas of European 
integration.  
2.4 Conclusions 
When applying federalism as a process of polity and state-building, the EU is a multi-tier 
federal system, with different, coexisting, levels of federal arrangements and integration. In 
summary, the main two levels are the EU and the Eurozone, with a special regard to the specific 
cases of Denmark and the United Kingdom. The EU per se already has some limited 
characteristics of statehood, and within it, the Eurozone has the strongest elements, since the 
limited elements of statehood of the EU itself are boosted by the presence of a single currency, 
the ECB and the framework of governance of the single currency. The fact that the Eurozone 
already displays some elements of sovereignty, without having a government in the traditional 
sense, is going to be one of the most significant questions to be addressed in the EU architecture 
in the next years.  
More specifically, it is not just worth investigating how the EU will change, but what 
other areas are most likely to be affected by this situation. As argued, federalism can help 
academia to find an answer. For years, federalism has been avoided as a term both by sections 
of academia, and political decision-makers and representatives. However, the developments 
that the EU has faced in recent years require it to be no longer assessed as an international 
organisation, but as a federal political system under construction. Here the target is not to assess 
whether the outcome of a federal state will, or must be achieved. By contrast, the objective is 
to demonstrate that some processes can be better explained by comparing the development of 
the EU to other similar developments in mature federations. More specifically, federalism 
   
 
108 
 
could explain some recent developments in the Eurozone; its need for further completion, and 
the specific demands for greater, and more consistent political legitimacy. The EU, or more 
specifically the Eurozone, is the most successful supranational federal-type system between 
states, who retain vast portions of sovereignty in the framework of a federal political system, 
and which displays some characteristics of sovereignty. 
The following chapter of this thesis aims not only to test the hypothesis of the Eurozone 
as a distinct federal political system, but also to discover what implications this has for the 
future of the Union. The attempt is not only to revive federalism as theory of European 
integration, but, as explained above, to incorporate elements of intergovernmentalism and 
neofunctionalism within federalist theory. Other authors, such as Jean-Claude Piris in 2012, 
have advocated the case for more integration among willing MS, but not always mentioned the 
Euro framework as the sole fault-line between willing and unwilling states. In opposition to 
other commentators, such as Stiglitz or Krugman, or hardcore Europhobes, the hypothesis of 
this thesis is that the Euro will not only continue to exist, but that the management of the single 
currency will continue to be one of the main driver of European integration.  
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3 Chapter III. Eurozone: historical background  
3.1 Introduction 
The long and tortuous evolution of the single currency and the EMU as a core element of EU 
integration, and as an EU exclusive competence (TEU, 2007) in a way mirrors the competences 
of federal states (Thygesen, 2016; Sadeh & Verdun, 2007). In this chapter, the main phases in 
the development of monetary integration will be reviewed, and I research how this has 
developed and changed over the years, how these phases are framed in a federal state-building 
process, and how the concepts of monetary union on the one hand, and federal state-building 
on the other, are interconnected. In this framework, I also examine how EMU is related to the 
concept of “core Europe” (Fischer, 2000), and again, how this relates to the concept of federal 
state-building.  
As I analyse further on in the Chapter, the single currency is one of the most prominent 
symbols of European integration, alongside the internal market and the trade policy of the EU 
(Kaelbaerer, 2004). As discussed in chapter II, currency has represented, since the Middle 
Ages, one of the traditional elements of statehood (Issing, 2006), but it has developed in its 
traditional form since the 17th century almost simultaneously with the development of the 
modern state, and kept developing throughout the 18th and 19th century until the 20th century, 
aligning with the formula “one nation, one money” (Kaelbarer, 2004). Even today, the presence 
of the single currency represents one of the most significant elements of state-building at the 
European level. For this reason, the history of the creation of the single currency might 
represent a sort of blueprint for federalism at European level.  
Right after WWII, a form of monetary coordination was in force as to facilitate the 
European Payments Union (Ungerer, 1997). This institution was an initiative of the 
Organisation for European Economic Cooperation, and played an important role in removing 
trade barriers and re-establishing currency convertibility between European currencies, in a 
situation of post-war reconstruction. The monetary integration of the EEC was not within the 
scope of the Treaty of Rome (Du Bois, 2005). However, it was only a few years after the 
creation of the EEC that the issue of monetary integration was raised. These first steps date 
back to 1962, when the Commission published the first proposals for Europeanising monetary 
policies (ibid.). From that moment, a number of different proposals emerged, but it took around 
eight years for the MS to agree to have an official plan drafted. At the 1969 European Summit 
at The Hague, the MS tasked Pierre Werner with coming up with a plan to achieve a stronger 
monetary integration. As a result, in 1970 the Werner Report was presented, the first time a 
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plan for integrating monetary policies was presented as a strategy for all MS, but for different 
reasons, it was not properly followed-up and failed to achieve its target (Steinherr,1994; 
Mongelli, 2009).  
These years also saw the emergence of two different approaches to the creation of a 
single monetary policy and a future single currency: the economist approach, supported by 
German authorities and economists, and the monetarist approach, supported by the French 
authorities and the academic world (Maes, 2003, 2007). This clash of approaches was to 
become a constant feature for many years (Mouron Druol, 2013), before it was reconciled. As 
I will see later, the economist approach viewed the achievement of a currency union and a 
single currency as the final step of a process of economic integration and convergence whereas 
the monetarist approach, by contrast, argued that economic convergence and integration was 
possible thanks to monetary integration and therefore, the monetary union could not be the 
final step of such a process.  
The implementation of the Werner Plan was also complicated by the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods System, leading to the subsequent attempt to recreate some form of monetary 
stability through the creation of the Snake in the Tunnel i.e. a band for monetary pegging, 
whose outcome was further prevented by the international volatility caused by the first (1973) 
and the second (1979) Oil Crises.  
Notwithstanding these setbacks, during this period the European Unit of Account 
(EUA), and the European Monetary Cooperation Fund were created. These provided the very 
first structures of a monetary union, which was further developed in the following years. In 
1979, monetary integration improved with the establishment of the European Monetary System 
(EMS), and the creation of the European Currency Unit (ECU). Under the leadership of Jacques 
Delors as President of the European Commission (1985-1994), there was a new commitment 
towards the establishment of a single currency, ultimately leading to the Treaty of Maastricht. 
The Delors presidency represented a phase of changes which witnessed the passage from the 
European Monetary System to the EMU, and ultimately the establishment of a single currency. 
This development was possible thanks to the combination of a slew of factors: the federalist 
efforts of Delors, the political entente between Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand 
(Moravcsik, 1998; Van Esch, 2012) and the window of opportunities opened in the eve of 
German unification. The years between the ratification of Maastricht, and the changeover to 
the Euro as single currency in 2002, were crucial, since in those years the structure of Euro 
governance was created.  
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Those years align with those that Delors described in his report as the “Second Phase” 
for the launch of the single currency (Delors, 1989), in which the basis of the current framework 
of the Eurozone was formed. From 2002 to 2009 the Euro developed progressively in the world 
currency markets and proved to be an important contribution to integrating European financial 
markets, even though the introduction of the Euro per se was not enough to drive economic 
convergence in the Eurozone (EU Commission, 2008). However, the process of monetary 
integration was imperilled by the European sovereign debt crisis. This crisis almost destroyed 
the integrity of the Eurozone, and opened a new phase of changes in European governance, 
which is still going on, and highlighted how incomplete the EMU was when the crisis erupted.  
Within these phases that preceded the entry into force of the EMU, some exogenous events 
shaped the process of the creation of the single currency. Some of these events were triggered 
by events outside Europe and outside European agency: the end of the Bretton Woods 
Agreement and the oil crises, and in more recent times, the subprime mortgage crisis. Others 
were a combination of exogenous and endogenous causes, like the Black Wednesday crisis or 
the sovereign debt crisis. 
In this chapter I will assess the hypothesis that, during these decades, the governance 
of monetary integration developed from an intergovernmental to a supranational structure, 
mirroring and incorporating elements of federal state-building. The history of monetary 
integration will be reviewed, highlighting those developments in monetary integration which 
most closely match the characteristics of federal political systems the most. 
3.2 Developing monetary integration 
3.2.1 The Beginning of the Economic Monetary Union: From the ‘Great Forgotten’ to the 
European Account Unit (1962-1974). 
Because of the existence of the Bretton Woods System, in the first phase of European 
integration there was minimal debate over the question of a common currency; the debate was 
mainly focused on customs and trade (Scheller, 2004). This seeming disinterest was because 
the founding MS of the EEC were also members of the Bretton Woods System (ibid.: 15).  
The Bretton Woods System provided a framework to maintain currency stability 
through pegging between gold and the US Dollar on one side, and on the other side between 
the US Dollar and the other currencies of the Bretton Woods System. As a consequence, the 
currencies of Western Europe and of the EEC MS were effectively pegged against each other. 
This meant that, at the beginning of the integration process, there was already a form of 
currency union keeping the European MS together, thus granting a relatively stable monetary 
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system. In the framework of the first EEC treaty, there was barely a basic infrastructure of a 
first core for the EMU. 
In fact, on monetary issues, the Treaty of Rome did contain some elements relating to 
monetary coordination (European Commission, 1970). The Treaty of Rome had the 
liberalisation of the movement of capital as one of the purposes of the treaty (Article 67). In 
article 105 of the Treaty of Rome, coordination among MS was required for achieving the 
purposes stated in article 104: i.e. that each MS had to 
pursue the economic policy needed to ensure the equilibrium of its overall balance of 
payments and to maintain confidence in its currency, while taking care to ensure a high 
level of employment and a stable level of prices (Treaty of Rome, 1957: Article 104).  
In article 105 (ibid.), it was pointed out that the Monetary Committee was the organ indicated 
in the treaties for achieving this, which more specifically had the duty of reviewing the 
monetary and financial situation of MS. 
Additionally, according to Article 107 (ibid.), the Commission had the authority to ask 
a MS to correct its exchange rate, when this was assumed to be distorting internal competition 
and was inconsistent with the purpose of the treaty. In fact, exchange rates were no longer 
considered as a national concern, but as a common, European issue. In this framework, the 
Treaty of Rome laid the first foundations for European monetary governance. In this phase, 
these foundations were essentially intergovernmental, and had relatively limited supranational 
oversight (Wolff, 1957), but it was still the very first, albeit limited, Europeanisation of 
monetary policies. There was an early recognition (Delouvrier, 1957) that there was an 
empirical correlation between the principle of a common market and the principle of monetary 
stability, especially since one of the purposes of the treaty was the liberalisation of internal 
financial markets.  
Although the issue of currency union was marginal, since it was delegated to the Bretton 
Woods System and eventually to the USA, the stability of exchange rates was already a core 
element in the Treaty of Rome, and was considered as one of the cornerstones of a functioning 
single market. Again, in the EEC the institutional framework was still fundamentally 
intergovernmental, and the role of the Commission was still very limited. Nevertheless, the 
EEC represented a first step, not only because it extended the experience of the ECSC to most 
economic areas, but also because it was enough to introduce some new elements for more 
integrated monetary policies and remained untouched until the Single European Act introduced 
major changes. Despite all this, monetary integration was so marginal that it was later dubbed 
as the great forgotten of the Treaty of Rome (Carreau, 1971). 
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The lack of provision for monetary policies in the Treaty did not prevent the 
Commission from taking the initiative in stating its position regarding the next steps of 
monetary union. The first proposal for a European currency policy was put forward in 1962, 
under the presidency of Walter Hallstein, who did not hide his federalist motivations and plans 
(Hallstein, 1973), and as such created a conflict with President Charles De Gaulle (Mueller, 
2012). In the Commission Action Plan, also known under the name of Marjolin memorandum 
(after the French diplomat Robert Marjolin, who presided over its development), the authors 
highlighted how economic integration was functional to achieving a political union in the field 
of the economy (Marjolin, 1962; 1986). In this memorandum, monetary policies were said to 
be a complementary component to the development of an internal market, together with 
competition, development, and structural policies. This memorandum was specifically meant 
to introduce the launch of a new phase of economic integration which, unlike the first negative 
integration, was going to be positive, i.e. based on initiatives focused on coordinating and 
integrating policies rather than removing obstacles. (European Commission, 1962). 
Chapter VIII of the Action Plan was specifically focused on monetary policy. This 
chapter not only highlighted the importance of price stability, but also how the Bretton Woods 
System was constantly under pressure due to its international configuration. Therefore, it 
advocated the creation of a European reserve currency, through a progressive coordination of 
monetary policies, with the ultimate purpose of merging them all (Chang 2016). More 
specifically, the Memorandum proposed a strict convergence of MS’ monetary policies, with 
the purpose of establishing a fixed exchange rate system, whose fluctuation bands had to be 
stricter than those envisioned by Bretton Woods (European Commission, 1962). In fact, the 
Bretton Woods System in the 1960s was already in difficulty, thus leading the Commission to 
play a more active role in the field of monetary stability, as well as in the completion of the 
single market programme. Monetary stability was considered a conditio sine qua non for a 
stable and efficient single market (ibid.) and from a broader, Monnetian perspective, the 
economic cornerstone for a future unified polity. Other than a system of fixed exchange rates 
with very narrow variation bands, the report mentioned free movement of capital as one of the 
main targets for a working internal market. Moreover, and the most salient element for this 
analysis, was the proposal of creating another committee composed of governors of National 
Central Banks, to work along with the Monetary Committee (ibid.). The memorandum also 
advanced proposals for addressing external representation for monetary-related issues. Here, 
the Commission was proposed as being responsible for shaping a common position in 
international monetary forums, following the recommendations of the Monetary Committee. 
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This proposal was to make external representation more efficient and “to make it work as a 
single unit” (Marjolin, 1962). While the Commission’s proposal was still essentially consistent 
with an intergovernmental scheme, it was, however, the first step in developing greater 
integration in the field of monetary policy, despite the absence of this in the Treaty of Rome. 
The proposal the Commission submitted to the Council was less ambitious than the one 
contained in Marjolin’s memorandum. Nevertheless, the Council Summit in 1963, while 
dismissing some of the proposals contained in the memorandum (like for instance, and most 
importantly, the external role of the Commission), adopted the proposals for the Committee of 
Central Banks Governors, the Budgetary Committee and the Committee of Economic Policy, 
which came in addition to the already existing Monetary Committee. These were finalised in 
the Council Meeting in April 1964 (Official Journal of the European Community 1964). 
After these preliminary proposals, discussions and debates on the issue went on, and 
efforts to tackle the increasing volatility in the currency exchange system were made at the 
intergovernmental level. It must not be forgotten that these years coincided with one of the 
most critical setbacks for integration, caused by De Gaulle’s nationalistic stance on the EEC 
(Mueller, 2012; Mollin, 2005). The 1960s are to be remembered as the years of the ‘empty 
chair crisis’ (Ludlow, 1999), and proposals for monetary integration were affected as well, 
even though the French president had an interest in counterbalancing the Bretton Woods 
System with a more balanced and symmetric international currency, mirroring French (and 
European) economies too (Bordo, Simard, and White, 1994; 1995). As a matter of fact, few 
years later, with the departure of De Gaulle, some opportunities opened for a more ambitious 
approach to monetary integration, even though France remained mostly ambivalent. At the 
same time in fact, all the proposals considered as markedly federalist were barely mentioned 
in other public speeches for fear of pre-emptive rejections, although Commission officers 
continued working on this topic.  
One of the most active proponents of economic and monetary integration was 
Luxemburg Prime Minister Pierre Werner. The Luxembourgish politician had been involved 
in developing an integrated monetary policy for the Community since the Marjolin report in 
1962 (Danescu, 2015). In 1970, Werner proposed a five-point action programme, based on 
mutual consultation on monetary policies, with the end-goal the establishment of a single unit 
of account, the stabilisation and fixing of exchange rates, more consistent mechanisms of 
coordination and a more consistent application of Articles 108 and 109 of the treaty on 
competition and state aids (Werner, 1991).  
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One month after Werner’s proposal, under the chairmanship of Raymond Barre, Vice-
President of the Committee of the European Commission in charge for Economic and Financial 
Affairs and the Statistical Office, the Commission submitted a proposal to MS’ governments, 
contained in the report "On appropriate policy in the Community on current economic and 
monetary problems" (European Commission, 1968). This was followed the year after by “The 
Commission Memorandum to the Council on coordinating of Economic-policies and monetary 
cooperation within the community.” This memorandum, which is also known as the First Barre 
Plan, brought back the proposals contained in the Second Stage Memorandum and proposed 
the elimination of inter-currency fluctuations and the creation of a system that could have 
finally led to a long-lasting framework for monetary convergence and free movement of 
capital. The document pursued more cooperation, and an enhanced role for both the Monetary 
Committee, and for the Commission as guarantor of European monetary coordination, but was 
already less ambitious than the five-point action plan advanced by Werner. Barre’s first 
proposal was focused on combining the economist approach supported by the German 
government and the monetarist approach proposed by the French government. However, 
Barre’s proposals, although advocating the presence of a political authority, focused on 
pragmaticism and on combining the two visions where possible.  
A year later, Barre submitted the second of his documents: the second Barre Plan, 
whose contents were mostly adopted in Werner’s final proposal. This second proposal by Barre 
was less ambitious than the first. For instance, the second iteration did not contain proposals 
for a mutual assistance clause (Barre, in European Commission, 1969). Nevertheless, the 
second Barre proposal met with greater acceptance by the MS (Carli, 1969). These documents 
were partly adopted at the Hague Summit in 1969, and were preparatory for the work of the 
Werner Committee, appointed by the Council.  
The First and Second Barre Plans, and the Werner Plan, were not the only proposals 
presented. In fact, after the Hague Summit in 1969, other MS representatives made public 
different proposals between the end of the conference and the publication the Werner Plan. For 
instance, a proposal was made on behalf of the German Government by Karl Schiller, German 
Minister for Economic Affairs.  
The Schiller memorandum was strongly focused on harmonising monetary policies, 
and reducing fluctuations between currencies. The memorandum proposed a schedule of 
objectives at the end of which it vaguely mentioned the introduction of a single currency, and 
the establishment of a Central Bank to replace the board of governors, as the final steps of the 
process. In some ways, Schiller’s memorandum represents a manifesto of an economist, 
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convergency-based approach. The German plan, presented in February 1970, is an important 
document, and should be kept in mind, because it is a witness to the importance given to the 
success of monetary union, being pivotal as a precondition for the realisation of political 
integration (Ungerer, 1997). Additionally, Schiller’s proposals took into account that the 
development of monetary integration had to go together with a simultaneous passage of 
competences to the Commission and to the European Parliament (ibid.) This plan prioritised 
economic convergence and monetary harmonisation over other elements, such as integrating 
the institutional framework, which was left to a later phase.  
Another plan was proposed by Jean-Charles Snoy et d'Oppuers, Belgian Minister of 
Finance. In particular, this plan sought to combine both convergence-based and monetary-
based policies, and, interestingly, this plan pursued the establishment of a banking union 
together with the introduction of a single currency. A monetary-based approach was contained 
in the first Werner proposal too, that he proposed on behalf of Luxembourg. In fact Werner 
advocated the introduction of a single unit of account, to be gradually introduced in the market 
after reducing fluctuations among EU currencies to a minimum, a process of harmonisation 
and then the establishment of a cooperation board to be turned into a central bank modelled 
after the Federal Reserve. As in the Belgian plan, presented by Snoy et d’Oppuers, the 
European Unit of Account represented the basis for a single currency. 
 
  
Figure 6 Development of Currency Plans 1962-1971 
All the plans discussed above shared an aim; creating the infrastructure for a common 
monetary policy. What emerges from these documents is that the idea of a single currency for 
the European Community, modelled after national currencies, was a universally accepted idea. 
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The only differences were in the way to achieve the aim, and the proposed structures of 
governance, which differed in all the proposals preceding the Werner plan.  
3.2.2 The Werner Report (1970) 
The Werner Report was divided into seven chapters, highlighting the objectives and stages for 
the introduction of an EMU. The aims of the report were to increase European influence on the 
world stage (i.e. external sovereignty), as well as reducing internal economic differences in the 
Community. The report proposed a progressive transfer of competences to the EU Institutions 
over monetary policies, the harmonisation of fiscal policies and the creation of a common 
market for capital. In order to respect the principle of democratic accountability, the report 
advocated the transfer to an EP, and the establishment of a form of “federal reserve system” 
for the European Community, but not of a European Central bank. The report foresaw the need 
for a general treaty reform to change the institutional framework, and allow proposals to be 
introduced in the legal framework of the European Community (Werner Committee, 1970).  
 
Summary of the path of European Monetary integration before the Sovereign Debt Crisis 
(1958 to 2009) 
1958 Establishment of the Monetary Committee 
1962 A proposal for economic and monetary union among the members of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) is first floated in the Marjolin Memorandum. 
1964 A Committee of Governors of the central banks of the Member States of the EEC is 
formed to institutionalise the cooperation among EEC central banks. 
1970 The Werner Report sets out a plan to realise an economic and monetary union in the 
Community by 1980. 
1972 A system (the “snake”) for the progressive narrowing of the margins of fluctuation 
between the currencies of the Member States of the EEC is established. 
1973 The European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF) is set up to ensure the proper 
operation of the snake. 
1974 the ECOFIN Council adopted a Decision to foster the convergence of economic 
policies and a Directive on stability, growth and full employment. 
1977 Roy Jenkins proposes his plan to resume the process for an economic and monetary 
union 
1979 The European Monetary System (EMS) is created. 
1987 Strengthening of the EMS through the Basle-Nyborg Agreement. 
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1988 The European Council mandates a committee of experts under the chairmanship of 
Jacques Delors (the “Delors Committee”) to make proposals for the realisation of EMU. 
1989 The “Delors Report” is submitted to the European Council. 
1989 The European Council agrees on the realisation of EMU in three stages. 
1990 Completion of "One Money, One Market" evaluation that had been commissioned in 
1988 as an input for the Delors Report. 
1990 Stage One of EMU begins in July. 
1990 An Intergovernmental Conference to prepare for Stages Two and Three of EMU is 
launched. 
1992 The Treaty on European Union (the “Maastricht Treaty”) is signed in February. 
1993 The Treaty on European Union enters into force. 
1994 Stage Two of EMU begins and the EMI is established. 
1997 The European Council in June agrees on the Stability and Growth Pact. 
1998 In May Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland are considered to fulfil the necessary conditions 
for the adoption of the euro as their single currency; the Members of the Executive Board of 
the ECB are appointed. 
1998 The ECB and the ESCB are established in June. 
1998 In October the ECB announces the strategy and the operational framework for the 
single monetary policy it will conduct from 1 January 1999. 
1999 In January Stage Three of EMU begins; the euro is launched; conversion rates are fixed 
irrevocably; a single monetary policy is established for the euro area. 
2001 Greece joins the euro area. 
2002 The euro cash changeover: euro banknotes and coins are introduced and become sole 
legal tender in the euro area by the end of February 2002. 
2004 In May the national central banks (NCBs) of the ten new EU Member States join the 
ESCB. 
2007 Slovenia joins the euro area. and Bulgaria and Rumania join the EU and ESCB 
2008 Cyprus and Malta join the euro area 
2009 Slovakia joins the euro area. 
Figure 7 Summary of the path of Monetary integration (1958 to 2009).Original Sources: Scheller (2004), 
German Federal Bank (2005), Mongelli (2009)  
 
   
 
119 
 
3.2.3 The case of the UK and Italy and their attitude towards the single currency: A federal 
perspective  
Simultaneously with the creation of the single currency, one of the deepest rifts in the debate 
on the future of the integration started. The projects for a single currency found a very strong 
and staunch opponent in Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. To avoid 
this, the future Iron Lady proposed a plan based on increasing the usage of the ECU, while 
improving and enforcing currency competition and liberalisation inside the community (Issing, 
1999), drawing on limited elements of the first Barre plan. Thatcher’s plan was first proposed 
by Friedrich von Hayek in a paper dating back to 1976 (von Hayek, 1976; Issing, 1999). In 
fact, Thatcher’s opposition was primarily based on ideological, rather than economic reasons. 
One of the main ideologists of her economic programmes, Austrian philosopher von Hayek, 
had criticised the projects of the EMS, and claimed that it would have the effect of recreating 
at the supranational level a government monopoly on the issue and control of currency (Von 
Hayek, 1978: 126). von Hayek, despite being his history as a classic liberal supporter of 
European federalism (Violi, 2015), had over the years become increasingly hostile towards 
ideas of monetary integration, as well as an opponent of the idea of national, central monopolies 
on money supply. Thatcher’s proposal for the full liberalisation and circulation of currencies, 
based on free competition as designed by von Hayek, was ideologically rooted in the rejection 
of European federalism, regarded as centralisation, and generally of state intervention, to be 
rejected both at national and supranational level (Thatcher, 1988).  
With the prospect of German reunification and rapid changes in the European context, 
Thatcher sharpened her opposition to the single currency (Thatcher, 1990). In her mind, the 
establishment of a single currency (together with the introduction of a social dimension of 
Europe) was the first step towards the creation of a super-state. She did not dismiss the ECU 
and SME and, ultimately, did not oppose the creation of a central bank, but she stated that her 
commitment towards monetary matters was not going to be more than supporting a larger use 
of the ECU, as asserted in the famous speech given in Bruges in 1988 (Thatcher, 1988).  
In Bruges, even though her speech was meant to offer a pro-European, but 
intergovernmental alternative to federalist proposals, Thatcher’s position inspired and offered 
the ideological grounds for British Eurosceptics, and for opposition to the adoption of the Euro, 
(and ultimately, decades later, for Brexit). Nonetheless, as planning for a single currency 
together with a reform of the EU governance progressed, her opposition strengthened too. In a 
debate at the commons she stated her three “noes” against transforming the Union into a 
federation or any other polity reproducing the features of a federation: no to the EP as 
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supranational democratic parliament, no to the Commission as official executive, no to the 
Council as supranational senate. A few years later, in her later book and testament Statecraft: 
strategies for a changing world, she described the European single currency as “The most 
substantial manifestation of the design to create a fully-fledged superstate” (Thatcher, 2002: 
351), adding that “This project is essentially political, rather than economic. The power to issue 
a currency is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty, not some symbolic or technical matter” 
(ibid.). Therefore, her opposition to the single currency was deeply rooted in her rejection of 
the adoption by the EU of any element that might have led towards the development of a federal 
political system with features of statehood. The single currency was in fact the most tangible 
symbol of European supranational sovereignty, and this was incompatible with her vision of a 
Community as an enhanced single market, where supranational sovereignty and national 
sovereignty were seen as incompatible, in a zero-sum-game; hence Thatcher’s fervent rejection 
of any alternative model of polity, that could question this vision. 
After her departure, (forced, among others, by the Pro-European wing of the Tories), 
and despite having negotiated an opt-out from the adoption of the single currency, Prime 
Minister John Major struggled to get the treaty ratified because of the internal opposition of 
the Tory right-wing (Crowson, 2018). Even though the subsequent Labour government was 
more open to discussing the adoption of the Euro, and positive about European integration, 
Blair’s cabinet failed to build a case for joining EMU from its inception. Some members of the 
government were sceptical about the adoption of the single currency, and the most outspoken 
critic of the move in the ruling party was Gordon Brown (Brown, 2003; 2010), Chancellor of 
the Exchequer. The scepticism of a substantial portion of the Labour party (Usherwood, 2007), 
like Brown himself, , and opposition from a very large portion of the British population and of 
the Conservative party, were amongst the elements that led to the decision against the adoption 
of the single currency. The simultaneous emergence the first cores of the United Kingdom 
Independence Party (known originally as the “Anti-Federalist League”), teaches us that the 
connection between the Euro as single currency and the idea of European state-building  (or 
European Super-State, in the pejorative wording of the British Anti-EU narrative), was very 
powerful in the mind-sets of the British political elite, as well as of its citizens. Thus, it is clear 
that monetary integration actually created a rift over the understanding of the nature and 
purpose of integration, which might be considered as the beginning of Brexit, years and years 
before the referendum on the withdrawal. 
In a way Italy represents an opposite case. Even though dissatisfaction in Italian public 
opinion on the handling of the crisis is currently still very high (Eurostat, 2018), Italy and 
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Italian elites were overwhelmingly in favour of the adoption of the Euro. The prospect of 
adopting the Euro offered the promise of ending the country’s interminable monetary 
instability, and to consolidate Italy as one of the most important MS in the future of Europe. 
Nonetheless, this ambitious plan was not without risks. In fact, for some economies, adopting 
the Euro required a greater effort of consolidation. One of the most significant cases was that 
of Italy.  
The country reached the appointed date for adopting the single currency unprepared. After the 
end of the Golden Age in 1973, Italy faced a decade long era of high inflation, (ranging from 
10% to up to 25 % per year), followed by a decade of public overspending. These economic 
manoeuvres, which aimed at keeping the rates of GDP growth rates moderately high after the 
end of Bretton Woods and the first Oil Crisis, had the side effect of ruining the reputation of 
the Italian Lire (Vacca, 2003) as stable currency, until the emancipation of the Central Bank 
from the control of the Ministry of Finance (Andreatta, 1991) and the stabilisation of inflation 
in the 1980s came into effect. Additionally, the economic policies pursued in the 1980s, with 
the goal to increase GDP output, sparked one of the greatest surges of public indebtedness in 
national history (Giarda, 2011). So, when the Treaty of Maastricht became effective in 1993, 
the currency had just experienced one of the worst speculative attacks in its history, while the 
Italian state had one of the greatest ratios of public debt to GDP in the world, second only to 
that of Japan (Istat, 1995). Given the impossibility of delaying the introduction of the single 
currency (as the Prodi-Aznar summit in 1996 proved (Battocchi, 2011), Prime Minister 
Romano Prodi, and most of the Italian establishment and public opinion, made the membership 
of the Euro almost a matter of national honour and prestige (ibid.). Italy undertook some of the 
harshest macroeconomic policies in its recent history to meet the criteria for adopting the Euro 
as founding member, despite the concerns and the scepticism of the German Federal Bank and 
of the German government and many economists (Giavazzi & Alesina, 1997). As a matter of 
fact, it is reported that Ciampi, former president of the Italian Central Bank and later Minister 
for Finance, and the German Federal Bank President Hans Tietmeyer had heated debates over 
the adoption of Euro by Italy (Bastasin, 2016), with the former calling the Mediterranean 
country unprepared to adopting the single currency.  
These two examples are quintessential of two different approaches that were sparked 
by the creation of the single currency. On the one hand, the rejection and the refusal due to 
viewing the Euro as the definitive loss of traditional sovereignty, on the other hand, the 
adoption of the Euro was considered a strategic objective and a chance to remain in the first 
class of the decision-makers of Europe and a way to consolidate the adoption of an European 
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path, i.e. a gain in sovereignty after decades of value and reputation loss for the Italian Lira and 
the Italian economic system. This tale of two MS is not just about different political 
preferences. The way these two countries behaved and chose policies represents an example of 
how European integration, as a process of federal state-building could lead to very different 
outcomes. In fact, in the case of Italy, the adoption of the Euro represented the natural 
development of the building of an European system, as many founding fathers of the Italian 
Republic and statesmen wished, other than a new chance to regain influence and stabilise the 
economy. Whereas, in the British case, to many it meant the creation of a supranational layer 
of government, destined to replace the nation. A vision where federal state-building and the 
existence of a MS are complementary and a play a positive sum game, opposed to a vision 
where the existence of the two is considered as mutually exclusive. The fact was that monetary 
integration had such a powerful, state-like content that made it unacceptable to a very large 
portion of the British audience. In the end, it might be stated that it is the fact that the EU has 
this state-building content, and it is not a simple economic project, was the original sin of Brexit 
(Bransden, 2017).   
It is not a case that, whereas in Italy the pro-European discourse has been, at least since 
the late 1970s until the populist surge in 2018, almost unanimous across the main political 
forces, and European federalism since the end of WWII always played a role in the intellectual 
debate, in the British case, despite a flourishing debate and tradition (Burgess, 1995), it failed 
to find approval among the political class. Therefore, while in Italy, since the foundation of the 
EEC and more importantly after the Eurocommunist phase in Italy (Ferrari, 2007), Italy’s 
adhesion to European integration was considered more and more as an irreversible choice, this 
was not the case in Britain. The emergence of anti-EU movements in the UK since the 1990s 
(Morris, 1997), simultaneously with the birth of the EU and the Euro, is perhaps the evidence 
of an existential rejection of any form of supranational federal state-building. 
3.2.4 From 2002 to 2009: The first years of the Euro. From the changeover to the crisis  
In the end, this phase of treaty reforms which started with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 was 
concluded by the Treaty of Nice in 2001. This last treaty change, the third in less than a decade 
after Maastricht and Amsterdam, tried not only to address some of the unresolved issues of the 
Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties but, after the initiative by Joschka Fischer in a speech in 
2000 (Loch, 2015), was also a more ambitious attempt to reform the EU towards a more federal 
path, or at least this was the intention of the German Minister for Foreign Affairs.  
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Even though the Treaty of Nice did not change the shape of the EU dramatically, it 
represented a major development towards a more integrated model. In fact, the treaty increased 
areas covered by the co-decision process, and gave a greater role to the EP in the EU’s decision-
making architecture, along with the introduction of a Chapter for Social Affairs. In fact, the 
voting system of the Council was changed, in spite of arguments about the weighting for each 
country in the Council (Loth, 2015). The arguments between Chirac and Schroeder, and the 
feeling of failure in addressing the weighting system, left a feeling of incompleteness and 
failure at the end of the negotiations, thus overshadowing the successes. Nonetheless, the sense 
of mitigated success of the Treaty of Nice was one of the reasons why that phase of institutional 
changes was not over yet, but was soon followed by the proposal for a Constitutional Treaty 
(Dinan, 2004), whose main institutional changes were later introduced through the Treaty of 
Lisbon (Goebel, 2013). The troubles of the passages from Nice to Lisbon did not directly affect 
the EMU, but the Treaty of Lisbon solved some of the main problems inherent in the treaty of 
Nice (Barr & Passarelli, 2009) 
The 2000s, the first years of the European single currency, were years of transition and 
adjustment. In a sense, with the changeover, the Eurozone switched from being a virtual entity 
to a current, actual entity, whose effect and whose existence was being experienced by 
European citizens in their everyday lives. Generally, these years are seen as a moderate success 
for the single currency (Mongelli, 2008; Trichet 2009). In fact, it proved to be a stable currency 
in times of economic expansion and stability, that managed to play an important part on the 
international stage, and proved many negative forecasts of a quick collapse wrong. In those 
years, it managed to emerge as the second reserve currency of the world, taking over the 
previous role of the German Mark, which had already played this role, and even going beyond 
the previous records and the sum of pre-Euro currencies (the Euro managed to reach 30% of 
the world reserve currencies before the sovereign debt crisis in 2009, and despite subsequent 
difficulties, has always remained above 20%), as international reserve currency and as currency 
for international trade. 
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Figure 8 The Euro as reserve currency (ECB) 
Additionally, the Eurozone started enlarging with the entry of new MS, in addition to the first 
twelve: Slovenia (2007) Cyprus and Malta (2008), Slovakia (2009), Estonia (2011), Latvia 
(2014) and Lithuania (2015). However, in a report by the DG for Economic and Financial 
Affairs, bearing the signature of Klaus Regling, came an acknowledgment that, despite success 
in some areas, the EMU had issues that needed to be addressed (EU Commission, 2008) In 
fact, the report highlighted that the single currency per se was not enough to guarantee 
economic coordination, or improvements in terms of competitivity and productivity. It went on 
to highlight the need for a “single voice” in international monetary forums, and that the 
Eurozone needed a change in its governance. 
It is safe to affirm that the Euro contributed greatly to integrate the single market. Import 
and exports of goods between Eurozone MS increased from 26% to 33%, and that of services 
went up from 5% to 7%. The introduction of the Euro, however, also had a great external 
impact on third countries: non-EMU-countries increase the trade of goods and services with 
the Eurozone by 27% on average (Mongelli & Wyplosz, 2008). Additionally, business 
synchronisation within Eurozone countries after the introduction of the Euro increased 
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significantly (Campos et al., 2017) and allowed to reduce the role of geographic proximity and 
country size as main factors of economic integration. 
Generally, this era also corresponds to a dramatic phase in European integration. In 
fact, during the decade, on the institutional side, the EU underwent the greatest enlargement in 
its history, growing from 15 to 25 countries and then 27 only in few years, and finally 28 in 
2013 (Loth, 2015) after a decade of preparation after the end of the Two-Blocks System. In 
those years, European integration registered both stalemate and progress. In fact, in the 2000s 
there was a first attempt to merge the treaties into a single treaty, i.e. the Treaty establishing an 
European Constitution, which was ambitiously signed in 2004, but was rejected by both French 
and Dutch voters the year after; two events that represented at the time an unexpected wave of 
Euroscepticism in two of the six founding MS (Stefanova, 2006). That episode led to a 
dismissal of the “constitutional” process, and to the introduction of the main innovations of the 
“EU Constitution” through traditional treaty amendments. The new Treaty of Lisbon was 
signed by the EU MS on 13th December 2007, more than three years after the signature of the 
EU Constitution in Rome, and its ratification process took two further years, and faced various 
challenges (Draetta, 2009). It was rejected in a referendum in Ireland, leading to some additions 
to the treaty and a second referendum. The treaty faced further challenges from the Polish and 
Czech presidencies, and by German MP Peter Gaulweiler, who demanded a constitutional 
check by the German Federal Constitutional Court. Eventually, it entered into force on the 1st 
December 2009, at the same time that the Greek insolvency crisis was starting its ravages.  
While EU MS were struggling to “upgrade” the governance of the Union, in the field 
of monetary policies the Commission role continued to be limited to monitoring the behaviours 
of the MS, as Eurozone MS continued to frame Eurozone governance within the mainly 
intergovernmental structure in the Council. This system was strongly criticised for being 
ineffective and weak. A telling case was the Commission’s failure to hold France and Germany 
accountable for breaching the budget rules in the face of opposition from the Council; this was 
seen as one of the limits of Eurozone governance at the time and one of the symptoms of the 
weakness of Eurozone governance at the time.  
In fact, the governance of EMU was fundamentally intergovernmental; according to 
some critics (Nicoli, 2015; 2018), it was a system where essentially the MS were in charge of 
oversight of the application of the Maastricht principles. This left the Commission with very 
limited agency in overviewing and applying the common rules for the Eurozone, despite the 
ECJ’s later ruling in favour of the Commission as the supervisor of the fiscal and budgetary 
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rules of the treaties, thus boosting the case for a stronger role of the Commission in respect of 
budgetary rules in the Eurozone.  
3.2.5 From 2009 to present: The Sovereign Debt Crisissovereign debt crisis and the 
beginning of a New Phase 
The year 2009 represented the beginning of one the darkest moments for European monetary 
integration: the European sovereign debt crisis. The crisis put the public finances of some of 
the EU MS into jeopardy, leading them to a series of interventions and policies, mostly with 
external assistance, to boost competitiveness in the affected economies and moreover, to 
appease international markets. This set of economic policies has entered the public discourse 
as “Austerity”, denoting a phase of fiscal policies aimed at cutting government spending, while 
sometimes increasing fiscal revenues, (Alesina et al., 2019) and it represented a turning point.  
It sparked a change in the way international and supranational institutions could 
intervene in domestic affairs, sometimes raising questions and doubts over the democratic 
legitimacy of such interventions. It sparked a long-lasting debate on the meaning and the effects 
of austerity on the societies involved, on the rise of populist and sometimes authoritarian and 
illiberal forces as a result of austerity policies, and on their actual efficacy. This phenomenon, 
that was not only localised in Europe, but affected most countries in the world, had a particular 
impact on the Eurozone. In fact, in the Eurozone case, the debate on austerity was strictly 
interconnected with the nature and the development of Eurozone governance.  
As a matter of fact, the sovereign debt crisis demonstrated that the architecture of the 
Eurozone was still largely incomplete. Its success in the years after its introduction could have 
been jeopardised by external shocks, and the European institutions, when it came to the 
governance of the single currency, needed to be more democratically legitimised than they 
were at that moment, since the crisis demonstrated that the supranational level was required to 
play a greater role, even in the shaping of national economic policies.  
In summary, the sovereign debt crisis represented a form of existential crisis for the 
single currency. It triggered one of the greatest setbacks in the European integration, a decrease 
in support for the EU in some countries (Eurobarometer 2014; 2015) and sparked a new debate 
in the field of European studies about the dynamics of European disintegration (Fabbrini, 2015; 
Eppler, 2015).  
Although many economists argue that the European sovereign debt crisis occurred as a 
consequence of the American subprime mortgage crisis (Ureche-Rangau & Buriets, 2013; 
Zestos, 2016), the dynamics that triggered the European sovereign debt crisis were 
substantially different. In fact, the sovereign debt crisis in Europe emerged from a series of 
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different factors which affected some of the Eurozone countries, the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, 
Greece and Spain) or PIIGS (in which the second I stands for Italy) which, for different reasons, 
suffered a surge in their sovereign bond yields, suffered a crisis of market confidence, and had 
to undergo austerity measures to recover market trust. In this phase, the European institutions, 
notably the Commission and the ECB, played an extensive role as never before in the economic 
recovery of the MS, along with the involvement of a non-European institution, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). This group of three institutions, later named by media “The Troika”, 
was given the responsibility of developing a programme of financial recovery and stabilisation 
for MS that required international assistance.  
Although the Troika was strongly criticised by many (Varoufakis, 2015; Verhofstadt, 
2015) for not having enough political and democratic legitimacy to prescribe and somehow 
force the austerity policies that were considered as necessary for the economic recovery of 
those countries, the Commission and the ECB started playing a role that had never been 
envisaged. This sparked a new debate on the need of additional democratic legitimacy of the 
Commission, and the need for more democratic oversight by the EP. At the same time 
according to some critics, the challenges of the European sovereign debt crisis also led to the 
abandonment of adherence the “No bail-out” clause in the Treaties, (Art. 125), which was later 
amended, thus leading to an unprecedented situation in the history of European integration. 
However, despite the criticism, the article did not totally forbid bail-outs, only permitted such 
bail outs that “do not have prejudices to mutual financial guarantees” (ibid.); this then provided 
the framework that allowed the current bail-out programmes. 
As a result, all European MS, to different degrees, found themselves in a situation of 
having to alter economic policies with the purpose of protecting their banking systems, and 
avoiding or mitigating a period of recession in their domestic economies. The MS’ policy 
responses were mixed and rarely agreed in advance with the Commission. In the general 
economic downturn, there were two very different cases that were representative of how badly 
the economic situation was going to deteriorate: Greece and Ireland. Greece is considered to 
be the country that actually triggered that chain of events leading to the of sovereign debt crisis. 
In fact, Greece underwent a strong period of recession, partly because of the fall of its main 
source of income, tourism, but above all because the expansionary measures previously 
implemented by Prime Minister George Papandreou were no longer sustainable. Once the 
Greek authorities asked for international and European assistance (Loth, 2015), it soon became 
clear that the financial position of the Greek state was much weaker than expected. It was soon 
clear that Greece was heading towards bankruptcy, and that the state needed a bail-out 
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programme. However, the discovery that past data on economic performance had been inflated, 
and that much of the data on actual expenditures was bigger than the ones previously released 
(Financial Times, 2010), sparked a wave of outrage in the public opinion of most northern 
European MS, thus making the idea of any possible rescue of the Greek state very difficult to 
endorse and support. The refusal to agree a plan for maintaining Greece creditworthiness and 
permanence in the Eurozone eventually led to a rapid downgrading of sovereign bonds by 
credit rating agencies. On late April 2010, George Papandreou, in a public statement, asked the 
EU and the IMF to intervene in assisting Greece. 
The Irish crisis was triggered by different dynamics. In fact, Ireland was almost 
unanimously regarded as an economic success story (Barry, 2003), but found itself in a very 
perilous financial position due to the exposures of its banking system. Just after the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers, Ireland had guaranteed €440 billion of banks liabilities. The subsequent 
injections of liquidity, to guarantee the creditworthiness of Irish based financial and banking 
institutes, rapidly made the Irish deficit figures unsustainable. As a result of this process, the 
Irish government asked for assistance from the IMF and EU Institutions (Castle & Alderman, 
2010; Clarke & Hardiman, 2012). 
Portugal and Spain were later involved in the same difficulties. The same wave of panic 
in the end hit Italy, which represents the third largest economy of the Eurozone, and the country 
bearing the biggest public debt in the EU (Eurostat, 2011). The sequence of weak economic 
performances, a high level of public debts, and the bad reputation of Berlusconi’s government 
and the weakness of his parliamentary majority, led in 2011 to a rapid growth of uncertainty, 
which was reflected by the increasing interest rates, or yields, payable on Italian sovereign 
bonds. In the end, after a series of ineffective interventions, and under the pressure of public 
opinion in Italy and an international lack of trust, Berlusconi resigned, and a new technocratic 
government was voted in, with the purpose of restoring the financial creditworthiness of the 
state (Il sole 24 ore, 2011).  
There are several reasons behind the crisis and the weakness of some EU MS. First of 
all, the lack of proper budgetary and macroeconomic overview, which made discrepancies in 
the accounting system more likely. Second, the lack of a proper reaction at the very beginning 
of the crisis by some important EU MS, namely Germany, and others like Finland and the 
Netherlands.  
The sovereign debt crisis affected countries that had different problems, but ended up 
suffering the same lack of creditworthiness. Independently from these different dynamics, the 
sovereign debt crisis sparked a long debate about the survival of the Eurozone as a whole. It 
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offered substantiation to Eurosceptic economists and political forces that their assertions were 
substantially true, and that the Eurozone was fundamentally flawed and doomed to collapse. 
What is evident is that the crisis highlighted the fundamental problems of the Eurozone: being 
a currency union without being a transfer and economic union. Some economists, political 
forces and representatives (Rutte, 2018, 2019; Kurz, 2020) argue that a general respect of the 
same economic conditions, performances and budget constraints make the functioning of a 
single currency area possible even without fiscal transfers (Heijdra et al., 2018; Feld 2018). 
However, conversely, many point out to the fact that an absence of this alignment, together 
with the lack of internal transfers, and the apparent lack of will of some MS to address the issue 
with institutional changes, were some of the reasons for the markets or policy makers outside 
the EU to lack confidence about the survival of the Eurozone. 
However, this crisis did not lead to the breakup of the Eurozone, as many economists 
and policy makers feared or forecast (Stiglitz, 2016; Krugman, 2010). On the contrary, its 
effects led to even more integration and, as some may argue, even centralised the 
Commission’s control over the MS. The sovereign debt crisis led the EU Institutions and its 
MS to adopt new measures like the European Semester, and led the various counterparts to 
resume talks and negotiations on questions related to the completion of Eurozone governance, 
that were abandoned or postponed after the adoption of the single currency. More importantly, 
it led to resume the talks about the Banking Union, which were anticipated in the Delors Report 
in 1989, but were de facto frozen. 
3.3 The history of the Eurozone through the lens of federalism: an example 
of federal state-building. 
This lengthy resumé of the main milestones, achievements, setbacks, and difficulties in the 
long process of creation of the single currency for the EU had the purpose of demonstrate how 
monetary integration represents the most apparent attempt of federal state-building. In 
particular, the idea of a single currency and a single monetary policy, as modelled after a state 
(Padoa-Schioppa, 1999), went from being the ‘great forgotten’ of the treaties (Du Bois, 2004) 
to one of the main exclusive competences of the EU (TEU, 2009), although without a fiscal 
union currently underpinning it.  
The Monetary Union proved to be solid enough in periods of economic stability, but it 
proved to have some crucial weaknesses during recessions and asymmetrical shocks. These 
weaknesses came out and became clearer because of the 2009-2019 sovereign debt crisis. As a 
consequence, and as it will be further assessed in chapter IV, the European MS and the 
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European institutions found themselves in a position to introduce new institutional 
arrangements, that again mirror some key architectures of states, but in a supranational fashion, 
sometimes with stronger and more evident intergovernmental elements at the European level. 
These are the European Financial Supervision System, the Banking Union and, to a lesser 
extent, the European Supervisory Mechanism and the European Stability Mechanism. All of 
these institutions display differences, these will be further analysed in the next chapter. More 
importantly, the ECB acted as an independent supranational actor, not very differently from 
the Federal Reserve. Whereas in Chapter IV it will be explained if, and to what extent the EU’s 
institutions display the characteristics of states institutions, the purpose of this chapter was to 
demonstrate that the development of EMU, and more specifically the Eurozone, followed a 
pattern of coming together federalism (Stepan, 1999) that, other federal political systems and 
federations, while different, have also undertaken. These patterns were steps that affected the 
building and the characteristics of the EU as a state-building process. 
As mentioned in chapters I and II, many classifications have been made of the 
Eurozone. Proponents of liberal and new intergovernmentalist theories state that the Eurozone 
is no more and no less a developed structured currency agreement, since it is still based on an 
intergovernmental agreement, as mirrored by the architecture of the ECB (Puetter, 2018). 
Nonetheless, this interpretation is quite superficial, since it fails to grasp the extent of the 
independence and sovereignty that the MS conferred on the ECB to enable it to pursue its own 
decisions, without suffering or fearing the vetoes of MS, compared to what, for instance, occurs 
in purely or overwhelmingly intergovernmental organs. The ECB acts in the interest of the 
Europeans, their MS, and citizens, within agreed, permitted boundaries, but not as a mere agent 
of the MS. This is in fact one of the main features of federations and federal state institutions, 
compared to confederal ones, where the role is almost passive and depends on the input of MS. 
In fact, the Euro represents more than a mere currency union, especially considering 
the presence of a custom union and a single market, at the same time pieces of a process of 
uniting of Europe; the Euro in particular represented an important piece in the building of the 
idea of united, federal Europe. In the current narrative, and given the current framework, it is 
easier to compare the Euro to the Dollar or the Swiss Franc rather than currency unions like, 
for instance, the Central African Franc or the Western African Franc. Therefore, applying the 
simple definition of currency union to the Eurozone is correct, but it is not enough, and fails to 
entirely grasp its specificities, since the Euro, as a currency, is closer to the model of a country 
(which may be defined as the closest model of monetary integration existing), rather than a 
regional organisation.  
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In history there have been other cases of currency unions, nonetheless very few of these 
came as close as the Eurozone in terms of integration. During the 19th century, and in first 
decades of the 20th, Europe had seen the presence of different currency unions like the Latin 
Monetary Union (Flandreau, 1995) or the Scandinavian Union, but these currency unions are 
not comparable to the case of the Euro or any other currently existing currency union. These 
unions were not created for the purpose of permanent integration, but as mean for facilitating 
free trade thanks to the free circulation and exchange of gold-based currencies, in an age when 
money supply was significantly different from what I have today. This is the reason why 
making these comparisons is not entirely relevant to this analysis, if not for the fact that these 
unions worked on merely interstate basis. More relevant is maybe the currency union bonding 
Benelux countries before the Euro, and the case of the gradual currency unification of Germany 
in the 19th century.  
A currency union, without a single authority and legislation underpinning it, was a good 
recipe to making the foundations of the monetary union weak (and for some, the Euro, as it 
came out from the negotiations in the 1990s, was also too weak). Additionally, the disruptions 
during the earlier attempts of monetary integration in the EEC/EC were additional proofs of 
how difficult maintaining a monetary union was without a proper, integrated infrastructure and 
decision-making process. It is exactly this volatility of keeping a monetary union together 
without a proper institutional framework, that led the “fathers of the Euro” to the conclusion 
that monetary unions have to be closer to the model of a state, in order to survive. Still, in the 
approach that was adopted, the adoption of a currency was the ultimate stage, the outcome of 
a process which started with looser forms of integration, and led to the closest possible form. 
This process, which is continuing and is far from being over, is an “artificial” and controlled 
reproduction of a process of monetary integration which other states went through in the past, 
most often over very long timeframes.  
As mentioned in chapter II, currency has been deeply enmeshed within the concept of 
statehood since the first polities started minting coins in the 6th and 5th centuries BCE in the 
Mediterranean (Gardner, 1974; MacDonald, 1980). As mean of exchange, reserve of value and, 
ultimately, as symbol of wealth, coins were also instruments of propaganda and power. Even 
today, despite the emergence of electronic currencies, cryptocurrencies and other forms of 
“denationalised” currencies (von Hayek, 1976), the relationship between currency and 
statehood is so strong in the mindset, and in the architecture of the international financial 
system, that the decision to create the framework for adopting the single currency was hailed 
(or condemned) as the beginning of a process of federalisation of the EU (Ciampi 1998; 
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Thatcher, 2002). Nonetheless, twenty years after the introduction of the Euro, and despite the 
Treaty of Lisbon ten years ago, the process is still unfinished, even though the turbulence in 
the decade 2009-2019 led to a series of events which forced changes that will be described in 
the next chapter. In conclusion it might be said that the Euro is a strong symbol of sovereignty. 
Despite the claims of some critics (Krugman, 2016; Stiglitz, 2016; Streeck, 2015), the 
Eurocrisis did not cause the collapse of the EU. By contrast, the conclusions that I can draw is 
that it introduced further incentives, not to retreat, but to forge forward with fostering EMU 
governance. Neofunctionalist authors (Schmitter 2018; Nicoli 2018), might claim that what 
happened in this decade confirmed the principle thesis of neofunctionalist theory. 
In the end, the introduction of the Euro and its process of consolidation highlighted how 
different the process of federalisation was in current federal systems, compared to the federal 
process ongoing in the EU. In fact, compared to other federal systems and federations, the Euro 
and the institutions behind it came before the foundation of a state (which is still far from being 
a reality). By contrast, in the case of many federations, the process of monetary unification and 
harmonisation occurred almost simultaneously, but concluded only after the political 
integration (or unification) was completed. It could be said that the process of monetary 
integration in the EU proceeded faster than that of political integration. Similar conclusions 
were drawn by similar researches (Dorrucci et al., 2015). While monetary integration has 
played a role in  deepening integration and further uniting the EU, bringing its closer to the 
benchmark of a state, its fiscal and political integration are still insufficient (Draghi, 2019).  
This should lead us to reflecting about the implications, in federal terms, on the 
mismatch between monetary integration and political integration and about the necessity to fill 
this gap and building a more democratic governance for the federal political system EU.  
3.4 Conclusions: consolidation of federal state-building 
Since the beginning of the European integration process, the question has been whether, and to 
what extent, the EC had a prospect of becoming a state from its foundation (Hallstein, 1969; 
Burgess, 2000). Even though de Gaulle managed to thwart the building of important elements 
of future European statehood, like the defence and political communities in the 1950s 
(Caraffini, 2015), the process of European integration was, and still is, oriented in a way that 
reproduces the elements of statehood at the European, supranational level. This is because, 
since the beginning of the integration process, the EC was designed to lay down the foundations 
of a single polity, and in the first years of its existence, a devoted class of civil servants, 
diplomats, intellectuals and scholars acted to implement this course of action (Burgess, 2000).  
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From this point of view, it is surprising that monetary integration was not taken into 
consideration in the treaty of Rome. The logic behind this decision was that the framework of 
the Bretton Woods System offered the stability European economies needed in that phase, and 
because monetary integration was considered as the final step in a process of economic 
integration yet to be implemented. In the case of the monetary integration process, it is 
legitimate to put its official starting date at 1962, as chapter VIII of the Marjolin Memorandum 
represented the first concrete proposal to address the lack of a monetary integration at the 
European level.  
From this point of view, it seems somehow ironic that monetary integration, which used 
to be the great lacuna of the Treaty of Rome, has, over the years, become one of the most 
crucial elements in determining the failure or the success of the integration process. This 
became particularly true during the sovereign debt crisis, which made clear how the destinies 
of the single currency and the EU were, and still are, inseparable.  
In the mind of the proposers of the currency union, the state represented the most 
functional model of a currency union (Padoa-Schioppa, 1999). Both in the monetarist approach 
and in the economist approach, as contained in the proposals for a European Monetary System, 
the introduction of a single currency was considered a pivotal step in a process of political 
integration (Schiller, 1970; Werner 1970; Tietmeyer, 2003). Right from the early reports by 
Barre and Werner, and up to the final work of the Delors Committee, the outcome of a 
functioning monetary union was measured de facto against the benchmark of a state system or, 
in another perspective, the state model of a functioning single currency. The state represented 
the model for an integrated, coordinated economy, with a single currency, a single central bank 
and a single political authority. We are still far from that model, which continues to have its 
opponents, but, in the end, the same argument applies to the creation of a monetary union, and 
ultimately the creation of a fiscal union. 
The European sovereign debt crisis was, in the life of the EU, unprecedented in its 
menace to the existence of the Union, and in its potential to trigger a disintegration process. 
The mismanagement of the crisis, and the risk of a Euro break-up, should have driven home 
the extent to which the success of the Euro as a single currency, and the European integration 
process, had become so entangled that they were co-existent and co-reliant. There was a failure 
to realise this fact by members of the national, mainstream elites in Germany (Schaeuble, 2011; 
Dobrindt, 2012; Rösler, 2012; Lindner, 2017) and elsewhere, and an insistence on considering 
permanency in the single currency as merely, or mainly, an economic, technical and legal issue. 
This, coupled with suggestions that Greece or other countries could have, or should have, left 
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the Eurozone, contributed to a fall in terms of the reputation and popularity of the single 
currency, among Euro MS, non-Euro MS and in international markets, along with a decrease 
in the popularity and reputation of the EU.  
Conversely, the most staunchly Eurosceptic and anti-EU forces used the weakness of 
the Euro and the possibility of its break-up to gain electoral momentum (Buti & Pinchelmann, 
2017), to create an anti-Euro narrative in the media and in the political debates of the MS, and 
to build and increase support for, and the popularity of, anti-EU and anti-Euro proposals (such 
as unilateral withdrawals from the Eurozone or the EU or both, or a total break-up of the EU). 
Likewise, on the other end of the political spectrum, staunchly federalist and pro-EU forces 
took the opportunity to propose initiatives which promulgated full fiscal and transfer unions, 
and advocated developments of the EU towards an official or de facto, federal state 
(Verhofstadt, 2014). In the meantime, both European civil servants and national policy-makers 
took initiatives, sometimes pragmatic and sometimes to safe-guard national interest, but with 
the same purpose – to stabilise the economic turmoil. The nature of the discussion was no 
longer just legal and technical, but was now increasingly political.  
It is still unclear how the future of the single currency will develop. Currently, after a 
long phase of reform, the process of completion of EMU has entered a very slowly paced phase: 
negotiations on the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) are proceeding very slowly; 
the common backstop provided by the ESM to the ESF will not be ready before 2024, although 
its negotiations were concluded in 2019. Currently, however, the proposal for a European 
Recovery Fund (I.e Next Generation EU) represents the first element of a potential common 
fiscal policy in the EU. After the experience of the crisis all the actors involved in the EU’s 
survival, the ECB, the Commission and the MS have demonstrated that interest in the Euro’s 
survival and success was, and still remains, very high. In contrast with the expectations of the 
MS, the Euro area as an economic space has developed dynamics that have proven to have 
effects that have gone far beyond the control or the agency of the states. Additionally, both the 
Commission and the ECB have started developing stronger agency in the management of, 
respectively, economic policies for the Eurozone through the Six- and Two-Pack legislation, 
and the issue of liquidity programmes (QE) targeted on the survival, stability and success of 
the Euro as main purpose of the ECB, since it is the condition allowing the ECB to pursue its 
main goal (inflation targeting).  
These last developments in Eurozone governance are the final proof that the Monetary 
Union had developed, from being the ‘great forgotten’ of the treaty to one of the most crucial 
policy areas of the EU. The issue of monetary policy has proved to be one of the main drivers 
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of European integration in the last years, but also a possible trigger for disintegration. In this 
situation, the creation of a fiscal pillar, or a fiscal union to complete EMU, is fundamental to 
consolidate the Euro not only from a legal point of view (as stressed by the German Federal 
Constitutional Court’s judgement in 2020), but also under the eyes of international economic 
actors and citizens. This thesis does not cover and does not treat the important introduction of 
the Recovery Fund in 2020, to tackle the depression caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. 
Nevertheless, that element goes in the right direction in creating a precedent for a fiscal union 
and a more consistent expansionary intervention.  
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4 Chapter IV. After the crisis 
4.1 Introduction: developments of federal state-building  
This chapter reviews institutional changes that emerged after the period from 2008-2018, and 
how their development represents a step in a process of federal state-building in the EU. I 
analyse how EMU governance represents the most advanced level of federal state-building, to 
what extent the new institutions and practices to save EMU are similar to existing ones in 
federal states, how the crisis led to the ECB playing a new role, and how the crisis laid down 
the foundations for future developments of the EMU. Despite persistent, and ongoing, 
pressures towards disintegration, the crisis led to a stronger role of the ECB and the 
Commission, and to the establishment of new legal tools and instruments, that strengthened the 
role of the European institutions (Becker & Bauer, 2014).  
The Eurozone as it is currently structured is not only the result of a decades-long 
development, as described in Chapter III, but significantly changed its features during the last 
years of crisis. The current Eurozone has a different level of integration than before the crisis 
in 2009, and there is generally a greater understanding for the need to make this system more 
solid, and resilient.  
An important observation here is the fact that, when compared to the EU as a whole, 
the Eurozone per se may represent a federal political system, with some features in its economic 
governance that have made it take further steps towards a distinct, more united core (Lionello, 
2017), and some may argue, more centralised polity (Scicluna, 2012; Fabbrini, 2017). In fact, 
this may demonstrate that, despite criticisms on the way the architecture of the single currency 
has been implemented, the existence of an EMU itself represented a strong disincentive against 
the disintegration and collapse of the EU (ibid.). This provides a counterfactual to claims 
coming from various sources that the Eurozone made the EU and its integration weaker 
(Feldstein, 2011; Jespersen, 2016; Mody, 2018; Kawalec et al., 2019; Szymanowski, 2020). In 
fact, currently the Eurozone has proved to be resilient enough to avoid collapse, while other 
European initiatives are facing more challenges and are more likely to be at risk of 
disintegration than the Eurozone. This has a special meaning because, in terms of increasing 
integration, the decision to create the Euro, even without fiscal union, should not be considered 
negatively, since it still represents the strongest drive towards unification. Assessing the 
introduction of the Euro in the absence of fiscal integration might show that, even without a 
comprehensive plan, this approach had the merit to create those conditions to allow the process 
to go forward towards a federal political system. Therefore, after explaining the historical 
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developments in the previous chapter, the process that led to the development of a federal 
political system, this chapter will investigate how the role of the ECB and the Commission 
changed, what innovations like European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and before it the 
European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) and the fiscal compact represent, and what is the importance of the Banking 
Union.  
In the following sections, I examine how the Eurozone institutions are framed in the 
methodology of this thesis. Here I show how some of the institutions of the Eurozone display 
a high degree of intergovernmentalism, where others, like the ECB, have emerged as 
independent actors, with little or no control by the MS, acting accordingly to supranational, 
European dynamics (Dehousse, 2015) and are therefore Europeanised. Some others are more 
hybrid, since they simultaneously display both intergovernmental and supranational elements, 
thus showing the signs of a system under development, yet still developing its own federal 
characteristics and key features that might go under the definition of supranational federalism 
(von Bogdandy, 2000; Pagano 2007; Cafaro, 2017). As explained in the previous chapters, 
European integration is a process of federal state-building, where intergovernmental and 
supranational areas coexist. This interaction has been going on since the beginning of the 
European integration process, when the three separate communities were founded through an 
unprecedented interaction between intergovernmental, federal and supranational dynamics 
(Burgess 2000: 74). This occurred, and is still going on, in many EU policy areas, and more 
specifically the Treaty of the European Union after Lisbon (TEU, Article 3) classifies policy 
areas according to the level of government in charge of it. EMU is no exception, and indeed 
represents a clear example of the coexistence of intergovernmental and supranational elements. 
Although supranational features in the Eurozone are stronger than in the EU as a single unit, 
the Eurozone also retains intergovernmental features while gaining newly Europeanised areas 
of intervention.  
As described in the previous chapter, EMU had been the result of decades of integration 
(Tietmeyer, 1994, 2003; Steinherr 1994). Nonetheless, in the ten years since the start of the 
crisis the structure of Eurozone governance has changed dramatically, and when compared to 
the pace of earlier development, in a relatively short frame.  
4.2 The new Eurozone: the historical context.  
As explained in chapter III, after heated debates about the need to bail out Greece in some 
form, including a threat by President Nicholas Sarkozy to withdraw France from the Eurozone 
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(Traynor &Tremlett, 2010), a first act was decided during the EU Council on 9th of May 2010. 
The introduction of the EFSF was the first step made to address the Greek insolvency crisis. 
This institution was meant to be only temporary, and not permanent, (Gocaj & Meunier, 2013) 
and was a first step to calm and stabilise the markets at that critical moment, and above all to 
react to the increasing lack of trust in the financial Markets (Juncker, 2019; Buti 2019).  
Nonetheless, the creation of the EFSF was only the first step towards a change in 
Eurozone governance, without changing the general framework of the EU treaties. In fact, the 
EFSF was established as a private company under Luxemburgish law, neither as an EU body 
nor as a public, intergovernmental fund (EFSF Framework Agreement, 2010). Together with 
the EFSF, another Fund was established, the EFSM. 
However, the issue was far from over: after a few months of slow stabilisation and 
calming down, the crisis raged once again after a Franco-German bilateral meeting in 
Deauville. During that meeting, both Merkel and Sarkozy stated their intention to make private 
investors responsible for any bail-out of a struggling Eurozone MS. In this statement, France 
and Germany declared that they were looking to introduce new rules in the economic 
governance of the EU; this sparked a new wave of uncertainty and fear in the markets, thus 
worsening the situation (Krotz & Schild, 2013), for the proposal of the Franco-German duo 
was considered punitive towards investors. 
As discussed earlier, and as the thesis will discuss further, in 2010 the EFSF was 
replaced by the EFSM. Unlike the EFSF, the EFSM is a public fund, established by an 
intergovernmental treaty, and envisaged a special role for the Commission and the ECB 
(Tuominen, 2019). The EFSM was designed with the intention of raising capital from the 
financial markets to stabilise markets, and help MS to continue borrowing from private markets 
(Adamski, 2012; Allemand & Martucci, 2012). After the experience of the EFSF, the ESM, as 
it will assessed in this chapter, represented a step forward, since it made institutions like the 
EFSF and the EFSM permanent, but under the condition of a more limited role of the 
Commission, and with the reintroduction of the unanimity vote, unlike the previous bail-out 
mechanisms (Adam & Parras, 2013).  
In 2012, a document known as “The Four Presidents’ Report” or “Towards a genuine 
Economic Union” (Barroso et al., 2012) was issued by the Presidents of the Commission, the 
EP, the Council and the ECB. This offered a blueprint for completing the Banking Union, 
completing the economic union and introducing a fiscal union, followed by a more genuine 
and democratic political governance (or political union). The Single Supervisory System and 
the Single Resolution System were introduced as components of the Banking Union. After a 
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lengthy debate, in 2018, some three years after the establishment of the ESM, the MS finally 
reached an agreement for the ESM to be the backstop of the Single Resolution Fund. 
Negotiations on the EDIS have been going on for years, but a final agreement on its shape and 
size still seems out of reach.  
In the meantime, while these new pieces of the EMU architecture were introduced, an 
intergovernmental treaty was signed in 2011: The Treaty of Coordination, Stabilisation and 
Governance (European Council, 2011). This Treaty was due to be integrated in the European 
Union Treaties and become part of EU primary law but, due to the veto of the British 
government of the time, it was signed and ratified by its signatories as an intergovernmental 
treaty, despite still having implications for EU governance. In the same year, legislation 
introducing the European Six-Pack reforming the governance of the EMU was also introduced, 
followed by other pieces of legislation in 2013. 
As previously mentioned, this new wave of changes to protect the integrity of the 
Eurozone was triggered by the Greek crisis, which was followed, like a contagion, by 
insolvency crises in other peripheral countries of the Eurozone: Ireland, Portugal, Spain and, 
ultimately, Italy. All these cases were different, but the common point was the lack of trust of 
international markets in the capacity of these economies to recover to their pre-crisis 
circumstances. 
Given its depth and intensity, of all these cases Greece represents one of the clearest 
examples of the limits of Eurozone governance at the time. Under the weight of the crisis, 
Greece had seven different governments (including two caretaker governments). Trust of 
Greek citizens towards the EU collapsed to the lowest levels ever registered (Eurostat 2012, 
2013, 2014, 2015), so that in 2019 they were among the lowest in the EU. Even though this 
crisis represented an opportunity to reform Greek public spending (mostly regarded as highly 
expensive and mostly inefficient) and civil service, in the end, austerity left many scars on the 
population, which used to rely on public intervention and subsidies. Because of the impact of 
those measures, Greek voters turned their preference to new political forces that emerged from 
the collapse of the traditional right and left wings, and voted for parties that were, until that 
moment, on the fringe of the Greek political spectrum, like the socialist-radical Syriza and the 
openly neofascist Golden Dawn. Syriza rose to almost win the elections in 2012 against the 
conservative New Republic party, and finally managed to win the elections and form the Greek 
government in 2015, on the basis of a promise to abandon austerity while keeping the country 
in the Eurozone. After some months of negotiations, and after agreeing to a new bailout 
package (Financial Times, 2015) the Greek government attempted to take strong action, and to 
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spark a debate to put an end to austerity policies by calling a referendum (which was held on 
an older proposal of the third bailout programme, already dismissed by all parties). 
The referendum (called on 5th July 2015) was not a move to seek the withdrawal from 
the single currency, but more a move to force the hand of the European authorities and its MS, 
in order to avoid further austerity measures, and initiate a debate to end these. A similar attempt 
had been made by Papandreou during the first bailout package, a move which was then 
abandoned and subsequently led to Papandreou’s resignation (Ekathimerini, 2011). Despite 
substantial support (60% to 40%) for the government proposition to dismiss the bailout 
proposal (Ekathimerini, 2015), and public support for Tsipras (Crespy & Ladi, 2019), the move 
backfired spectacularly at both the European and international levels. Reactions from the rest 
of Europe, despite a more understanding and friendly approach by Italian PM Matteo Renzi 
and French President Francois Hollande, were described as very angry. The Greek government, 
and especially its Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis, were accused of bad faith. Some 
governments renewed their calls for Greece’s expulsion from the Eurozone (Kirby, 2015). In 
the hectic days after the referendum, under international and domestic pressure, Varoufakis 
immediately resigned (he resigned the morning after the referendum), while Tsipras accepted 
a new bail-out programme, whose conditions were even tougher and harsher than in those 
previously negotiated (ibid., 2015), in a spectacular U-turn, that most of its own party and 
voters perceived as a true defeat. As follow-up, a snap election was held in the autumn, in the 
same year.  
The failed attempt by Tsipras was the ultimate, tensest moment in the crisis. After that 
point, the situation seemed to calm down, even though some authors (Stiglitz, 2018; Krugman 
2016; Varoufakis, 2017) argue that the wave of far-right and anti-EU electoral successes in the 
EU was essentially primed by the mismanagement of the sovereign debt crisis, along with poor 
economic performances in the same period (Nicoli, 2018) 
Despite the circumstances, the shape of EMU changed. These changes were a series of 
significant moments that, despite missing the same solemnity and importance as the treaty of 
Maastricht, or the Treaty of Lisbon, contributed to changing the Eurozone.  
The changes introduced were perhaps not supported with the same enthusiasm as the 
introduction of the Euro ( Kuhn & Stoeckel, 2014; Hobolt & Wratil, 2015) (and it could have 
hardly been otherwise, since the mood of the public opinion drastically changed in the 
meantime), partly because these introductions were not seen by the public as a result of a 
political debate, but in most instances as rushed decisions to solve a difficult situation, and 
partly because many of these changes were very technical and sector-specific.  
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The innovations introduced in the years 2010-2018 did not all go in the same direction. 
In fact, as mentioned before, some of those innovations follow a more intergovernmental 
direction, while others a more supranational. Even though some authors have highlighted a 
transfer of sovereignty to the ECB and the Council only (Da Conceicao-Helg, 2016), the 
transfers concerned the Commission as well, alongside the ECB and the Council. Indeed, these 
changes represented a general increase in terms of Europeanisation, in all its dimensions. In 
fact, the ESM is predicated on the participation of the MS, and works according to the 
unanimity system, while the European institutions’ supervision in it is very weak. Yet again, 
the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance, (the ‘Fiscal Compact’), came into life 
as an intergovernmental treaty. During the crisis, Merkel (2013) Sarkozy (2011), and Dutch 
Prime Minister Mark Rutte (2013) all tried to water down or dismiss the idea of further transfers 
of competences to the European institutions, while pushing more for the concept of 
intergovernmental coordination, and on the centrality of the Council instead of the Commission 
and the EP (Fabbrini, 2015). While it is true that intergovernmentalism played a great role in 
post-Maastricht Euro governance (Puetter, 2014), limiting our definitions of the innovations of 
these years as intergovernmental because of some elements, (like for instance the appointment 
of the ECB Executive Board), might be dismissive of the greater picture of the changes.  
Therefore, even if it might be true that in some areas coordination and 
intergovernmentalism prevailed, it is also true that both the Commission and the ECB increased 
their role and agency in a way that was hardly foreseeable just a few years earlier. In fact, the 
Commission acquired new direct powers over European fiscal discipline, through the Six- and 
Two-Pack legislation. In tandem with this, the ECB acquired an independent role, becoming a 
de facto lender of last resort (De Grauwe 2011, 2013; Praet, 2016) and displayed a high degree 
of entrepreneurship. This means that the supranational institutions were never so strategic and 
“powerful” as in EMU governance. By contrast, the EP was not involved to the same extent in 
institutional changes in the Eurozone, thus emerging as a more limited actor (Crum 2013, 622; 
Curtin 2014, 17; Kratochvil, 2019), as I will argue further on. 
The hypothesis is that the Eurozone distanced itself from the EU, while still being 
totally entrenched within it. This occurred both in an intergovernmental way, with the creation 
of European but intergovernmental institutions like the ESM, and in a more supranational 
direction too, as witnessed by the role played by the ECB, and the role played by the 
Commission with the European Semester. Both these developments had the common outcome 
of transforming the Eurozone into a distinct federal political system within the EU. All the 
elements that constitute elements of statehood are included, in a holistic way, as elements that 
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determine the extent to which the Eurozone is closer to the area of federalism than the EU, and 
to what extent its ad hoc institutions and provisions make it a distinct federal political system.  
As described in Ch. I, European integration is a process that does not simply aim at 
replicating a state-like entity in a supranational form (Rosamond, 2000: 28), but more 
specifically is a federalising process aiming at building a federal political system (Friedrich, 
1963: 586). It is as such a highly dynamic process that, by combining national autonomy with 
comprehensive unity (Friedrich, 1963: 595), aims at creating a form of polity that can combine 
the legitimacy and sovereignty of its MS with the level of efficiency that is typical of unitary 
states. Therefore, this process of federal state-building is a progression that, based on the 
context and its purpose, can develop from the weakest level of supranational integration, 
international organisations, to the highest, traditional federations. In the EU case, it is possible 
to witness a polity that, despite not being a state in the traditional sense, features elements that 
are typical of federal states. Inside this, the Eurozone displays even more similarities with 
federal states (Fabbrini, 2015; Lionello, 2017).  
First, consideration should be given to which institutions to examine to determine the 
degree of federalism of the Eurozone. The first to be considered is the ECB and its new 
mandates and initiatives; then the Banking Union in its two pillars, the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and the plan for a third pillar, 
EDIS; then the ESM (and its predecessors: the EFSM and the EFSF); then the Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG); and finally the Six- and Two-Pack 
legislation. 
I will also take into consideration that some of those institutions and provisions, despite 
being in a European framework, are not part of the EU, while some of those are part of the EU, 
and membership is only compulsory only for Euro MS. Thus, making the case for evaluating 
the Eurozone as different FPS even stronger. 
 
Eurozone only institutions and provisions EU wide innovations, but compulsory and 
with specific provisions for the Eurozone. 
Change of policies by the ECB Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance 
Banking Union  Reform of the SGP (Budgetary provisions) 
European Stability Mechanism (linked to the 
TSCG) 
Reform of the SGP (Macroeconomic 
provisions) 
Figure 9 First categorisation of the new innovation in EMU 
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4.3 The highest degree of federalism in the Eurozone: the role of the 
European Central Bank  
The ECB represents perhaps the greatest example of federalism (Praet, 2017) in the EU, and, 
among the institutions of the Union, is the main example of an institution operating as a federal 
structure. In other word, the ECB is an organ that most closely matches the benchmark of 
existing federations. 
The national banks taking part in the Eurosystem play a meaningful role in applying, at 
the national level, decisions taken in Frankfurt. The Central Banks of the Euro MS take part in 
the Eurosystem, and their governors are full members of the ECB’s Governing Council, and 
members of all EU Central Banks are members of the ECB’s General Council. Even though 
the ECB retains some (weak) intergovernmental/confederal elements, at the same time it has 
managed to acquire an agency that makes it closer to the same level as the Federal Reserve.  
The way it was established is not the only difference to other central banks. As a matter 
of fact, unlike the Federal Reserve, the ECB was not supposed to be a Lender of Last Resort 
(LLR) (De Grauwe, 2011). The model for the ECB was indeed the German Federal Bank, 
which is not an LLR. Additionally, the Treaties confirm this aspect, and this was used as an 
argument against any involvement of the ECB in any direct or indirect bailout, or liquidity 
injection into the debtor countries’ economies (Henkel, 2011). Similarly, others (Savona, 2018) 
criticised the fact that, unlike the Federal Reserve, the ECB does not have, among its duties, 
that of guaranteeing the level of “maximum employment” (Federal Reserve Act: Section 2A. 
1917 as amended in 1946). However, with actions like those attempted under the Draghi 
Presidency with Quantitative Easing (QE) and the “Whatever it takes” policy, the ECB 
acquired an agency that was not initially foreseeable, and began de facto to act as a LLR (Buiter 
& Rahbari, 2012). The fact that the German Federal Constitutional Court referred the actions 
of the ECB to the ECJ, and declared these to be in line the EU law (under some conditions), 
was also at the time an important victory for the ECB. This decision meant that the German 
government could avoid taking action against the ECB, thus avoiding a conflict that could have 
backfired or jeopardised the EU’s architecture and the stability of the single currency. The fact 
that the ECB managed to implement and perform its QE programme even against or without 
the support of some of the main Eurosystem central banks, (Jens Weidmann, the representative 
of the German Federal Bank, voted against it) proves the capability of the ECB to assert its 
own agency against the will of some of its main MS. An element that allowed the ECB to assert 
a European interest that did not necessarily match that of the Member States.  
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The new role of the ECB has a political meaning that goes far beyond the implications 
for the political economy of the single currency. In fact, as mentioned in Ch. I, central banks 
are present in all federations as federation-wide institutions. They might also represent a driver 
for political integration, as past experiences teach us, by creating a uniformity of currency 
supply in the same economy (Hammond, 1957: 377). Additionally,  with the completion of the 
Banking Union, the ECB became responsible for most of EU banking supervision. Its decisions 
have a direct effect on Euro MS. When it comes to external sovereignty, the issue is more 
debatable. In fact, in much the same ways as the EU has developed strong external sovereignty 
in the area of trade, the ECB is currently regarded as one of the most influential organisations 
in the world monetary system (Hajek & Horvath, 2018). Having said this, its external 
representation remains shared between its MS, so that the ECB has to rely on them, meaning 
that the central banks of the Euro MS de facto represent the Eurozone in international fora like 
the IMF. This creates a paradoxical situation in which the ECB is one of the most powerful and 
influential monetary institutions in the world, but still needs to rely on the central banks of the 
Eurosystem in some of the most important international fora (ECB, 2011). This does not occur 
in other more informal, less institutionalised fora; but in the case of the IMF, the ECB can only 
be an observer, since the IMF Charter is categorical on the fact that only countries can be 
members (IMF Charter, Article 3, 1945). 
In the IMF, Germany and France both have their own seats, while other Euro countries 
like Italy or Spain are dispersed in different geographical groups, thus making coordination 
and the prospect of a single representation more difficult. For instance, Spain shares its 
geographical district with other Latin-American countries. Despite being an observer, the ECB 
can participate in IMF Board meetings. The case for the external representation of the ECB 
depends on EU law itself. In fact, following ECJ jurisdiction, in those cases where the EU has 
an exclusive internal competence, the EU alone is responsible for their external representation 
(ECB Monthly Bulletin, May 2011:87-88) For the competences relevant for EMU, this 
principle applies to the single monetary policy and exchange rate policy, so that in all of these 
areas, the relevant EU institutions represent their policy competences in international fora 
(ibid.: 88). And this is the case of the ECB. Additionally, the TFEU (Art. 138) states that  
In order to secure the euro's place in the international monetary system, the Council, on 
a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt a decision establishing common positions 
on matters of particular interest for economic and monetary union within the competent 
international financial institutions and conferences.  
The same treaty explains that ‘the Council shall act after consulting the European Central 
Bank’, thus enhancing the role of the ECB in external representation. Yet again, the TFUE 
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explains that the Council, ‘on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt appropriate 
measures to ensure unified representation within the international financial institutions and 
conferences’. Even though the article asserts that consulting the ECB before taking any 
initiative is necessary, this article highlights how the external representation of the Eurozone 
still depends on intergovernmental dynamics, despite the recent international activism of the 
head of the ECB. More importantly, Article 138 asserts that only Euro MS can vote on this 
topic, accordingly with the qualified majorities as defined in article 238(3)(a) 
To tackle this fragmentation inside the IMF, the EU Economic and Financial 
Committee has an IMF related subcommittee. In addition, the EU MS at the IMF constitute the 
EURIMF, an informal group (Hagan, 2009). As a result of this, coordination between Eurozone 
members has grown, and the ECB has acquired agency in its external relations, even though 
the presence of the Eurozone remains fragmented in some fora, partly because states alone, and 
not supranational entities of any sort, are eligible for participation. 
In addition, the ECB has played a central role in the development of the bail-out 
programmes for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and in the development of “austerity policies”, 
despite the political judgements made on the social impact of these (Bovens & Curtin. 2016). 
The ECB developed substantial agency in shaping these policies and developed a role in setting 
out the conditionality of these programmes, and in insisting on structural reforms in recipient 
MS (Caporaso, Kim & Durrett, 2014). The ECB played a significant role in linking the request 
for structural reforms with money supply, with the purpose of reducing the level of risk in 
bailed out countries. The role of ECB in the Troika also raised questions about the democratic 
legitimacy of its actions (Tesche, 2018). On the other side, Draghi found himself often asserting 
that the ECB was playing a political role that other actors should be taking. Additionally, the 
ECB became proactive in tackling the accusations of lack of accountability, by reporting 
periodically to the EP and, in addition, MS national parliaments (ibid.). 
Nonetheless, the role of the ECB leaves a great margin for further scrutiny. In fact, the 
ECB started playing that role in a situation in which other supranational institutions proved to 
be unable to intervene. The ECB emerged in a situation of a lack of supranational governance, 
when it was needed the most. However, it remains open for discussion that the actions of the 
ECB were not subjected to democratic scrutiny (Papasavvas, 2015), and that perhaps a stronger 
role for the EP would have been welcome. Similarly, there is a case that the Commission should 
have been conferred with the political capability to play the same role as the ECB. The question 
of the democratic legitimacy of the ECB (and more generally the Troika in regard to the EC 
and ECB), and of the role of the EP in addressing political economy of the countries under 
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procedure, raises questions not only in respect of the federal principle of subsidiarity, but also 
in respect of the democratic legitimacy of such interventions. King (1982) argued that 
democracy may work without federalism (as the case of unitary, democratic states prove), but 
the opposite does not occur (unless we consider cases of failed federalism in Russia and in 
Venezuela as successful). This opens the door to a further question: whether the Eurozone is a 
situation in which we have monetary and economic federalism, but its democratic governance 
does not match it properly? Or, put differently, whether the legitimacy it already has, according 
to treaties and council decisions, was not enough for it to perform the interventions required of 
the Eurozone in that situation. This leads to opening new possibilities and perspectives on 
supranational democracy (Habermas, Fine & Smith 2003), in a dimension that goes beyond the 
definition of the EU as demoicracy (Nikolaidis, 2013). 
So, empirically, there might be a point in highlighting how the ECB is not just an 
economic institution supplying money to European banks and markets, but also plays a role in 
pushing European integration forward. Moreover, in keeping the Eurozone united, despite the 
difficulties that occurred in the last decade, the ECB played a political role that went well 
beyond that of simply a guarantor of price stability. It is very unlikely that this role could be 
easily rolled back, any time soon, especially since the Commission is currently unable to play 
a similar role.  
Finally, it could be asserted that the ECB is an institution whose agency emerged as 
federal, despite having intergovernmental elements in its composition, or in some areas of its 
external representation. Moreover, the ECB is an institution that is seminal in boosting the 
Eurozone as a federal political system. 
4.4 Federalism and the European Financial System Supervision  
One of the elements that caused the progression of the EU towards a model of statehood is the 
creation of a single European system of financial supervision, also triggered by the spread of 
the crisis into the European financial markets. An awareness that the fragmentation between 
different national supervisory systems might have exacerbated the effects of another financial 
crisis in Europe led to a major revision of European financial governance, and sparked a new 
wave of integration in that field. As result, we have now an integration of national systems of 
financial supervision within a single European Financial Supervisory System (EFSS), in effect 
an EU-wide multilevel system of financial supervision. In just a few years, European 
supervision developed from a soft coordination system to a system based on hard law 
(Hennessy, 2014). 
   
 
147 
 
The EFSS is one of the main institutional innovations that tackled the lack of a single 
system of supervision. Its establishment was one of the actions taken to tackle the causes of the 
subprime mortgage crisis, and its follow up effects in Europe, more specifically, to the 
fragmentation of the European capital markets after the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis 
(Fiedler et al., 2016). Before the crisis, financial supervision was managed through loose 
coordination between MS’ supervisory authorities; but, differences between national systems, 
conflicting interests of national banking industries, and the lack of political will to act in the 
integration of financial supervision hampered the creation of a common supervisory system 
(Perez & Westrup 2010; Schirm 2011).  
Just after the beginning of the crisis, the de Larosière Report (2009) pointed out how 
the effects of the crisis had worsened because of the lack of European supervision of the 
banking sector on one hand, and on the other hand because of the lack of coordination between 
MS’ supervisory bodies. The report highlighted how the lack of a single European framework 
(though the report also highlighted that this legal fragmentation was a global issue), multiplied 
the effects of the crisis on the EU MS. Therefore, the report called for the introduction of a 
supervisory mechanism, that was, to a great extent, modelled on previous models of banking 
supervision. More importantly, it proved to be a starting point for the subsequent Banking 
Union, as well as for a potential European capital market. 
The structure of the supervisory system that the EU adopted represents an interesting 
opportunity for assessing the case of federalism and incremental federalism in the EU. In fact, 
the model of supervision for financial systems in the EU follows previous models of financial 
supervision at the national level (Hennessy, 2014) and, as in other federations, it adopts a two-
layer model, wherein the states play a role in the supervisory architecture. 
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Figure 10 Basic structure of financial supervision in federations 
Different models for financial supervision exist globally, and there are different classifications 
of them. Goodhart (1998) introduced three categories: sectoral or institutional, functional, and 
objectives based. Over the same time period, Michael Taylor (1995) argued for a model known 
as the ‘Twin-Peaks' approach.  
In Goodhart’s taxonomy the institutional, or sectoral, approach means that financial 
institutes have oversight according to their institutional nature, not their business activities; 
whereas the functional approach is organised according to the typology of business; and lastly, 
the objectives based approach, is based neither on the institutional nature, nor on the nature of 
business, but on the purposes of the supervision (Goodhart, 1998). Integrated approaches aim 
at integrating elements of all of them in a coherent approach under a single supervision, while 
the proposed ‘Twin-Peaks’ approach (with a clear reference to David Lynch’s popular tv 
series), is based on two pillars, whereby one peak (pillar) carries out supervisory functions and 
the other focuses on conduct-of-business regulation. It is an objectives-based model.  
Different scholars have argued for integrated approaches (Goodhart, 1998; Saunders, 
1994; and Taylor 1995’s ‘Twin-Peaks’ is somehow an integrated approach). The Group of 30, 
a think-tank including some of the main central bankers and top economists in the word, 
adopted four distinctions: institutional (or sectoral), functional, integrated (considered as an 
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approach per se) and Taylor’s Twin-peaks (Group of 30, 2008).3 In a report of the National 
Bank of Slovakia (Zimková & Vargová, 2006), only sectoral and functional models were 
considered, with different levels of integration. This classification of financial supervision may 
have different variants: totally separate bodies, partial integration and full integration. In the 
model of full integration, all sectors are overseen by a single supervisory authority. In the 
middle of these two models, we find partially integrated regulation, in which the banking 
system on one hand, and insurance and investment funds on the other, have two different 
supervisory bodies. In some variations of this, the supervision of the banking sector, instead of 
being under the responsibility of a separate body, is under the responsibility of the central bank 
(ibid.).  
This taxonomic debate does not concern our analysis, but it does give us a clearer 
picture on the different variations on this topic. It also gives us the tools to frame the EFSS 
within the literature on financial supervision.  
The EFSS has elements that come from all of these models. The EFSS consists of two 
objectives-based pillars: one focused on micro-prudential supervision, the other based on the 
macro-prudential side. The micro-prudential pillar has the purpose of supervising the behaviour 
of single financial institutions in case of exogenous risks, while macro-prudential supervision 
is focused on systemic risks. 
 Essentially, the micro-prudential pillar is modelled on a sectoral approach. In Europe 
there has never been, and indeed still is not, a uniform system, but a majority of countries have 
adopted a sectoral model of financial supervision, with some notable exceptions opting for a 
functional model, such as France, Spain and Italy. Some models adopted a formula by which 
the national central bank is also the main supervisor of the whole banking sector. Among the 
EU MS, banking supervision is normally outside central bank supervision, under a specific 
banking supervisor, with some exceptions. 
The micro-prudential supervision of the new supervisory mechanism is in fact 
structured around three supervisory authorities at the supranational level, with the assistance 
of a fourth. The first three are the European Banking Authority (EBA), for banking supervision 
(EU Regulation 1093/2010), the European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA), for stock 
exchanges (EU Regulation 1095/2010), and the European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority (EIOPA), for insurance and pension funds (EU Regulation 1094/2010). 
The fourth authority is the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB); it plays a role in assisting 
 
3 Retrieved from: http://group30.org/images/uploads/publications/G30_StructureFinancialSupervision2008.pdf 
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and informing the three authorities on the macroeconomic system, and is composed of the 
Commission, the ECB, in addition to the chairs of the three Authorities. The three institutions 
established a Joint Committee of European Supervisory Authorities (JCESA), to cooperate and 
coordinate their practices. In addition to the supranational level, the EU-27 MS supervisory 
authorities also take part in the EFSS, thus creating a multi-layered and decentralised 
framework, that works horizontally among supranational and national supervisory institutions 
and vertically between the supranational and national supervisory institutions.  
Nonetheless, the ECB still plays a supervisory role, especially in the macro-prudential 
part of the EFSS. In this way, the EFSS represents a hybrid system, displaying both sectoral 
and functional features, and having different models coexisting at the national level, together 
with a single European level. In fact, this specificity exists because every MS in the 
negotiations was eager to bring the supervision system closer to their own domestic system 
(Avaro & Sterdyniak, 2014). Nevertheless, in the end the system that was adopted is composed 
of three sectoral agencies, and a functional branch maintaining a macroprudential overview of 
systemic risk: the ESRB, which represents an example of a functional, integrated agency. It is 
composed of the EBA, the ESMA, the EIOPA, and the ECB, with the latter chairing and hosting 
the work of the ESRB. The Commission also takes part in the work of the ESRB (EU 
Regulation, 806/2014). 
 
Figure 11 Scheme of the European Financial Stability Facility (Source: ECB) 
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Figure 12 The two layers of European Financial Supervision. (Source: ECB) 
Among these institutions, the EBA found itself in a position to play a fundamental role for the 
Banking Union, since its role was to craft and create common practices for banking supervision 
within the framework of EU Law, with no prejudice to the powers of the Commission (EU 
Regulation 1093/2010) and to cooperate with the ESRB in strengthening financial and banking 
stability in the Union. The practices related to banking supervision were collated by the EBA 
into the European Supervisory Handbook or Single Rulebook (SR). The purpose of the SR is 
to create harmonised legislation in the banking sector, on the implementation of the Basel 
principles, those requirements issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
that banks need to comply with. The objective was to avoid a repetition of the same poor 
performances in banking supervision that led to the outbreak of the crisis in the EU. 
Nonetheless, problems in the general European framework (EU and national levels) remain. 
When it comes to financial supervision in federations, there is no prevalent model. In 
fact, some federations follow an integrated approach, others a more sectoral model, but there 
is a common pattern: the supervision has two layers, a federal one and a state one. The EU 
matches this pattern since it has a supranational layer and a national layer. 
In conclusion, with the adoption of the EFSS, the EU chose one of the elements that 
actual states possess. This involved all the EU’s MS, meaning that there is no case for 
separating the level of federal state-building of the EU from that of the Eurozone. The decision 
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to adopt a EU-wide financial stability system and not a Eurozone-based one was also preferred 
since the banking sector is not just a Eurozone concern, but involves all MS (Goodhart & 
Shoenmaker, 2006). Additionally, London was the main financial hub of the EU and since it 
played such an important role had to be included in the framework, even if the UK was not a 
Eurozone MS at the time. (Schoenmaker 2013). Therefore, this does not undermine the case 
for the advancement of the EU towards a model of deeper federal state-building, especially 
since the framework of the EFSS provided the basis for building the framework of the Banking 
Union.  
In general, the EFSS replicates at the European level a system that exists at the national 
level, which is integrated into and not replaced by the EFSS. More importantly, the EFSS 
represents a case of supranational financial supervision and currently remains unique. 
Nonetheless, some issues still remain. The EFSS is still very much work in progress, and its 
efficacy in tackling possible crises still needs to be assessed. The coexistence of such 
articulated levels of governance may prove unnecessary or even counterproductive. Problems 
of a lack of communication and coordination between the two layers may affect the action of 
the institutions of the EFSS. Still, the change that occurred remains dramatic.  
The fact that the EFSS replicates, at a supranational level, the structure of a typical 
financial supervision, represents a form of federal state-building. At the same time, it tells us 
that the state represents a benchmark for further integration in these areas, which seem very 
technical and somehow very functional. In the meantime, financial supervision has taken many 
steps forward. The EP has tried to play a role in this, in accordance with democratic rules, 
where it has written reports and scrutinised the work of the EFSS’ officials. It could be said 
that, in a way, the model of financial supervision argued by Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa is 
represented here (Padoa-Schioppa, 1999).  
4.5 The Banking Union 
The entry into force of the EFSS did not remain an isolated step, but must be assessed, in the 
general framework, as one step within a general advancement in the reform of banking and 
financial governance. In fact, after the establishment of the EFSS, the architecture of the 
banking and financial markets supervision in the Union was still far from being 
comprehensively integrated. Additional elements were still required to create a more 
comprehensive supranational framework, and these could only be achieved through the 
establishing of a banking union. According to Padoa-Schioppa, (1992) the single currency was 
thought of as an infrastructure development that could have led to a new wave of integration 
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for the single market, implying transnational mergers, acquisitions, and expansions inside the 
single market, as well as the creation of greater, transnational supply chains.  
This growth in integration did become a reality, (European Commission, 2007), thanks 
to the removal of currency exchange related risks, and to the economic growth in those years. 
However, the crisis highlighted that the lack of single supervision in the banking field, and the 
fragmentation in the legal framework both hindered the full integration of European markets, 
and prevented European banking groups from achieving a truly global dimension. Nonetheless, 
before the crisis, no effective action had been undertaken in this direction; there was no 
consensus on the best model to adopt for the Banking Union, and in addition, MS calculated 
the cost of fragmentation to be lower than the cost of integration (De Rynck, 2016).  
Representatives of the ECB, IMF, and OECD criticised the lack of single banking 
supervision as potentially very risky, and as early as the beginning of the 2000s, Italian 
economist Padoa-Schioppa had called for the creation of a single banking supervision for the 
Eurozone, modelled on that of existing states (Padoa-Schioppa, 1999), in order not to have a 
currency without a state (Padoa-Schioppa, 2004: 35). The only real development towards a 
single supervisory mechanism was the Committee of European Banking Supervisors. Only the 
crisis, and the fragmentation of European credit markets, triggered a new drive for resuming 
the project of a banking union. A first initiative was taken by the EP, which in 2010, sent a 
resolution with recommendations to the Commission on Cross-Border Crisis Management in 
the Banking Sector (2010/2006(INI)), asking for action on launching a union; this was soon 
followed by the Commission, whose President Barroso also called for a Banking Union 
(Barroso, 2012). In this framework, the Banking Union represented an important step “to place 
the banking sector on a more sound footing and restore confidence in the Euro as part of a 
longer term vision for economic and fiscal integration” (European Commission, 2012).  
The Banking Union was also one of the four goals set out in the Four Presidents’ Report 
(European Council, 2012). This report, in regard to the Banking Union, pointed out that an 
integrated financial framework, (Report on a Genuine Economic Union, 2012: 3), was one of 
the four pillars of a More genuine economic and Monetary Union (The official name of the 
Four Presidents’ Report). The key features of this framework, which was about differentiated 
integration, was that even if it were necessary to preserve the unity and the integration of the 
single market due to the coexistence of different currencies other than the Euro, some specific 
provisions and arrangements for a correct functioning of the Eurozone might be needed (Avaro 
& Sterdyniak 2014). This implied that the creation of a Banking Union, to be followed by a 
fiscal union, was a development that might separate the future of the Eurozone from that of the 
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rest of the EU outside the Euro. This would also have required the adoption of institutions that 
are more typical of the ordinary functioning of a state but applied at the supranational level.  
As a matter of fact, The Four Presidents’ Report advocated the creation of a single 
European supervision, of a single resolution mechanism and a single deposit scheme. In respect 
of the European supervisory system, the report argued for the adoption of a two-layer structure, 
consisting of a European and a national level, in which the European level had ultimate 
responsibility, and had the tools to intervene pre-emptively to prevent bank failures, with the 
use of deposit guarantees and resolution funds (Report on a Genuine Economic Union 2012: 
4). The report advocated the activation of Art. 127(6) of the TFEU to confer supervisory powers 
to the ECB. In this framework, the report highlighted the importance of two schemes: EDIS, 
to oversee national banking deposit schemes under single European supervision; and a 
European Resolution Scheme (ERS) with the purpose of helping apply corrective measures to 
non-performing banks, removing the cost to taxpayers of interventions on the banking sectors, 
and in the long run reducing the need for public interventions. In this framework, the ESM was 
highlighted as the likely “fiscal backstop” of the deposit and insurance scheme. Generally, in 
the project of the Banking Union, mirroring the pattern adopted for the EFSS, the European 
supervisory pillars do not substitute the national ones, but integrate them in a model that takes 
on a multilevel, federal architecture based on the principle of subsidiarity. 
The Banking Union is designed to have three pillars (See figure 13): a supervisory 
mechanism, a resolution mechanism and a deposit insurance scheme. The Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) is the first pillar and plays the role of Single European Supervision as 
identified in the Four Presidents’ Report. Even though its negotiation and implementation were 
relatively quick, (at least compared to the much longer negotiations regarding the creation of 
the EDIS), the SSM is considered to be the most radical introduction in the Banking Union 
(Veron, 2014; De Rynck, 2016). By contrast, the SRM is the second pillar of the Banking 
Union. The SRM is applied to those banks covered by the SSM. The SRM is managed by a 
Single Resolution Board, that also supervises the administration of the Single Resolution Fund 
(SRF). 
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Figure 13 Structure of the Banking Union (Source: European Central Bank) 
These two pillars are also a result of the experience of the European Banking Agency, 
especially where the SRM is concerned. The SSM enhances the role of the ECB, which, thanks 
to this mechanism, becomes also the main supervisory institution of the Union. However, in 
this case too, the ECB would not be the only supervisor of the Union, but its role would be in 
addition to, and not in substitution of, the national supervisory institutions. Additionally, the 
ECB’s supervisory authority covers those banks whose dimensions are considered systemic for 
the stability of the European banking system. The two legal sources of the SSM are the 
Regulation 1022/2013 of the Parliament and the Council, preparing and aligning the EBA 
regulation with that of the incoming SSM, and the Council Regulation 1024/2013, establishing 
the SSM. The banks whose dimensions are described as “significant” for European financial 
stability have to meet one of these five criteria:  
• the value of its assets must exceed €30 billion,  
• the value of its assets exceeds both €5 billion and 20% of the GDP of the member state 
in which it is located,  
• the bank is among the three most significant banks of the country in which it is located,  
• the bank has large cross-border activities,  
• the bank is under, or is going to be under, a programme from eurozone bailout funds 
(i.e. European Stability Mechanism or European Financial Stability Facility).  
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As of 1st of April 2018, 118 banks are under the ECB’s direct supervision (European 
Central Bank, 2018), while another c. 6000 are under direct national supervision, and indirect 
ECB overview. Nonetheless, the ECB, in certain circumstances, may decide to intervene by 
extending its direct supervision at any moment. The executive body of the SSM is the European 
Supervisory Board (EU Council Regulation 1024/2013), and has a mixed composition of 
European and national representatives, composed of a chair, a vice-chair elected from the 
members of the ECB Executive Board, four ECB representatives and one representative from 
each MS (ibid., Art. 26). Within this body, a Steering Committee is established, composed of 
the same chair and vice-chair, one of the ECB representatives and five of the (currently 
nineteen) representatives of the national central banks.  
The SRM was established by Regulation 806/2014, and is structured around the SRF 
which is managed by the Single Resolution Board (SRB). The purpose of the SRM is to manage 
bank defaults without causing tensions in the system, to prevent a banking crisis from 
contaminating the rest of the banking system. For this reason, the SRF plays an important role. 
The SRF is made up from contributions of private institutions (i.e. banks), and is not supported 
by public funds (Chapter 2, Regulation 806/2014).  
The SRB is an independent agency inside the EU framework, and was established with 
a responsibility to manage the SRF (Veron, 2018). The model of the SRB is similar to that 
already adopted for the ECB; it is composed of a president, a vice president and four permanent 
members.  
There has been a recent debate about the role of the SRF, over whether this should be 
provided or not with a backstop mechanism, and whether this is enough to tackle possible crises 
(Vallée et al., 2019). In 2012, the Council had already mentioned a temporary backstop as one 
of the pillars of the Banking Union (European Council, 2012). The Commission proposed, in 
the roadmap for deepening Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (2017), a Monetary Fund 
(i.e. the European Stability Mechanism) to provide a credit line or a guarantee to the SRF, to 
be activated only as last resort insurance, should the funds available in the SRF be insufficient. 
But, even though the backstop had already been agreed in 2013, it did not become operational 
for many years. The Council finally agreed on the backstop on 29th July 2018 (European 
Council, 2018), establishing that the ESM would be equipped with a €80 billion capacity to 
bail out MS, to be triggered only in the cases of insufficient funds. Additionally, the change in 
the structure of banking supervision, from a mere transnational framework to a form of 
hierarchical structure (Posner 2010: 45), is perhaps the most concrete element in the assessment 
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of an evolution in terms of the similarity to that of statehood. Nonetheless, the SRB, despite 
representing a significant step forward, still maintains many intergovernmental elements 
(Howarth & Quaglia, 2014), given the will of the German government at the time of the SRB’s 
creation to hinder any possible mutualisation (Merkel, in Opperman 2012). 
The SSM and the SRM have, until now, despite their brief existence, proved effective 
in their targets to end and reverse the fragmentation of the EU’s financial markets, more 
specifically of the banking sector. Nonetheless, the Banking Union will remain incomplete 
until the entry into force of the EDIS (Holzmann, 2019). 
The third, and still absent, element of the Banking Union is the EDIS, which remains 
under negotiation, and was designed to be the third pillar of the banking union. According to 
the Report Towards Genuine Economic and Monetary Union, (European Commission, 2012), 
the EDIS is a deposit guarantee scheme for banks, under single European supervision. In the 
report, the EDIS would be financed via payments from the banks and other credit institutions, 
with the principle of serving as a general insurance of deposits under European supervision. 
The EDIS, in the proposal of the Commission, might be set up under the same resolution 
authority as that of the SRF. Even in this case, the EDIS was designed to be an instrument of 
last resort to be adopted in a framework where the ESM serves as backstop. 
The EDIS does not represent an outlier in the proposal for the Banking Union; in other 
systems, analogous insurance schemes are included, designed to safeguard bank deposits in 
specific cases. Deposit insurance schemes are a reality in all national banking systems in the 
world. Currently, according to the International Association of Deposit Insurers, an 
independent organisation gathering all the deposit insuring bodies, one hundred forty national 
deposit insurance systems exist, while 28 are under development (IADI, 2018). Some of those 
systems are centralised under a single deposit scheme, others are divided into different 
schemes. For instance, among EU MS, Germany has several different deposit insurance 
schemes, provided by different insurers (German Federal Bank 2015), categorised according 
to sectoral/institutional criterion. The same occurs in Austria, where five different deposit 
insurance schemes exist, while, in Italy there are two, one for banks, and the other for 
Cooperative Credit Institutions.  
Should the EDIS come to life, the EU will have reproduced, with some differences due 
to its specificities, a similar system to that which would have been adopted by the entire 
Eurozone. The EDIS would cover Europe-wide banking groups, whose importance is assessed 
as systemic for the EU banking system (European Central Bank, 2018), but in a multi-level 
system along with national deposit mechanisms. Indeed, the EDIS would be applied to those 
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European groups which are already under SSM, while the single national banks will be covered 
by their respective national deposit schemes. 
The question remains if the Banking Union, as described by Padoa-Schioppa (1992), is 
now closer to the model of integrated, single supervision like that observed in states. The 
answer is that the development of EU supervision is still in progress, and it is not yet similar 
to a single supervision and resolution mechanism (Skuodas, 2017), like that seen in states; 
however, together with the creation of the EFSS, it nevertheless represents a significant step 
forward. Nonetheless, without the implementation of EDIS and the fiscal backstop provided 
by the ESM to the SRF, the architecture of the Banking Union risks remaining fragmented and 
incomplete (Schnabel & Veron, 2019). Nevertheless, the creation of the Banking Union has 
been described as a success of European entrepreneurship and of the cooperation between 
Commission and ECB (Nielsen & Smeets, 2017) 
The negotiations on the EDIS are ongoing, and are proving to be particularly difficult, 
complicated by the differences between MS in terms of the stability and reliability of their 
credit and banking sectors (Howarth & Quaglia, 2018). However, the move towards the EDIS 
would represent one of those elements making the EU closer to a federation, since, as discussed, 
the proposed model is in essence very similar to existing benchmarks. In fact, the EDIS is a 
fundamental element in any single, coherent banking system, and therefore, a presence of a 
single deposit insurance scheme would somehow make the EU closer to a state, than it actually 
is. However, it is very likely that the EDIS will differ from the former models proposed, since 
it is still to be agreed by MS. It is very likely that, in the EDS, the EU MS will play a more 
substantial role than, for instance, in similar deposit insurance schemes. 
In terms of federal state-building, the Banking Union represents another transposition, 
at the supranational level, of a typical feature of banking systems. It represents one of the most 
significant advancements in terms of integration (Draghi 2013; Howarth & Quaglia 2014), 
especially because, even if it is not as well-known as foreign or security policy, it concerns a 
competence which is still the ‘most jealously guarded domain of national sovereignty – banking 
governance’ (Epstein & Rhodes 2016, 416). It represents, in a way, a simultaneous 
advancement, in a functional way, of the importance of the role of the ECB and of supranational 
agencies like the SRB, but in particular the ECB, which managed to play their role 
independently and become front-runner of pan-European interests (De Rynck, 2015). It also 
tells us more about the problems of intergovernmentalism, since the absence of the EDIS is the 
result of the failure to agree a common position, unlike what happened for the first two pillars.  
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Nevertheless, the existence of such a state-like, and even centralised (Montanaro, 
2016), framework at the supranational level represents per se a rejection of the idea of a 
weakening of the EMU and represents an irrefutable proof of a process of a state-building at 
European level.  
4.6 Federalism and the role of the European Commission in the Six-Pack 
and Two-Pack. 
The Six-Pack is a group of six measures that were introduced at the EU level to reform the 
Strategy and Growth Pact (SGP), and the governance of the EMU, after the start of the crisis. 
These were approved in 2011 and were soon followed by another package of two measures, 
the Two-Pack, in 2013. More precisely, the Six-Pack is composed of five different EU 
Regulations and one directive, of which, four are focused on fiscal policy and two on 
macroeconomic policies. The Two-Pack is, instead, focused on macroeconomic surveillance.  
The legal instruments composing the Six-Pack are the following: Regulation 
1173/2011, “On the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area”; 
Regulation 1174/2011, “On enforcement action to correct excessive macroeconomic 
imbalances in the euro area”; Regulation 1175/2011, “On the strengthening of the surveillance 
of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies”, amending 
regulation 1466/97; Regulation 1177/2011, “On speeding up and clarifying the implementation 
of the excessive deficit procedure”, amending Regulation 1467/97; Regulation 1176/2011, “On 
the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances”; Directive 2011/85/EU, “On 
requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States”. Among these, Regulations 
1174/2011 and 1176/2011 are those which cover macroeconomic surveillance, while the other 
four are those focused on the budgetary side.  
The Two-Pack, which came into existence two years after the entry into force of the 
six-pack, is composed of two EU regulations: 472/2013, and 473/2013. The first addresses the 
economic and budgetary surveillance of MS, whereas the second intervenes in monitoring and 
assessing draft budgetary plans, and on correcting budget deficits in the Euro area. 
As previously mentioned, despite the claim that no transfer of further competences to 
the European institutions had taken place in the field of budgetary and macroeconomic 
supervision (Merkel & Sarkozy, 2012), the Commission gained significantly in its new 
competences and powers, in a way that was hardly foreseeable, and might have been opposed 
by MS before the crisis (Bauer & Becker, 2014). These new competences, introduced through 
the Packs, aimed at a reform of the application of the SGP and to improve the Commission’s 
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tools to provide overview and to intervene in macroeconomic and budget imbalances. These 
new legislations introduced, among others, the following tools: the European Semester, the 
Medium-Term Budgetary Objectives, an enhancement of country surveillance, a reformed 
excessive deficit procedure, the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure and ultimately, the 
possibility of imposing graduated financial sanctions, which may rise to 0.5% of GDP, on those 
Eurozone MS at risk of breaching their commitments under the Excessive Imbalance 
Procedure.  
Regulation 1173/2011 is named “On the effective enforcement of budgetary 
surveillance in the euro area”. Alongside other regulations, it consolidates and reinforces 
discipline over the use of fines in the Euro area for MS. In terms of asymmetrical federalism, 
the regulation follows the same logic as the other pieces of legislation, since the regulation is 
applied only to the Eurozone MS, and sets out a system for enforcing the preventive and 
corrective elements of the SGP (Art. 1). The regulation applies two different disciplines for 
interest bearing and non-interest-bearing deposits. In the regulation, the Council still plays a 
significant role, thus confirming that the intergovernmental dimension is still present. The 
Commission’s role is nonetheless enhanced too. The Commission can in fact propose that the 
Council (Article 23 1173/2011) suspend, totally or partially, the transfer of European Structural 
Investment Funds, for those countries undergoing the Excessive Debt Procedure (EDP), (the 
same happens for those countries undergoing the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP), 
but in that case the suspension is only up to 50%). 
Following the experience of Greece’s misreporting of its statistical data prior to the 
crisis, the regulation also has specific provisions to counter the manipulation of economic data 
on states’ deficits and debts. Even though this represents an innovation, some difficulties are 
still hindering a true and consistent application of the regulation, for instance the lack of 
instruments to prove intent in misreporting. In fact, the fine remains the same irrespective of 
whether the wrongdoing was caused by intent or mistake. The regulation requires that a reverse 
majority voting procedure is taken by the Council, if the proposed Commission fines are to be 
dismissed. If this blocking threshold is not met by the Council, action is taken. The TSCG 
provisions sets out the application of fines as “automatic”, and thus represents a step forward 
compared to that of Regulation 1173/2001. This regulation is perhaps one of those that most 
demonstrate the increased role of the Commission.  
Regulation 1174/2011: “On enforcement action to correct excessive macroeconomic 
imbalances in the euro area” introduced fines on Eurozone MS which do not comply with the 
request of the Council to address their macroeconomic imbalances. This regulation only applies 
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to Eurozone MS, and focuses on strengthening the application of procedures to address their 
macroeconomic imbalances. The regulation foresees fines, or the MS to make interest-bearing 
deposits, and fines can be imposed if two successive Council meetings decide that the MS has 
not complied with the adjustments required to accommodate the Commission’s request to 
address the macroeconomic imbalance. The Council can reject the Commission’s request to 
bring in the MIP by reverse qualified majority. Unlike the EDP, in this case the action tailored 
for the MIP is only corrective, and not preventive. 
Regulation 1175/2011 introduced the concept of structural balance into the SGP, that 
should be in line with the concept of Medium-Term Budgetary Objectives (MTO). However, 
this does not give a precise target, merely that budgets must be oriented towards a structural 
balance, although it does not set out a precise number, as the TSCG does. It does give more 
specifics on the European Semester; here the idea of ‘economic dialogue’ represents an 
interesting development, since it reinforces the role of the EP, which can invite members of the 
Council and the Commission to discuss issues related to the European Semester. This 
regulation increases the role taken by the Commission, by introducing surveillance missions 
(Art. 11.1) and enhanced missions (Art. 11.2). These missions purpose is to provide fiscal and 
economic coordination. Surveillance missions are ordinary, routine measures, undertaken for 
greater coordination and to increase dialogue and the exchange of practices and views with 
MS, while enhanced missions are performed in cases of significant deviation from the MTO 
(Regulation 1175, Arts. 6.2 and 10.2). 
 The adoption of these regulations is significant, since it further enhances the role of the 
Commission. Missions organised by international organisations are common, indeed routine, 
but it is an interesting development in terms of federal-state building that in this context, and 
especially in case of enhanced missions, there is an asymmetric relationship between the 
Commission on one side and the MS on the other. This was not foreseeable before the sovereign 
debt crisis, and in fact this procedure was sparked by experiences of the management of the 
Greek, Irish, and Portuguese bail-outs, which led to regular visits by the Commission (together 
with the ECB and the IMF). Whereas, at the time of the crisis, this was an exception, now the 
objective is to pre-emptively create a permanent exchange with MS (Kreilinger, 2016). Some 
more time needs to be spent on the European Semester, the Expenditure Benchmark and the 
MTOs, to which I now turn. 
In order to grasp these developments, I need to give greater attention to the European 
Semester, the Expenditure Benchmark and the MTOs. The European Semester, together with 
the MIP, is perhaps the main innovation of the Six-Pack (Delivorias & Scheinert, 2019). It is 
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maybe even more important because it is the instance when surveillance and coordination are 
performed. The European Semester extends from January to July, and seeks to prevent 
macroeconomic imbalances, and boost investments, growth, jobs and competitiveness. The 
European Semester is the result of a three-way dialogue between the Commission, the Council 
and the MS, with the Commission playing the major role. The role of the Commission in this 
part of the legislation is highly proactive. From the beginning of the year, the Commission 
starts analysing the actions and policies that each MS applies. It can adopt recommendations, 
and for instance it can monitor and address the way EU-based policies are implemented 
(Section A1). The European Semester is one of the main elements that demonstrate the new 
role the Commission may play in the economic policies of its MS. 
The Expenditure Benchmark (EB) is the component of the Six-Pack that requires net 
growth rates of MS’s government spending to be at, or below, their medium-term potential 
economic growth rates. The EB process means that, when expenditures exceed the medium-
term potential economic growth, additional discretionary measures must be implemented to 
match the MTO and make it sustainable; while the MTO is one of the preventive tools of 
reformed SGP, and is designed to support EU MS in achieving their budgetary targets. The 
MTO is strictly connected to the EB. When the MS are misaligned with these, they need to 
adjust their structural position of 0.5% of GDP per year as benchmark. The EB is described as 
complementary to MTOs, and is designed as a tool to maintain them. 
MTOs are set to ensure sound fiscal health. They address the need to achieve 
sustainable debt levels, while ensuring governments have enough room to manoeuvre, and a 
safety margin against breaching the EU’s fiscal rules. 
In contrast with past practice, countries which are highly indebted are expected to tackle 
their debt burdens more drastically, and are required to take tougher measures. Global 
economic trends are also taken as a criterion, which means that, when the economic cycle is 
negative and economy is stagnating or in recession, the pace for adjustment will be slower, 
whereas, during phases of expansion and growth, MS will be required to set into motion 
adjustment measures (Estella, 2018). 
Regulation 1176/2011, ‘On the prevention and correction of macroeconomic 
imbalances’, is the second macroeconomic-focused piece of the Six-Pack, together with 
Regulation 1174/2011, which provides the corrective part of the legislation. It introduced the 
MIP, and set out the details of how this new instrument would cover all EU MS. The MIP is 
one of the tools of the Commission, which has been introduced with the Six-Pack. The MIP is 
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an instrument designed with the purpose of overviewing the macroeconomic developments of 
MS to correct pre-emptively and prevent trends that might be considered risky.  
Due consideration is given to a country's economic situation as well as its sustainability 
conditions. EU MS with excessive and potentially risky debt burdens are expected to make 
faster progress. All countries are generally required to do more when economic conditions are 
favourable, so they can have more flexibility when conditions are tough. At the same time, the 
required pace of adjustment is reduced when economic conditions are unfavourable. MTOs are 
defined and updated every 3 years, or more frequently after a structural reform, in order to 
assess the latter.  
In case of deviation from the MTOs by one or more MS, the Commission shall 
recommend that the Council start a Significant Deviation Procedure (SDP). The SDP is a 
warning, that should pressure the state into adopting a more prudent fiscal policy and should 
prevent the triggering of further procedures like the EDP. 
The MIP is partly modelled on a reformulated EDP. This innovation is very interesting, 
since it puts the macroeconomic policies of the MS, and not just their budgetary policies, under 
the surveillance of the Commission. The Council retains the authority to open and close the 
excessive imbalance procedure, but in the process, the Commission plays a significant role in 
assessing and reporting MS’ imbalances. Even though the Council retains the final word on 
initiating the MIP, The Commission plays a significant role in its preparation and 
implementation and consequently, it might play a significant part in addressing the behaviour 
of MS in the phases of its development (Savage & Verdun, 2016; Verdun & Zeitlin, 2017) 
Among the elements of the new regulatory framework, the MIP is based on the use of 
a dashboard of indicators that the Commission uses to evaluate the macroeconomic trends of 
MS. To do so, the Commission uses in-depth reviews to evaluate them. For those countries 
undergoing budget imbalances, the preventive arm of the MIP is activated as part of the 
European Semester, thus meaning that the MIP-relevant recommendation will be submitted as 
part of the Country Specific Recommendations. The Commission and the Council follow Art. 
121 of TFUE (Regulation 1176/2011). 
Nonetheless, in cases where the Commission finds an excessive imbalance, it may 
decide to trigger the Excessive Imbalance Procedure (EIP). This procedure is a designed to be 
a last-resort measure and, as of today, it has never been triggered. Until now, investigations 
about possible imbalances have been conducted, but they have never reached the final stage, 
since both the Commission and the MS preferred avoiding such drastic measures. Its 
mechanism requires the MS to submit a plan of corrections with a related time frame to the 
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Council. Once the Council approves it, both institutions need to monitor the implementation of 
the measures. If the MS subject to the procedure fails to tackle the imbalance, the institutions 
can impose a fine. If it succeeds in implementing the actions that the Commission and the 
Council require, the EIP ends (ibid.).  
Regulation 1177/2011 acts on the EDP, and describes the scheme of fines that should 
be applied in case of EDP. Art. 11 of the regulation represents a significant change compared 
to the previous regulation, establishing that fines shall be preferred “as a rule”, thus amending 
old Art. 11 of Regulation 1467/97, which said that a non-interest-bearing deposit was, as a rule, 
required (Estrella, 2018). The passage from interest-bearing deposits to fines represents a step 
towards a more rigid and in many ways a more coercive form of vertical control (ibid.), through 
which the supranational level of European governance can “punish” its MS. This is bringing 
the EU closer to a form of coercive federalism (Kincaid, 1990) than a traditional 
intergovernmental model. This is confirmed by the application of TFEU Art. 126.11. 
Additionally, Art. 12 sets the criteria for the calculation of fines. More interestingly, the 
regulation indicates that the Council shall impose additional fines on those MS that still do not 
comply with the targets of excessive deficit reduction, in each year the original fine was 
imposed.  
Directive 2011/85 has a highly technical content. It instructs MS to use accounting rules 
in budgetary exercises, and to use the ESA 95 accounting standards to draft budgets, instead of 
national ones. Nonetheless, this directive represents a step towards federal state-building, since 
its target is the harmonisation of the budgetary frameworks of its MS, and more importantly, 
by harmonising some of the fiscal and budgetary procedures of EU MS, it tries to create 
harmonised, common foundations for a future fiscal union. This suggests that some of the 
elements of directive 2011/85 are likely to be included in plans for a fiscal union. More 
interestingly, this directive insists on national budgetary frameworks being multiannual and 
not annual, in line with the MTOs.  
These legal tools do not stand alone, in fact Regulations 1174 and 1176 are to be 
considered together, Regulation 1177 reinforces regulation and 1173, and Regulation 1175 and 
Directive 2011/85 are complementary. In the end, these laws currently constitute the legal 
backbone for the action of the EMU’s governance. Their importance is strongly linked to the 
fact that they represent some of the most significant changes in the EMU and, unlike the ESM 
or the Fiscal Compact, they were introduced within the existing framework of the EU treaties 
and not outside of them, like, for instance the TSCG 
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As previously mentioned, the two ‘Packs’ were introduced by Regulations 473/2013 
and 472/2013. The former introduced further surveillance, with the purpose of making national 
budgetary policies consistent with the requirements of the SGP and the European Semester. 
Furthermore, this regulation aimed at establishing a common budgetary timeline for Euro MS, 
and more stringent criteria for MS under the EDP, in such cases, when reporting to the 
Commission.  
Regulation 472/2013 focuses on MS that are under one of the procedures, or under any 
financial assistance programme of the IMF or the ESM (or its predecessors EFSF or EFSM). 
This regulation increased the role of the Commission in directing the choices of the Council, 
which remained politically responsible for giving the green light to Commission initiatives. 
The regulation introduced a mechanism for enhanced surveillance. Unlike the former, 
Regulation 473/2013 is addressed at countries that are not subject to any procedure for 
excessive imbalance or deficit. 
Regulation 472/2013, “on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance 
of Member States in the euro area” introduces and regulates the enhanced budgetary 
surveillance by the Commission. This enhanced surveillance was also a product of the 
experience of the bailout in Greece (Estrella, 2018). 
In reference to those countries experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with 
respect to their financial stability, Art. 5 of Regulation 472/2013 stipulates the need for 
enhanced regulation of Eurozone countries, requiring regular reporting to the EP; and just after, 
Art. 7 asserts that “all recommendations addressed to the Member State in the course of an 
excessive deficit procedure or an excessive macroeconomic imbalance procedure should be 
taken into account” (Regulation 472/2013). Art. 2 states that the Commission has the authority 
to subject MS to enhanced surveillance, should instability be contagious in other member 
states. Art. 3 dictates that the enhanced surveillance shall be performed in liaison with the ECB, 
the ESAs, the ESRB, and, if appropriate, the IMF.  
In this way, the regulation not only gave stronger powers of surveillance to the 
Commission, but also put the Commission in a position to develop further know-how and 
procedures to address the action of the MS, that is unknown among international organisations, 
and closer to the know-how that characterises a national civil service.  
As previously mentioned, Art. 7 introduced another tool to address misalignment: the 
macroeconomic adjustment programme. In this case, it is the role of the ESM (and its 
predecessors EFSF and EFSM), in partnership with the Commission, to draft a programme. It 
will be seen, in Regulation 473/2013, that the adjustment programme and the economic 
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partnership are mutually exclusive; more specifically, macroeconomic adjustment “builds on 
and substitutes” economic partnership programmes. As is the case in other pieces of the Six-
Pack legislation, the true power of the Commission lies firstly in drafting the guidelines of the 
adjustment programme that the Council has to approve, and secondly in ensuring coherence 
between the adjustment and the obligations contracted by the MS under surveillance with the 
ESM or the EFSF. The regulation then gave more detail on the integration between the stability 
programme and the macroeconomic adjustment programme (Art. 10). Among others, it states 
that Regulation 1176/2011 is not applicable to states under an adjustment programme, apart 
from the dashboard indicators (Art. 11). Therefore, a country under an adjustment programme 
is exempt from the European Semester obligations (Art. 12). 
The role of the Commission emerges again in Art. 14. The article states that a MS shall 
remain under post-programme surveillance as long as 75% of the financial assistance has not 
been repaid. Should the MS not meet the threshold by the agreed date, the Commission has the 
authority to propose an extension to the Council, which then has ten days to reject it by reverse 
qualified majority. 
Regulation 473/2013 is focused on the strengthening of the SGP. More specifically, the 
regulation is designed to target and synchronise the budgetary policies of those countries whose 
currency is the Euro. From the perspective of federal state-building, this move in the direction 
of creating a single framework for common budgetary policies inside the Eurozone. It sets 
some of the timeline and provisions of the European Semester, and of the yearly monitoring 
procedure. More specifically, Art. 6 of the regulation directs that MS are not only obliged to 
submit their budgets by the 15th October of each year, but also that the budgets must be 
consistent with the recommendations of the Commission to MS, thus increasing the role of the 
Commission in the national budget-making system. Article 9 instead introduces the notion of 
Economic Partnership Programme. 
Finally, Regulation 473/2013 considers that macroeconomic adjustment programmes, 
like those linked to bailouts, and economic partnership programmes, do in a way overlap. Here, 
Art. 1a establishes that a MS subject to the former is exempted from submitting the latter, and 
the details of the economic partnership programme would be included the macroeconomic 
adjustment programme, as mentioned previously. 
Thanks to the tools provided by the reformed SGP, the Commission has acquired an 
important instrument to direct national governments towards pan-European targets. Even 
though this is not entirely a characteristic of a federal political system in a traditional sense, 
this legislation might over the coming years increase the role of the Union in national policies, 
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whereas in the past this did not occur (Rasmussen, 2018). This would suggest that the major 
involvement of not just the EP, but also of national parliaments, should be created and triggered 
in processes of scrutiny, and in dialogues with the Commission (Crum 2018; Hallerberg, 
Marzinotto, & Wolff, 2018; Lord 2017; Maatsch 2017). More than ever, the Commission is 
becoming a third party in the shaping of national policies, so that, not only national institutions 
and politics make these policies, but also the EU dimension strongly influences these (Fasone, 
2018). This means that, given the parliamentary control over national budgets, a healthy, 
cooperation between national parliaments, European parliaments and the Commission should 
be pursued and promoted. 
In fact, despite all the issues and criticisms that might be highlighted, in the terms 
explained, the Six- and Two-Pack legislation represented a strong shift towards the 
Europeanisation of budgetary and macroeconomic policies, whereby the instruments of the 
Commission are designed and applied to align fiscal and microeconomic policies of the MS to 
the objectives that the EU is pursuing. This shift had already started with the adoption of the 
Maastricht Treaty and the single currency, yet budgetary control was still based on coordination 
(Schmidt 2013; Rasmussen, 2018; Nicoli 2018). However, this more recent step moves away 
from coordination and more towards centralisation. While coordination is the pursuit of a target 
through single actions, the implementation of the Six- and Two-Packs increases the capacity 
of the Commission to deliver fines and to hold countries accountable for fiscal alignment, with 
the goal of a functioning EMU, even though it requires authorisation by the Council. This 
represents a further shift from the area of MS self-rule to that of shared rule, with the 
Commission playing a main role. In King’s terms (1982: 24), what occurred after 2009 was a 
process of centralising federalism. It is very likely that the degree of shared rule through 
Europeanisation of fiscal policies is still suboptimal compared to what the Eurozone needs 
now. Yet, like other examples of developing fiscal federalisms (Alber & Valdescalici, 2012) it 
is an ongoing process, step by step, in which the Commission is increasing its competences, 
but also improving its know-how on its own action to assess and address the action of MS.  
Recent events, like the confrontation between Italy and the Commission, confirm the 
increasing Europeanisation of budgetary and macroeconomic policies. More specifically, the 
centralisation of the authority of the Commission over the MS has confirmed the transformation 
of a previous area of sole national competence into a Europeanised one, specifically binding 
on the Eurozone countries, represented specifically by the Two-Pack legislation. In terms of 
federal state-building, the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack increase the level of intervention of the 
Commission not only in the economic governance of the Union, but more specifically, in the 
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economic governance of its MS, with all the implications that this may hold (Van der Veer & 
Haverland, 2018).  
In the case of the Six- and Two-Packs, there are some elements that might well be 
critical. First, the new budgetary and macroeconomic overviews are now very far removed 
from any category of federalism. Even though budget constraints are a common feature in most 
federal states (Besfamille & Lockwood, 2007), the two legislative packages have to be analysed 
from a different perspective. This means that, both in the way MS are bound to their obligations 
towards the Commission (for instance by sending their budget drafts during the European 
Semester) and in the way the Commission issues country-specific recommendations and 
potentially initiates macroeconomic imbalance procedures, the European Semester goes well 
beyond federalism, and some may argue that it is an ongoing form of centralism (Schneider, 
2014). 
The link with democracy remains fundamental to assess a true federalist structure 
(King, 1982), and one of the main problems emerging from the Six- and Two-Pack legislation, 
is that while the Council and the Commission play a main role (with the former shaping the 
policies and the latter authorising or denying the proposals of the Commission), the EP does 
not properly emerge as an actor. Piattoni & Papadopoulos (2018) have highlighted that the 
European Semester was a missed opportunity for the EP to emerge, because of a lack of will 
of its main policy-makers, and because of a specific intention to maintain a dialogue which 
principally involves the Commission and the Council, by excluding the EP. For instance, the 
role of the EP in scrutinising the application of the European Semester has remained 
consistently limited, if compared to that of the Commission and the MS in the Council (Piattoni, 
2018). The role of the EP needs further analysis, and generally differences in terms of 
application of the Six-Pack legislation raise some questions, notably whether there should be a 
differentiation inside the EP between Euro and non-Euro Member States; this represents an 
argument favouring a “Eurozone votes for Eurozone Laws”, since a greater involvement of the 
EP should be considered.  
This raises the issue that, since fiscal and budgetary control is the cornerstone of 
parliamentary liberal democracy (ibid.), there might still be a gap in EU governance that needs 
to be filled, to have a functioning supranational democracy, matching pre-existing standards of 
parliamentary democracy. Another issue is linked to the way the reformed SGP is applied, 
which results in a difference of treatment between large and small MS (ibid.). Nonetheless, this 
is not a new issue in the field of comparative federal studies, and it is debatable whether it is 
one of the main issues with the intergovernmental elements of the EU (Magnette & Nikolaidis, 
   
 
169 
 
2003). Asymmetries between states created by different fiscal or demographic weighting are a 
recurrent element in many federal systems (Agranoff, 1994). Even if this might be undesirable, 
it is not an uncommon phenomenon, and addressing it has been a topic since the Federalist 
Papers (1782). 
In terms of federal state-building, the Six- and Two-Packs represent a step forward in 
European integration as a development of federal statehood. However, it features some 
elements that can perhaps point toward the direction of centralisation, as similar processes of a 
centralisation of economic governance have occurred in federal and unitary states in the past, 
and displays some bias, like the role of the EP, that needs to be addressed. This being said, 
these problems should not be considered in isolation. The reformed SGP, as well as other 
elements of the Six- and Two-Pack legislation, are specifically applied to Eurozone MS. The 
fact that the EP represents the EU as a whole and does not formally have a “Eurozone Votes 
for Eurozone Laws” clause, also prevents the EP from playing a greater role.  
In terms of governance, the Six- and Two-Pack legislation represent work in progress 
with significant potential of improvement, and represent only the first step towards the creation 
of a future fiscal Union. Some critical areas remain, as previously mentioned, but nonetheless 
this legislation represented a significant step forward in the process of European state-building, 
with the Commission playing a significant role, taking more responsibilities in assessing the 
actions of its MS, and with additional powers of fining MS when they do not respect their 
budgetary commitments. In terms of agency, when compared to the Commission before the 
years 2008-09, this is comparably higher. The reformed SGP also represents work in progress, 
that is likely to change in the coming years; not just because of political decisions made by the 
MS, but more specifically because of the expertise and experience developed, and change of 
practice in the way the Commission, its Directorate Generals and horizontal units implement 
the SGP’s content. 
The process of reform of the SGP and the European semester are maybe difficult to 
compare to other federal systems. It was a form of centralisation of budgetary and 
macroeconomic overview that was needed to address the economic governance of the EU, and 
more specifically the Eurozone, and to pursue credible risk-reduction policies, that are 
necessary to pursue more risk-sharing in the future. Yet again, the ideological approach behind 
it tries to combine the principle of subsidiarity and to consider different sizes for different fits 
(Alber & Valdescalici, 2012), with the need to have a centralised, stronger, overview. It is a 
dynamic process, in a system under construction, whose dynamics are no different from the 
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dynamics of (re)centralisation and decentralisation that are common in all federal systems 
(ibid.). 
Compared to the role of the ECB post Draghi’s “Whatever it takes” (Verdun, 2018), or 
to the acceleration in the banking union or the EFSS, it is more difficult to assess the level of 
federalism and federal state-building in the European semester. Nevertheless, over the last 
years, there has been a trend by the Commission, and by the EP, to adopt and broaden the 
purpose of the European Semester. There has been a push to include environmental and social 
policies, thus shifting the target of the Semester to areas other than compliance with the SGP 
or macroeconomic stability. Therefore, the European Semester may represent a strong 
instrument for implementing the application of the policies like the new Green Deal (Tinagli, 
2020; Lalucq, 2020; Lambert, 2020). Other than surveillance, the European Semester is not a 
centralist instrument of control, even if it increases the role of the Commission significantly, 
but it is also based on an exchange of information with the MS, in a relationship based on 
intentions of mutual agreement, good faith and subsidiarity (Delivorias & Scheinert, 2019). It 
represents the first attempt of addressing the economic policies of the Union, trying to balance 
the role of the Commission as guardian of macroeconomic stability, but also as an enforcer of 
the economic programmes of the Union, with the self-rule of MS. 
4.7 Europeanisation with intergovernmentalism: The European Stability 
Mechanism  
The ESM is one of the new institutions which emerged from the sovereign debt crisis. The 
ESM is an intergovernmental body that assists countries struggling financially, and replaces 
both previous risk-stabilisation funds: the EFSF and the EFSM, which still remain in place 
until their assistance programmes expire (Treaty establishing the European Stability 
Mechanism, 2011, (1) Preamble). 
The decision to create a permanent crisis-management mechanism was taken by the 
Council in late 2010 (European Council, 2010). The ESM was established in February 2012, 
became operational in September 2012 and entered into force on 1st July 2013. 
Chronologically, it follows both the EFSM and the EFSF. Indeed, the EFSM was established 
at the beginning of 2010, and was soon followed by the EFSF. The EFSM is a Commission 
fund (European Council Regulation 407/2010) under article 122(2), allowing the Commission 
to raise funds from banks and financial institutions, in order to inject liquidity intro troubled 
MS, by using the budget of the EU as collateral for its operations. The EFSF was later 
established with a more intergovernmental framework, and partly outside the supranational 
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framework (Stratigopoulou & Mylonakis, 2013), since its capacity mainly consisted of MS 
contributions, has a much bigger financial capacity, and it was created outside the European 
institutions, in the legal form of a private company. Unlike the EFSF, the ESM is a permanent 
institution, but by contrast, the role of the MS is greater in the ESM than in the earlier EFSF 
and EFSM structures.  
As set out in Art. 4 of the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM 
Treaty, 2012), the ESM has a Board of Governors and a Board of Directors. In the latter, the 
Treaty sets out three voting methods: mutual agreement (i.e. unanimity with the possibility of 
abstaining), qualified majority (a 2/3 majority of at least 2/3 of the voting rights) or simple 
majority. While participation is compulsory for Euro MS, non-Euro MS have the right to opt 
in if they want to participate in any of the assistance programmes. Conditionality is one of the 
core conditions on which support and financial assistance to MS is provided (TESM, 2012). 
This criterion was fundamental to allow for the reform of article 136 of TFUE via a simplified 
revision procedure, thus avoiding further challenges. The previous programmes of the EFSF 
and the EFSM were not discarded, but still continue as transitional agreements, facilitating the 
passage from the EFSF framework to the ESM one.  
The ESM can intervene in the markets, using a wide set of tools. It can grant loans to 
countries, provide precautionary financial assistance, purchase bonds of beneficiary MS on 
primary and secondary markets, and provide loans for the recapitalisation of financial 
institutions. All financial assistance is linked to appropriate conditionality specified in an 
agreement concluded by the Commission, the ECB, the IMF and the beneficiary MS. Despite 
this, the role of the European institutions is still very limited, since the MS remain the main 
stakeholders of the ESM. Nonetheless, similarly to the Fiscal Compact, the ECJ is given the 
role of settling any disputes arising within the ESM, and its decisions are described as binding 
for the parties of the treaties (TESM, Art. 37). So, even in this case, the European institutions, 
more specifically the ECJ, play a main role as the guarantor of an intergovernmental treaty.  
The ESM does not entirely match the characteristics of a supranational body. In fact, 
despite being an institution under EU Law, the Commission and the ECB have a very limited 
say in it, while the EP has none. In fact, the Commissioner for Monetary Affairs may participate 
as observer in the meeting of the Board of Governors, and so may the Presidents of the ECB 
and of the Eurogroup, while no representative of the EP is eligible to participate. However, the 
Board has the right to give a mandate to the Commission to negotiate, in accordance with the 
ECB, the conditionality of the economic policies underpinning each financial assistance 
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programme, in accordance with Art. 13(3) (Art. 5, TESM). This implies that the Commission 
remains a meaningful player, despite mostly being an agent of the EU MS in this framework. 
As the treaty on the ESM states, membership is compulsory for Euro MS, in the same 
way as the membership of the TSCG. Similarly, those MS requiring the assistance of the ESM 
have an obligation to be signatories of the TSCG.  
There are several differences between the earlier EFSM/EFSF and the ESM. While the 
EFSM had a limited capacity, the EFSF could count on a greater one; the ESM can count on 
an even greater capacity. Another main difference between the EFSF and the ESM, in terms of 
federalism, is that MS invest jointly in the fund, while in the EFSF, guarantees were provided 
individually by each MS. As already mentioned, one of the greatest differences, is that the 
EFSF was run under Luxemburgish private law, instead of being established as an 
intergovernmental treaty, since the EFSF was created under pressured circumstances. The 
decision to establish the EFSF under the stricter EU framework was thought to be somewhat 
contentious (Stratigopoulou & Mylonakis, 2013: 19), but the choice made under the 
circumstances was to avoid the long procedures, and the possible legal challenges, that an 
intervention within the framework of the EU treaties might have triggered.  
In a comparative perspective, the governance of the ESM might be compared to the 
ECB. Both institutions share some intergovernmental features. In the ESM, the Board of 
Directors is composed of the representatives of the economic and finance ministries of the MS. 
Similarly, the Board of Governors of the ESM is composed of the finance ministers of the 
Eurozone MS themselves. These are the main decision-making bodies, with the difference that, 
while the ESM’s Board of Directors has an executive purpose, the ECB’s Board of Governors 
has a more political role, since it represents the positions of the MS. In the case of the ECB, 
the Governing Council brings together the governors of the Euro MS’ central banks. In 
contrast, the ESM does not have an ECB-Style Executive Board, thus making it more 
intergovernmental and less supranational than the ECB. Nonetheless, within the ESM the 
managing director plays an executive role, similar to that of the President of the ECB, and in 
order to perform his duties, the managing director relies on a managing board. The main 
difference is found in the voting system in the decision-making process; here, the ESM’s Board 
of Directors uses Qualified Majority Voting, while the ECB’s Board of Governors uses 
unanimity.  
Focusing more on the purpose of the ESM, instead of its governance, the ESM might 
be compared to the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) (Sinha, 2018). The TARP was a 
US government release programme, which was part of the Emergency Economic Stabilisation 
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Act. It aimed at intervening in the economy by injecting liquidity into banks. The main 
difference is that, while that was a non-permanent programme managed by the US Treasury, 
the programmes in the EU will be performed by an independent, permanent agency, under the 
main control of the MS. 
In terms of federalism, the ESM might represent a step forward, but there are some grey 
areas that need to be addressed. The fact that a permanent body was established, with a special 
focus on the Eurozone, and with the duty to mitigate market pressures on the weakest 
economies and to facilitate their market access, was certainly a step forward in enhancing the 
supranational dimension of public intervention. This is an element that was impossible to 
imagine just few years before the start of the crisis, and in fact some fiscal conservative parties 
(like the German FDP or the Dutch VVD) still contest the existence of the ESM as a permanent 
body. Nevertheless, the role for the Commission and the ECB is still very weak for a body that 
might play a significant role. Additionally, the EP is completely uninvolved, and a form of 
democratic, supranational oversight is necessary. 
However, some elements remain to be discussed. The ESM remains separate from the 
EU, and it does not represent a form of fiscal transfers, because of the criteria of conditionality, 
and the limited role of the European institutions, whose decisions mostly depend on the MS. 
The role of the EP is almost non-existent, even if the ESM top decision-makers, including 
Managing Director, Mr. Klaus Regling, were briefed by, and had Q&A sessions with, the EP. 
Nonetheless the ESM represents an innovation that ultimately improves the governance of the 
EMU, and furthermore, it is a step towards the possibility of permanent European intervention. 
Despite this, the ESM, compared to the ECB, is still more intergovernmental in its features 
(especially the ESM Board of Governors), even if the ESM represents the core of a necessary 
step in the making of the Eurozone as a federal political system. By contrast, the fact that the 
ESM is de facto an international organisation based on an intergovernmental treaty (Ruffert 
2011: 1783; Schwarz, 2014: 400; De Nes, 2015: 132), is responsible for safeguarding the single 
currency and its stability, while at the same time remains outside of the EU legal framework, 
represents an anomaly even in terms of federal state-building. An anomaly that, in legal and 
constitutional terms, should be amended as soon as possible. Mentioning the ESM might not 
seem relevant, because of its highly intergovernmental model, boosting the role of the MS 
whereas the role of EU institutions is very limited. Nevertheless, the ESM has the potential to 
become more integrated into the EU framework, and it still represents a case of Europeanisation 
despite its intergovernmental character. 
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4.7.1 Federalism in The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance, the Fiscal 
Compact  
The choice to include the Fiscal Compact in this analysis, even though it is an 
intergovernmental agreement at the European level, was made for a number of reasons. One of 
those is that it represents a further attempt to deepen fiscal discipline in the EU, and to lay the 
foundations of a single fiscal discipline throughout the Eurozone. Additionally, because it is 
still very connected with other innovations in EMU governance: as previously described, ESM 
membership is linked to the ratification of the Fiscal Compact, which was compulsory for all 
Eurozone MS. Additionally, some of the provisions contained in the TSCG were already in 
some ways internalised by the Six- and Two-Packs (Estrella 2018). 
The TSCG came into life in March 2012. It is an intergovernmental treaty, signed by 
25 out of 27 Member States (Croatia was yet to become a Member State). The treaty went 
through long negotiations, which in the end saw the UK asking for special treatments and 
exemptions. The refusal to accommodate the British requests, and the UK’s subsequent veto 
(BBC, 2011) led the EU MS to transfer this treaty from a supranational basis to an 
intergovernmental one, thus bypassing the UK veto. In the end, the Czech Republic also 
preferred to opt out from the ratification, thus becoming the second state not to adopt the Treaty, 
which was soon referred to as the “fiscal compact”, after a speech by Draghi in 2011 (Draghi, 
2011).  
The Fiscal Compact represents a further step towards establishing a single fiscal 
discipline in the EU, and ultimately more steps toward a fiscal union, further deepening the 
framework that had been already established with the Six- and Two-Pack legislation. 
Generally, in the years of the crisis, the Commission played an increasingly important role and 
centralised some of the competences that had remained mostly intergovernmental and in the 
hands of the ECOFIN after the move to the single currency in 2002.  
Despite being an intergovernmental treaty, the Fiscal Compact gives a greater role to 
the Commission. In the Fiscal Compact framework, the Commission has the responsibility to 
monitor how EU governments implement and respect the requests of the treaty (TSCG, 2011). 
The Fiscal Compact contains the following rules: general government budgets shall be 
balanced or in surplus with the result that the annual structural deficit must not exceed 0.5 
percent of GDP (ibid.). Furthermore, the TSCG also states that those countries with 
government debt levels significantly below 60 percent, in the case of low long-term 
sustainability of public finances, can reach a structural deficit of at most 1 percent of GDP. 
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The TSCG requires that these rules must be incorporated in MS’s national legal systems 
“through binding, permanent and preferably constitutional provisions” (ibid.). Additionally, 
the Treaty states that these rules must contain an automatic correction mechanism that ‘shall 
be triggered in the event of deviation. The mechanism will be defined by each Member State 
on the basis of principles proposed by the European Commission’ (ibid.).  
The treaty therefore requires that the MS internalise the decisions taken in the treaty, in 
a form of Europeanisation (Börzel, 1999), that tends to Europeanise and make national fiscal 
policies uniform. Nonetheless, this happens within an intergovernmental framework, not 
because of a top down approach. Nonetheless, the TSCG enhances the role of the European 
institutions as few treaties have done before.  
In fact, the treaty requires that all signatories recognise the jurisdiction of the ECJ to 
verify the transposition of the rules on structural deficit to the national level. MS must converge 
towards their specific reference level, according to a timetable proposed by the Commission. 
MS whose government debt exceeds the 60% reference level shall reduce it at an average rate 
of one twentieth (5%) per year as a benchmark. MS in Excessive Deficit Procedure shall submit 
to the Commission and the Council an economic partnership programme detailing the 
necessary structural reforms to ensure an effectively durable correction of excessive deficits. 
Once approved, the implementation of the programme, and the yearly budgetary plans 
consistent with it, will be monitored by the Commission and the Council. MS agree to take the 
necessary actions and measures,  
which are essential to the good functioning of the euro area in pursuit of the objectives 
of fostering competitiveness, promoting employment, contributing further to the 
sustainability of public finances and reinforcing financial stability (TSCG: article 9, 
2011).  
MS must also ensure that all major economic policy reforms that they plan to undertake will 
be discussed first and, where appropriate, coordinated among themselves and with the 
institutions of the EU. The implementation of the programme, and the yearly budgetary plans 
consistent with it, will be monitored by the Commission and by the Council. As soon as a MS 
is recognised to be in breach of the 3% ceiling, the Commission submits a proposal of counter-
measures, concerning particularly the nature, the size and the time-frame of the corrective 
action to be undertaken, while taking into consideration country-specific sustainability risks. 
Progress towards and respect of the medium-term objective shall be evaluated based on an 
overall assessment with the structural balance as a reference, including an analysis of 
expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures. These proposals are binding unless a 
qualified majority of MS rejects them. 
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Another important step was that the Fiscal Compact was created as an 
intergovernmental treaty, with a commitment to integrate the treaty into the TEU and the 
TFEU, and thus to Europeanise the treaty by bringing it from an intergovernmental framework 
into a supranational framework. Nonetheless, the purpose of the Fiscal Compact is in addition 
to, and not a substitution or with prejudice to the obligation of EU membership. In fact, as 
previously mentioned the treaty was originally planned with the purpose to be an EU wide 
treaty, but, because of the veto of the UK government, it came into life as an intergovernmental 
treaty. With the ratification by the Czech Republic in 2019 (CNBC, 2018) and Brexit, all 27 
MS are now parties to the treaty. It must be observed that the treaty represents one of the 
greatest innovations in the EU’s framework in the last few years, but it came to life through an 
intergovernmental method (Lo Bue, 2014). 
It is likely that the Fiscal Compact will provide the basis for fiscal discipline in the EU 
(European Council, 2012). Therefore, it represents a necessary step to further increase the 
possibilities of broader fiscal policies in the future.  
Even though the purpose of the TSCG was to restore market confidence in European 
public finances and to create a common ground for fiscal discipline in the Eurozone, the TSCG 
does not entirely fit the criteria of federalism. In fact, the TSCG is an agreement that requires 
the MS to constitutionalise fiscal policies. However, the way the TSCG intervenes in the fiscal 
policies of its MS is something that finds some correspondence with other federations or federal 
political systems. In this case the idea of a “golden rule” (Kopits & Symansky, 1998) is to be 
introduced, an idea that a state should rely on its own resources and not to indebtment, when it 
comes to its current spending, or that it should prioritise risk reduction before demanding risk 
sharing.  
As highlighted by Fabbrini (2012), golden rules are common features in many states, 
for instance in the United States and Germany. The golden rule is a set of provisions that limits 
expenditures at constitutional levels, for example the US federal government has always 
applied a “no bail-out” rule to constituent units and most states have adopted internal provisions 
to limit or avoid deficit spending (Rodden, 2006). In Germany, the Basic Law contains a form 
of budget constraint, since it states the principle of fiscal autonomy and responsibility. 
Additionally, the German Federal Constitutional Court, in two different judgements (Spahn, 
2001), stated that even if responsibility is a fundamental constitutional principle, solidarity 
should not be sacrificed either. So, despite the differences that might distinguish the EU from 
other federal political systems, these forms of golden rule are not unusual. The Fiscal Compact 
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represents a form of budget constraint, a golden rule, establishing a system of Hard Budget 
Constraints (HBC).  
HBCs, which are a recurring feature in federal as well as in centralised states, are those 
dispositions, that normally encompass no bail-out clauses, and strong limits on deficit spending 
at the subnational level. By contrast, Soft Budget Constraints (SBC) imply central government 
intervening with fiscal transfers, grants and subsidies to support constituent units financially 
when these are not self-sufficient (Qian & Roland, 1998). From a federal point of view, it is 
arguable that HBCs are more coherent with federal principles (Ter-Minassian, 1997; Spahn, 
2001), while SBCs are, because of their features, very likely to cause a permanent dependence 
of federal constituent units on the fiscal resources of the central government. HBCs can be 
products of two circumstances: they can be either based on rules (constitutional provisions or 
ordinary acts) or on market dynamics (Rodden, 2003; Ter-Minassian, 2004). Market based 
HBCs occur when there are no rule-based constraints on borrowing, except for those shaped 
by market dynamics, i.e. trustworthiness of the constituent units, interest rate levels, economic 
performance. Rule-based constraints are instead limitations on constituent units, which are 
required to abide by rules on deficit or on debt sustainability. The Eurozone represents a case 
of HBC, in which MS found themselves in a situation of agreeing tighter rules because of 
market pressure, and agreed to solve this under the overview of the Commission, and the 
scrutiny of the ECJ. The acceptance of the Fiscal Compact to gain access to the programmes 
of the ESM represents a further condition binding on the MS.  
In the case of the TSCG, the budget constraints are derived from an intergovernmental 
agreement, that supranational institutions have a responsibility to enforce, in a similar way to 
the budgetary supervision occurring under the European Semester and under the authority of 
the Commission. Nonetheless, the lack of a Eurozone or Eurozone Plus fiscal capacity, and of 
vertical fiscal transfers, as well as equalisation schemes matching the standards of those of 
federations, and in general of a fiscal union, highlights the flaws of an architecture that requires 
MS to abide by fiscal rules, but is lacking those elements that are common in federations. 
Furthermore, the Fiscal Compact opens up a greater parliamentary role in fiscal 
policies, since Art. 13 asserts that, as provided in the Title II of Protocol (No 1) of the TEU, 
the budgetary committees of the EP and the national Parliaments of the contracting parties will 
have to discuss policies and issues covered by the Treaty (TSCG, 2011) 
The paradox of the system adopted by the EU is that the MS have to adopt an EU 
version of the golden rule, to be transferred into their domestic constitutions, while giving the 
Commission the responsibility of enforcing the agreement. This led the paradoxical result of 
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being much more centripetal than other federal systems, like for instance the US (Fabbrini, 
2012). Nonetheless, the Fiscal Compact is the first form of golden rule that enhances budget 
constraints at the supranational level, that originates from an intergovernmental agreement.  
As of today, the TSCG is still outside the EU Treaties, but more voices have emerged, 
demanding a review or a reform of the former, before being included in European primary law 
(Darvas & Ragot, 2018; Scholz, 2019). Even in case of abolition of the TSCG by the MS, in 
order to adopt another treaty and fiscal discipline, the Fiscal Compact represents the first 
attempt to establish common fiscal discipline and culture at the European level. More 
interestingly, the Fiscal Compact represented a break with the rule of unanimity, since MS used 
the format of an intergovernmental treaty to bypass the veto of specific governments. The fact 
that it remained outside the Treaties prevented further developments and Chang, for instance, 
(2013) defined the TSCG as an innovation with strong intergovernmental aspect, which could 
have a destabilising impact on the EMU governance and its supranational legitimacy. 
Nevertheless, it remains important for its content in the field of fiscal discipline and because it 
was a first attempt to create an EU-wide fiscal discipline, that might allow more steps towards 
a fiscal union in the future. It is also important, because it evidences a strong will by the MS to 
avoid vetoes through intergovernmental instruments.  
4.7.2 New challenges 
By the end of Jean Claude Juncker’s term, the EMU underwent many changes and is still 
undergoing changes. Disagreements, like that of the German economic authorities over the role 
of the ECB, have been resolved (even if the German Federal Constitutional Court reignited 
some criticisms with its recent Weiss judgement), while others have remained and emerged. 
An examples here is the dispute between France and the Netherlands and other Northern 
Countries (or the “frugal four”, as they were later called during the pandemic crisis), over the 
role of the ESM. More recent disagreements have been over the dimensions and functions of 
the Budgetary Instrument for Convergence and Competitiveness (BICC) (Schoeller, 2020), the 
new Eurozone-related fund which was being discussed while this thesis was written, but even 
more importantly, the Next Generation EU Programme and the Multiannual Financial 
Framework after Covid-19 (this is not treated in the thesis, since it is outside the timeframe 
under investigation, but the commentary is postponed to the conclusions). 
In the meantime, one of the effects of Brexit is that of substantially weakening proposals 
and discussions about institutionalising a two-tier or two-speed Union (Cooper, 2017). 
Proposals for splitting the EURO-19 and non-Euro MS, based on different obligations and 
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purposes in terms of membership, have been made by Jean Claude Piris (2011), Sergio Fabbrini 
(2015), former UK Chancellor George Osborne (2015), and Giulia Rossolillo (2014). A report 
by Verhofstadt in 2017, advocating the introduction of two tiers of membership, and 
demanding that Eurozone MS be committed to the purpose of an “ever-closer union”, was 
approved by the EP. Nevertheless, all these proposals have had no follow-up, and had very 
little support in terms of treaty change, As analysed in the thesis, even if these proposals failed 
to trigger a debate on treaty change, Eurozone/EMU only arrangements were applied in many 
other practical instances, as we saw throughout the thesis. The most recent case was attempted 
for the BICC. With the UK, the main and biggest non-Eurozone country, no longer in the EU, 
interest in accommodating non-Eurozone countries (and even EEA, non-EU States) through 
permanent, country-tailored arrangements is fading. Additionally, the UK represented one of 
the brakes, if not the main one, to further integration in many areas. With the UK no longer a 
MS, many policy areas which were not Europeanised or integrated precisely as a consequence 
of the political stand-off were finally unblocked. As previously mentioned, the Fiscal Compact 
represented a second instance of asymmetry, since two MS refused to sign it. Even in this 
instance, with the ratification by the Czech Republic in March 2019, the only state not to have 
either signed or ratified the Fiscal Compact was the UK, which left a few months later.  
Currently, there are two proposals for the Eurozone and its future: one more focused on 
risk reduction and nation-based fiscal responsibility, whereas the other is focused more on risk 
sharing, stabilisation and equalisation. The conflict between these two positions is not 
necessarily irreconcilable, in some respects they represent the two sides of the same coin (Buti, 
2018). Nevertheless, countries supporting one or other architecture for the Eurozone have 
recently found themselves on opposing positions. More importantly, the fact that France and 
Germany traditionally making up the engine-room of European integration, found themselves 
on opposing sides, did not help in making any steps forward, other than those already taken. 
As mentioned, the first faction is represented by French, under Macron. His speech at 
the Sorbonne (2017) represented one of the most profound proposals in the debate on changes 
of the Eurozone in the last few years. Macron’s proposals were not just limited to Eurozone 
governance, but to investments, integration in higher education and research, trade, security 
and defence, and migration policies at EU level. In fact, his speech introduced some new 
elements and sparked new enthusiasm among the pro-Europeans in France and in Europe, 
about a new phase of negotiations with the German government to reactivate a new phase of 
developments in Eurozone governance, and a new development in the French-German 
relationship. As I assess later, the results concerning the Eurozone were suboptimal. Macron’s 
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proposal for the Eurozone was centred on a proposal to introduce a Eurozone budget with 
stabilisation functions. Despite his support and push, his proposal met with the scepticism of 
the German government, and the opposition of the Northern Countries, championed by the 
Dutch government. 
4.8 The countries of the “Northern Block”, the frugals and their position 
As previously mentioned, a division between the “Northern Block” and the South began to 
emerge during the Sovereign Debt Crisis. This division already existed in the narrative, based 
on a stereotypical vision portraying the countries of Northern Europe as economically efficient, 
liberal, and pro-business, as opposed to the southern states, seen as inefficient, reliant on public 
interventionism and blighted by bureaucracy thwarting economic and business initiative. To 
many, (Kaitatzi-Whitlock, 2014, Tzogopoulos, 2016) the crisis and the narrative of the PIIGS 
countries (even if one “I” stands for Ireland, which is neither a Mediterranean nor a Latin 
country) was a confirmation of this stereotype. Public intervention to solve the insolvency 
problems in the states in turmoil was considered as a necessary evil in the best case, or with 
outrage and hostility in the worst, even if the interventions were made in the form of loans and 
not as pure bail-outs. Anti-EU parties in the North, like the “True Fins” in Finland, The Party 
of Freedom in the Netherlands (Vossen, 2016), and Alternative for Germany (Lees, 2018; 
Goerres, Spies and Kumlin, 2018) emerged or built much of their electoral fortunes on 
opposing programmes aiming at keeping the PIIGS in the Eurozone. As a result of this, after 
accepting the changes in the EMU, the Banking Union and the policies of the ECB, some 
governments in the creditor states began considering that the previous changes represented 
sufficient concessions, and hardened their positions on the final parts of the EMU and Banking 
Union to be completed (Seikel and Truger, 2019; Schoeller, 2020). Therefore, the purposes of 
the ESM Backstop for the Single Resolution Fund and the EDIS became contested fields. The 
same destiny was faced by the Macron-backed proposal for a BICC (Schoeller, 2020). 
Additionally, given the final outcome of the BICC, it might be said that the final result was 
mostly underwhelming for the proponents, since many of its original objectives were 
abandoned during the negotiations (Ibid.). 
The clearest examples of this position, and the role of some governments in shaping it, 
is the “Joint Statement on the future of the EMU” (Joint Statement on the Future of the EMU, 
2018).This document was presented on the 4th March 2018 by the governments of six Euro MS 
(Ireland, The Netherlands, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia) plus two non-Euro MS, Sweden 
and Denmark. The position of these countries was based on a two-layer perspective, based on 
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liberal-oriented reforms at the national level and on a very limited and market-oriented 
integration at the European level.  
The position of these countries was in some ways a challenge to the idea of decoupling 
the governance of the EURO-19 MS and of the EU 27, on the basis that the decisions regarding 
the single currency effect all MS, and that, with the exception of Denmark (the UK is not 
mentioned, and considered as being out already) all MS are legally obliged to join the single 
currency. Therefore, it was argued that they should have the same say on the EMU as the 
Eurozone MS (so that Denmark and Sweden are signatories of the statement). Additionally, 
the document states that Euro-based initiatives should therefore not be exclusive, but open for 
non-Euro MS to opt in. This is no different from what already happens with the Europlus Pact, 
and is in no way different from the current situation. 
While it is debatable whether the Macron proposals would progressively lead to a 
dismissal of the Maastricht criteria, the Joint Statement demands that all MS respect the EMU 
criteria entirely, and to implement all necessary measures to do so, but at the national level. In 
fact, the document proposes that the MS create “fiscal buffers in national budgets to allow 
room for national fiscal policies, both automatic and possibly discretionary stabilisation” (Joint 
Statement on the future of the EMU, 2018), with the intention to “smoothen economic 
downturns”. So, according to these MS, the proposals that should be enforced at the EU level 
according to Macron’s proposal for the Eurozone, i.e. stabilisation and convergence, should 
instead be implemented at the national level. The EU should therefore rely on a strengthened 
framework at the national level, to deliver initiatives and results for its citizens. Therefore, the 
vision and the proposal emerging from the document is strongly intergovernmental and 
confederal, since while it advocates a Union, this only enforces a few, more market-oriented 
policies, and the states continue to prevent further developments at the supranational level.  
The Joint Statement rejects the idea that there should be an increase of competences for 
the EU’s institutions, while insisting on deepening economic and financial stability in order to 
regain public trust. More specifically, the document focuses on completing the Banking Union 
and on the transformation of the ESM into an IMF-modelled institution, a European Monetary 
Fund (IMF). It asserts that more cooperation among MS should be pursued at the 
intergovernmental level. When it comes to describing proposals for the EMF, the document 
states that, should the ESM evolve into an EMF, it should have greater responsibility in 
developing financial assistance for the MS, and also in allowing debt-restructuring 
programmes. They report’s signatories assert that the decision making in the EMF should 
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remain within the intergovernmental framework, as the ESM currently is, and adopt the 
currently existing voting rights (i.e. unanimity) (Rule of procedures of the ESM, 2012).  
Again, in the chapter on the Banking Union, the proponents ask for the ‘Roadmap’ 
developed by the European Council in 2016 to be followed, especially for technical issues 
regarding the implementation of the EDIS and for the SFR. They highlight how private risk-
sharing should be developed through the development of a Capital Market Union, with the 
purpose of harmonising legislation, and allowing more free movement of capital and 
investments in the European market, which is currently fragmented. 
The document is to some extent a direct development of Rutte’s vision on the EU, or 
rather, it is an actual manifesto of the Dutch PM’s vision for Europe. His discourse found the 
acceptance of such countries as the Baltics, and Finland, that fear being states which would pay 
more in a process of debt sharing, and also states which are more doubtful about the idea of 
further expansion of supranational powers in monetary governance.  
Rutte’s vision is to some extent a reprise of an intergovernmental, confederal discourse. 
In different speeches, Rutte set out a vision of a Union based not only on the principle of 
“National when possible, European if necessary” i.e. an idea of Union strongly and strictly 
based on the principle of subsidiarity, but also on a strong preference towards 
intergovernmental solutions as opposed to any transfer of competences to the Commission and 
the EP, stating for instance that the EU integration was not a goal per se (Speech at ALDE 
Congress, Rutte 2017; Busch, 2019). 
By taking the role of frontrunner in these stances, Rutte intends the Netherlands to play 
a balancing role to France, as a champion of neoliberal policies in the Council, but also as the 
champion of a Union which only serves as a support to MS, but not as an independent actor, 
and not as a government. In the end the document represents a speedbump for the plans to 
reform the EU, but also a form of political manifesto by the so-called Northerners (or New 
Hansa) for a strictly confederal, intergovernmental development of the EU.  
4.9 The proposals of the European Commission 
The European Commission in this situation played a role of bridging the position between the 
Northern Countries, on one side, and France and allies on the other. In the documents of DG 
ECFIN, as in the words of its Director Marco Buti, the Commission always points to a balance 
between risk-sharing and risk reduction, highlighting how these are connected (Buti, 2019). 
During the Juncker presidency of the Commission, the institution concentrated its efforts on 
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the completion of the Banking Union in bridging the positions on the reform of the ESM, and 
eventually on drafting the final proposal of the BICC.  
In December 2017, the Juncker Commission set out a ‘Roadmap for responsibility and 
solidarity, risk reduction and risk-sharing,’ (European Commission, 2017) known as the 6th 
December Package. However, the document, and Juncker himself, explained that the package 
was not a blueprint, but had the purpose of creating a consensus on some core areas to “deepen” 
by 2025. This text challenged the notion of decoupling Eurozone and EU governance, by 
stating that the EMU and its completion must remain open to all EU MS, including those which 
are not adopting the single currency. This approach is not new in the EU framework, that was 
traditionally designed in a way to be binding for the Eurozone MS, but open for participation 
to all the other non-Euro MS. In the December Package there is also a demand for more 
transparency and democratic accountability in the decision-making process, although no 
solutions are proposed, but mainly demanded of the states. The completion of the Banking 
Union is consistently targeted as one of the main goals, to deepen the EMU and make it more 
solid.  
When it comes to the area of risk management, the approach of the Commission in the 
December Package is focused on implementing discipline and on insolvency management and 
restructuring. Particular weight is given to how this system should tackle the problem of non-
performing loans, described as the greatest burden to the recovery of EU banking sector. The 
European Semester is also highlighted as a method that the Commission might use to assess, 
together with the MS, the state of financial stability of individual states and the level of 
financial risks. Nonetheless, the European Semester is partly criticised, and it is stated that a 
reform of it should be needed.  
In respect of the completion of the Banking Union, the Commission’s Document 
“Towards the completion of the Banking Union” of November 2015 and the Council’s roadmap 
to complete the Banking Union of June 2016 are indicated to be the two main blueprints to 
follow. The December Package also states the importance of introducing a fiscal backstop in 
the SRF, to make banking resolution effective.  
The completion of a Capital Market Union (CMU) is described in the December 
Package as one of the main goals in diversifying sources of funding in Europe (Hakkarainen, 
2020). It is known that in most European countries, banking is overwhelmingly the main source 
of financing for businesses and households (European Commission, 2018). The fact that 
national legislation in the Capital Market sector remain very separate and uncoordinated does 
not help the flow of capital and the process of diversification of financing in Europe. The 
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building of the CMU also represents an incentive to improve the quality of existing financial 
supervision , and to boost the role of Euro as a single currency (Constâncio,  Lannoo and 
Thomadakis, 2019). 
The development of Sovereign Bond-Backed Securities Safe Asset is also prioritised 
as one of the main goals of the Commission, in order to enhance the European dimension of 
capital markets to match that of the US in terms of attractiveness.  
Convergence also seems to be one of the most important words in the December 
Package 2017, so that different economic realities might respond similarly to economic shocks. 
The report highlights three different kinds of convergence: real, nominal and cyclical.  
The reinforcement of the EU Semester is also seen as a possible way to tackle the lack 
of convergence, also with the purpose of fostering a dialogue with stakeholders from MS, and 
involving them in the European Semester process. The idea here is to improve the link between 
the priorities of national governments and the priorities of the aggregate euro area in deciding 
domestic policies, and, also, to link multiannual national policies with the process of the 
European semester. 
When it comes to the chapter regarding institutions and governance, the Commission’s 
December Package highlights two different paths: a reform of the treaties, or 
intergovernmental agreements. These things had to go together with the internalisation of the 
TSCG. The internalisation of the ESM within the EU Treaties is not foreseen, or proposed, and 
this decision is left by the Commission to the states. Similarly, the Commission does not 
mention proposals for formally differentiating the governance of Euro and non-Euro MS, since 
it states that non-Euro MS are legally expected to adopt the single currency (European 
Commission, 2017). When it comes to the configuration of the Eurozone, the December 
Package states that an additional different configuration in the Council might be introduced. 
Additionally, it proposes that the titles of the Eurogroup president and that of a Commissioner 
for EMU be merged. By contrast, this last proposal might be questionable, since it proposes 
the merger between a “governmental” figure, with that of a figure more similar to that of a 
President of an Upper House Committee. Moreover, it prioritises the fact that the representation 
for the Eurozone at the IMF and any other international forum should be performed as one, and 
insists that the MS should adopt the Commission’s proposals for unifying the external 
representation of the Eurozone by 2025 (European Commission 2015; European Commission 
2017; European Parliament, 2019). The Commission insists on aspects of good practice to 
democratise Euro governance, by mentioning a dialogue between Commission and Parliament 
on the European Semester and TSCG. 
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In the December Package, the Commission supports the idea of a European Treasury. 
However, their proposal of a Treasury, which is described as being a later stage of EMU 
integration, is to regroup all the fiscal institutions for fiscal and economic supervision under an 
umbrella organisation, still under the Commission. This institution would combine a European 
fiscal board with other tasks, among others that of issuing safe assets. This would include the 
integration of the ESM, or the planned EMF, into the European Treasury.  
As mentioned before, the aim of the December Package is that of reinforcing and 
deepening convergence and stability inside the Eurozone. However, to do so, the path that the 
Commission chooses is that of convergence between member states. That would also imply 
not only more responsibility for the Eurogroup but, at the European level, greater oversight by 
the EP.  
Simultaneously, other initiative were brought forward, between 2017 and 2018. Other 
than the changes in the ESM, one of the other changes was the Budgetary Instrument for 
Convergence and Competitiveness (BICC), finally agreed on December 2018, with the final 
proposal on its size and governance coming out in the autumn of 2019. In this final iteration, 
the function of stabilisation of the BICC was not included, (Rutte, 2019); moreover, the final 
amount of resources assigned to the fund will be defined during the negotiations of the MFF, 
but it will be likely that they will not be even close to the ratio proposed by the French 
counterpart.  
It seems that, because of political instability in Spain, and the self-exclusion of Italy 
from all the main European dossiers as a result of the anti-EU turn, after the emergence of the 
populist-nationalist coalition in Italy (Chiaramonte et Al., 2018 Garzia 2019; Giugliano, 2019; 
Baldini 2020), there was no solid “Mediterranean Front” to support Macron’s proposal, and to 
counter the manoeuvres of the Northerners. It could be said that Macron, by relying too much 
on cooperation with Germany, failed to build a homogenous and solid coalition of likeminded 
MS, like Spain, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, and Greece. Therefore, the BICC, as it was delivered 
(European Fiscal Board, 2019), was much closer to the watered-down version the Northerners 
agreed on, rather than the ambitious version Macron argued for during the Sorbonne speech. 
Additionally, unlike in the first proposal, the BICC was not established as a self-standing fund 
or even a Treasury in a traditional way but, as the word suggests, as a budgetary instrument 
inside the EU budget. In the end the BICC, in its final form, was criticised for being more of a 
hybrid duplicating existing funds (Merler, 2019) and no longer the ambitious project it was set 
out to be (Vallée, 2019). Nonetheless, the BICC formally completed the European framework, 
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and it might be said that the monetary union has for the first time a core of a fiscal union, 
together with the Fiscal Board.  
4.10 Conclusions 
As discussed, the Eurozone has developed elements of statehood as shown in the new role of 
the ECB, the creation of a single financial supervision, the Banking Union and the 
implementation of a market-driven fiscal discipline (despite the attempted objections from 
some European governments). The Commission and the ECB emerge as the main winners. 
New supranational agencies emerged, like the SRB and the ESM, that despite having a strong 
intergovernmental composition, follow a ECB-lite model, and represent the formation of a new 
form of European federalism bearing its own peculiarities and dynamics, deriving from 
combining intergovernmental relations between national and (multinational) states, 
supranational and federal dynamics.  
As a result of this process, in its structure the Eurozone has developed its own form of 
monetary and (incomplete) banking federalism, and a form of supranational fiscal discipline 
and supervision that are already part of the action of the Commission, that could potentially 
form the base of a future fiscal union, should this step be agreed. After the crisis, the Eurozone 
not only introduced changes by adopting some typical features of states, like banking 
supervision, but to some extent it represents the case of an emerging federation and of federal 
state-building at the supranational level.  
Nonetheless, in these developments, we still see a conflict between the role of the 
Commission and the ECB, and the role of the Council and the emergence of new bodies. Apart 
from the ECB, which played a main role in the attempt to overcome the crisis and launched QE 
despite the opposition or the scepticism of some MS, the Commission also increased its 
importance in EMU governance, given the authority allocated through the Six- and Two-Packs. 
The case of the negotiations on the Italian budget in Autumn 2018 witnessed a change of 
paradigm, by which the Commission managed to temporarily force one of its MS to change its 
budgetary plans and to respect its commitment towards its budgetary and macroeconomic 
policies. This situation might reoccur, given the poor macroeconomic and budgetary 
performance of the nationalist-populist coalition which came into power in 2018, and it might 
be the case that the Commission will start a Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure against Italy. 
The case of the Italian 2018 budget demonstrated a progressive and incipient 
Europeanisation of the overview and consideration of national budgets, that is no longer 
entrenched within the national debate, but takes place at a national and European dimension. 
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Additionally, the Commission, unlike in previous situations, managed to hold a country 
responsible for its unwillingness to honour its obligations, and as a consequence the state, Italy, 
found itself completely isolated, as the MS backed the action of the Commission. This scenario 
would have been hardly imaginable in the years just before the sovereign debt crisis, and 
without doubt represents a development towards supranationalism and even centralisation, 
although the approval of the Council (i.e. an intergovernmental validation) remains. 
Nevertheless, it must be considered that, despite the elements of federalism, and 
advancements in terms of state-building, the Eurozone, in its current form, is still strongly 
intergovernmental, so that it might be considered more as confederal, rather than federal. 
Nonetheless, recent events confirm that, contrary to the definition of confederation, where the 
raison d’être of its institutions is much more than a mere dependency on the states, the EU 
institutions acted in a way that is congruent and consistent with the general interest of the states 
(or at least the majority), but not equal. Additionally, since the EU is a federal political system 
formed by older countries and people coming from different cultural and linguistic 
backgrounds, the intergovernmental aspects of the Union are not to be considered as an obstacle 
to federalism but, on the contrary, are to an extent a fundamental aspect of the Eurozone federal 
political system. These aspects are not only to be found in the role of the Council, but also in 
the Commission and the ECB, whose composition remains based on a national criterion, like 
that of the ESM and the SRB, and finally in the nature of the Fiscal Compact as an 
intergovernmental treaty. More evidently, and specifically in the instance of the ECB, original 
intergovernmental features did not prevent these institutions from acting in a “federal way”, 
and in the pursuit of a supranational interest, even against the preferences of some of its MS.  
In general, the intergovernmental aspects also changed during the crisis. In fact, some 
intergovernmental features were retained, and, to some extent, these helped the process of 
Europeanisation instead of hindering it and otherwise, no Europeanisation would be possible.  
More than intergovernmentalism per se, the use and the presence of veto power, (which effects 
other policies areas of the EU and therefore will not be specifically addressed here), is hindering 
the impact of the EU. The presence of the veto is the most anti-federal element of the current 
Union, and is preventing a general improvement of the EU as a federal political system. The 
same critique can be applied to the weakness of the parliamentary governance of the Eurozone 
(and of the Union). In fact, while the former aspects impact on the efficiency and consistency 
of the activities of the EU, hindering its capability to deliver results, the relative weakness of 
the EP hinders the democratic and supranational legitimacy of the Union.  
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The insufficient role of the EP is an element that needs to be resolved, in order to give Eurozone 
federalism a proper democratic dimension. With the process of politicisation of the 
Commission, and the development of a political dimension at European level, the importance 
and the impact of these innovations, and the way they are implemented (this is specifically true 
when it comes to the application of the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack), are no longer just 
technocratic questions. These have political spill-overs that must be taken into consideration. 
In fact, the obligations of any possible future Fiscal Union are specifically binding for the 
Eurozone. It is likely that empowering and improving the EP’s oversight and powers of 
intervention on European fiscal, macroeconomic and banking legislation, and creating a true 
supranational European democracy, other than the previously mentioned demoicracy concept, 
can lead to a more democratic and federal governance of the Union. Stronger cooperation 
between a more responsible EP, a more political Commission, the Council and the ECB, all 
with discrete independence and roles, is necessary to create a stronger link between democracy 
and federalism in the Eurozone, especially since the Eurozone is developing, intentionally or 
accidentally towards a form of governance that is closer to a form of statehood.  
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Conclusions 
Introduction 
Since the doctoral proposal behind this thesis was submitted, many events have taken place 
that have impacted on the content and direction of this work. Brexit has become a reality, and 
a populist-nationalist wave has infected many Western liberal democracies. More importantly, 
a pandemic has rocked the world to its core, and has claimed over a million lives around the 
world. This, as I will mention, has represented an even more dramatic moment for the EU.  
The aim of this thesis was to relaunch federalism as a grand theory of EU integration, 
and to approach and analyse changes in the architecture of the Eurozone, not simply according 
to neofunctionalist or intergovernmental dynamics, but as a process of federal state-building, 
as it was conceived at the beginning of its journey. Federalism is therefore not just an 
instrument to assess what has changed in the governance of the Eurozone, and how this is 
relevant for the entire EU, including non-Euro MS, but is also an instrument to assess how the 
Eurozone is relevant for analysing the perspective of federal state-building at supranational 
level, even, possibly, for other cases of regional integration outside the EU. 
Main findings  
As already described in the introduction, this thesis aimed at answering the following 
questions: first, to what extent can federalism be framed as a process of federal state-building?; 
second, how can federal theory explain changes in the Eurozone during the financial crisis?; 
third, to what extent have these changes influenced the process of integration, starting from the 
hypothesis that European integration is a federal-state building process?; fourth, to what extent 
does the Eurozone represent a vanguard of federal state-building, and which asymmetries did 
this process spark in the EU?; and lastly, what impact did these changes have on the idea of 
federal state-building for the EU and on the proposal for the future of the EU, and what do they 
mean in terms of federal theory?  
In chapter I, I reviewed the literature on federal theory. I briefly went through the main 
steps in its development and argued that federalism is a polymorphic concept, as I recounted 
some of the most important definitions and interpretations of federalism. I described the 
contribution of some of the main scholars of federal theory, in particular Kenneth Wheare, Carl 
Friedrich, Daniel Elazar, Preston King and Ronald Watts, The chapter focused specifically on 
Friedrich and his description of federalism as a dynamic process, and on Elazar and his 
definition of federalism as the combination of shared-rule and self-rule.  
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After introducing the definition of federal political system by linking federalism with 
the concept of state-building, and defining federal state-building as the process of creating a 
political arrangement which may end up in different forms of federal political system,  I 
followed the federalist literature, especially the work of Watts (2003, 2007) and his 
classification of federal political systems. His work, which drew from a previous classification 
by Elazar, provided a useful framework to classify federal political systems on a scale from the 
least to the most integrated. Following that example,  I isolated three models of federal political 
system: international organisations, confederations, and federations. These three archetypes 
have different characteristics, and they differ in terms of their balance between shared-rule and 
self-rule. As I made the case and described in chapter II, the EU falls in this classification and 
in the definition of federal political system (Burgess, 2000; Watts, 2007), even though, as  I 
mentioned in the chapter, elements of internationalism, confederalism and federalism coexist 
in different policy areas.  
Finally, I briefly reviewed the relationship between the grand theories of European 
integration. I I  underlining how intergovernmentalism matches Riker’s (1964), and McKay’s, 
(1996, 2004;), theory on the origin of federations. At the same time, I highlighted how 
neofunctionalism is not in opposition to federalism, but it can indeed be framed as part of the 
process of federal state-building as incremental or gradual federalism; This review allowed me 
to introduce and summarise the personal understanding of federalism, as a dynamic process of 
combining shared-rule and self-rule and development of a federal spirit, resulting in a process 
of federal state-building.  
In chapter II I temporarily adopted a more comparative approach, for the sake of 
building our argument of the EU as federal political system. Consequently, I applied the 
definition of federal political system, that I described in Chapter I, to the case of the EU, 
alongside Michael Burgess’ (2000) and Finn Laursen’s (2016) contributions. The latter 
provided a classification of the policy areas of the EU, from the most integrated or rather 
federalised, to the least integrated: the single market, trade policy and economic and monetary 
union. From this point, I started reviewing what is federal in the current structure of the Union, 
and then I proceeded with the exclusive competences of the Union. I followed Laursen’s 
argument to describe the single market and trade policy as examples of state-building, as the 
reproduction at the supranational level of the model of a state. I highlighted just how 
dramatically the role of the ECB has changed, underlining how the ECB, during the most 
critical phase of the crisis, managed to behave, in almost Schmittian terms, as a sovereign 
entity. In the second part of Chapter II, after describing the significance of the Euro as a federal 
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element, I  deployed the concept of asymmetric federalism (Tarlton, 1965). I described how 
asymmetries might be de facto or de jure, and that some form of de jure asymmetry is a constant 
element in every federation, whereas some federations are known for having specific 
constitutional arrangements for some of their entities. In the European integration literature, 
the concept of asymmetry is normally referred as differentiated integration (Freudlsperger, 
2019). The chapter argues that, ontologically, differentiated integration and asymmetric 
federalism match, and that differentiated integration is indeed a form of asymmetric federalism 
and that monetary integration is one of the policy areas, which has most consequences for state-
building. This is the reason why in the next chapter  I analysed how monetary integration had 
an impact on the development of European integration and on pushing it in the direction of a 
federal state-building process. 
In chapter III, I reviewed the history of European monetary integration since the Treaty 
of Rome.  I highlighted how monetary integration was very marginal at the beginning of the 
European Community and in the Treaty of Rome. I linked the main phases of the creation of 
monetary integration with the main steps of federal state-building. I reviewed the first proposals 
of monetary integration in the 1960s up to the publication of the Werner Report in 1970. The 
chapter also described the difficulties, in the 1970s, of implementing the report and described 
the different political preferences, and philosophical approaches, that caused a slowdown of 
monetary integration. The chapter linked the theory of federal state-building to the European 
Unit of Account and later the European Currency Unit, and their importance as stages towards 
the creation of the single currency. The Treaty of Maastricht was the pivotal moment, since it 
represented the introduction of the single currency in the 1990s. I reviewed the years of the 
Euro and the years of the ‘polycrisis’. In this chapter I did not focus on the history of the 
monetary integration as a whole, but on the steps and on the phases that constituted a process 
of federal state-building: the progressive passage from the grand-oubli of the treaties to one of 
the most Europeanised and most important policy areas of the treaties. 
As mentioned throughout chapter III, the single currency is the most state-like element 
of the EU, and cannot be fully understood if not as a political project, even more than an 
economic one (Padoa-Schioppa, 1999). Its development is an example of how monetary 
integration, and the issue of a common currency, had an impact on supporting European 
integration as a political project. As a consequence of these changes, MS adopting the single 
currency must currently accept stricter conditions and more legal obligations. As a further 
result of this, asymmetries between non-Euro and Euro MS have increased. However, 
especially after the departure of the UK, the predominant non-Euro economy, these 
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asymmetries did not become structural or constitutional (with the exception of Denmark), but 
they continued to represent more of an exception to a state model than should be the norm for 
the EU. The idea of the EU as a permanent multi-currency Union, as proposed by Thatcher in 
the 1980s and later by Prime Minister David Cameron (Cameron, 2014) never materialised, 
thus decreasing the appetite for “constitutionalising” multi-speed or multi-tier integration.  
After explaining the theory of federal state-building in chapter I, and after having 
applied it to assess the EU in chapter II, and described the building of monetary integration as 
a process of federal state-building, in chapter IV I finally reviewed the institutional framework 
of the Eurozone after the crisis. I analysed the role of the ECB and how, after Draghi’s 
presidency, it is now perceived as a federal institution. Among all the EU institutions, the ECB 
is the one which comes closest to a national, federal state benchmark, that of a traditional 
central bank. Additionally, the banking union emerged as a new element in EMU governance. 
While incomplete, the uniformity of the banking system and financial supervision of the EU 
mirrors an element common to states; more specifically, the European Financial Supervision 
System, displays the same key features that supervisory systems in other federations have. I 
also analysed how the European Financial Supervision System is structured, and I highlighted 
how it matches the benchmark of existing mechanisms of financial supervision operating at the 
national level. I argued that the European Semester is an innovation, and that this dramatically 
increased the role and expertise of the Commission. The Commission now plays a stronger role 
in macroeconomic and budgetary supervision, addressing countries economic imbalances, 
issuing recommendations to single countries and to the Council (Becker & Bauer, 2014)  
I then analysed the Treaty of the Stability, Coordination and Governance, which 
represents an attempt to create a single instrument of fiscal discipline in the EU; despite being 
an intergovernmental treaty outside the framework of the EU Treaties, it was designed to be 
compulsory for the Eurozone MS, and to be integrated in the EU framework. I highlighted how 
the Banking Union also replicated forms of banking supervision already implemented at the 
national level, and moreover how the Banking Union’s aims, in EDIS in particular (the third 
pillar of the banking union), would also mirror the insurance deposit schemes existing at 
national level. I described the ESM, which contrasts with earlier innovations because it is 
strongly intergovernmental; although it remains outside the current EU legal structure, it is still 
mentioned because of the role it plays as a backstop for the SRB, because it still represents a 
case of Europeanisation and because of its potential for further developments. and because of 
its potential for further developments. 
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As mentioned in Chapter IV, Brexit has weakened demands for a redesign of the EU 
based on asymmetrical arrangements and made this less likely. By contrast, the asymmetry 
between Euro and non-Euro MS is not going to disappear in the next years, despite all countries 
but Denmark (which has an opt-out from the EMU, although the Krone has been pegged to the 
Euro via ERM II for many years now) being legally obliged to join the Euro. This situation 
will go on because some of the MS that are bound to adopt the Euro are not going to do it any 
time soon (even if some countries, like Croatia and Bulgaria to begin with, are expected to join 
the area in the 2020s).    
In the discussion, I reflected on the differentiated integration inside the Union and I 
highlighted how the Eurozone represents a strong element of federal state-building at the 
supranational level. The existence of Euro and non-Euro MS represents a case of differentiated 
integration, and, within the framework of federal theory, a clear case of asymmetric federalism. 
This differentiation, alongside the symbolism of a single currency and the different institutional 
framework and obligations, leads us to consider that the building of the Eurozone has been a 
form of federal state-building. Nevertheless, even if the Eurozone represents the most advanced 
form of federal state-building at the European, supranational level and the Eurozone is the form 
of integration that mirrors the elements of a state, and even if the Eurozone is associated with 
the idea of an European avant-garde, there is currently no political appetite for changing the 
existing treaty framework. It is possible that the departure of the UK from the Union has 
reduced appetites for such a development, whereas differentiated integration and enhanced 
cooperation remain options for the MS. Finally, I described the proposals that were made 
before 2019 to address the future steps of European integration, to give a perspective on the 
future of the EU and to highlight how the issue of the Eurozone is always at the centre of any 
discussion on the future of the Union, since no fiscal union and even less political union can 
be realised without monetary union. 
In summary, the main findings of this thesis highlight how the EU, especially where 
the governance of the Eurozone is concerned, has undergone a process of federal state-building 
which is still ongoing. This process, after the Treaty of Maastricht, the transformation of the 
Communities into the Union, and the introduction of the Euro, but even more after the events 
of the sovereign debt crisis, has its own specificities. In fact, the federal political system which 
is emerging from this process is closer to that of federations than other federal arrangements, 
despite maintaining many confederal, intergovernmental features, and despite the 
disagreements between MS. Some institutions and some changes strongly mirror aspects of 
federal states; others do not, because they are still strongly intergovernmental even if they 
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represent an advancement in terms of Europeanisation, while they potentially represent cores 
for future processes of supranational federal state-building. The evidence of this can be found 
not just in the founding documents of the European Community and of the Union, but in its 
institutional framework and, more recently in many of the arrangements adopted to tackle the 
crisis in sovereign debts. In 2015 research performed by Dorrucci, Ioannou, Mongelli and Terzi 
for the European Central Bank, using quantitative methods, assessed that there was a 
progression in terms of integration, which was calculated by using statistical indexes, and 
demonstrated that there was an increase in integration over the years, and this is consistent with 
the introduction of the single market and the single currency (Dorrucci et al., 2015). 
I also argue that some of these tensions are structural phenomena in the development 
of federal political systems, and ultimately, the EU is a federal political system in development. 
The EU-27 still retains traditional features of both confederations and federations for a number 
of reasons, but the EMU already shows some of the features of a federal state, despite being 
incomplete, especially in its lack of a fiscal system and consistent fiscal transfers. For this 
reason, our conclusion is that it is correct to state that the sovereign debt crisis triggered a new 
phase of federal state-building at the European level, while at the same time, and as 
consequence, increased the level of asymmetry, or differentiated integration, between the Euro 
area and the non-Euro MS. Yet again, even if the EU is not a state, it has never undergone so 
many changes as in the last years. This trend increased even more during the Covid-19 
pandemic, despite the initial “panic mode” and the unpreparedness. Even if it is not being 
analysed here, the future temporary Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency 
(SURE), the Next Generation EU Programme  and the Multiannual Financial Framework 
emerged as reactions to the economic shock caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, and could be 
framed in a similar way, as will be discussed later on, but again, this process was already 
triggered.  
This process, triggered by the sovereign debt crisis, accelerated the process of state-
building in the Eurozone, and led to the development a more deeply interwoven governance of 
the single currency, required to tackle the explosion of tensions on international financial 
markets. The Council remained an important player, but the Commission increased its 
importance in preparing and proposing the decisions related to the application of the Six- and 
Two-Pack legislation (Becker & Bauer, 2014). The move to Reverse Qualified Majority Voting 
prevented veto situations in the Council, thus making the decision-making procedure smoother. 
Additionally, the ECB emerged as a more important player. The constitutional moment of this 
change was the “Whatever it takes” speech by Draghi, followed by policies like QE. These 
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represent the final steps in the evolution of the ECB as a supranational institution that came to 
match the features of a state-based institution and agency. Nevertheless, as discussed in the 
final sections of Chapter IV, differences remain between MS over future choices for the EU, 
whether it should take a more federal/Europeanised or confederal/intergovernmental path. 
Although proposals for separating the path of the Eurozone from non-Eurozone MS has been 
dismissed, some tensions remain, but these relate more to countries that are challenging the 
rule of law and liberal democratic values, and therefore are putting their own membership in 
jeopardy.  
Even though some policy areas are still not europeanised and are barely integrated at 
intergovernmental level, the economic and monetary integration has become the most 
advanced example of a traditional symbol of statehood to be europeanised . Thus, progressively 
fulfilling the condition that one of the archetypes of federalisation through economics (or the 
economic union archetype). By contrast, there are still many areas of traditional sovereignty, 
like security, defence and foreign policy (i.e. Riker’s archetype of a federalisation through 
defence and security), that do not fall under this condition. The moment where we could say 
that the EU is a federation, will be the moment where both these competences, these areas of 
intervention, will be pooled at European level, with a democratic body responsible for that in 
front of its citizens and the Member States: monetary and economics on the one hand and 
security, defence, and foreign policy on the other. At the same time, this has not been and will 
continue not being a linear process (as the failure of the EDC in the 1950s prove), it will be 
occurring and is already occurring at different speeds. Thus, implying that whether the 
eurozone and its institution might be closer to the model of a state, it might take much longer 
for other policy areas to reach the same level of integration and Europeanisation. Additionally, 
and more importantly, as we will see later, the introduction of the Next Generation EU, of the 
possibility to raise funds through bond-issuing might represent another step towards creating a 
fiscal union, a corollary of the economic integration, which will bring the process of 
supranational state-building to a step closer to that of federations. This will have a dramatic 
effect on the necessity of enhancing the quality of supranational democracy at EU level.  
Thoughts and proposals on the future of Europe and future developments.  
The picture that emerges from this development is that, since the Eurozone and the EU are not 
separable (in fact, the introduction of the EFSS concerns the Union as a whole, and it is one of 
the changes that replicates the patterns of a state the most), the EU has started developing a 
different form of federalism, whereas other elements, like the presence of non-Euro MS and 
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the presence of opt-outs (like that for Denmark), represent cases of internal asymmetries: this 
is caused not only by the presence of the Euro as element of state-building, and by a stronger 
role of the ECB, but also by the changes in obligations deriving from Eurozone membership, 
which were, and continue to be, developed as an answer to the crisis. As a result, the Eurozone 
represents the most integrated existing example of federal political system at the supranational 
level. More specifically, it is the tier of European integration which most replicates the features 
of federalism, as seen in more developed federations. Maastricht was the crucial moment of 
divergence between the EU, on the one hand, and the Eurozone on the other, but it did not 
address issues related to risk management or financial supervision (Montanaro, 2016). It was 
the eruption of the sovereign debt crisis in 2009-2019 that increased the degree of divergence.  
I also argue that the adoption of the single currency has become more difficult, and in 
many ways less attractive for non-Euro MS, since these states are now obliged to align their 
legislation with EU regulation supporting the Banking Union, and are bound by the provisions 
of the Six- and Two-Pack legislation. Using the words of Elazar (1987), in order to join the 
Eurozone, MS now have to accept a greater level of shared rule than that they were supposed 
to accept at the beginning of the process of integration/federalisation (Schoenmaker & Jensen, 
2020) and, symmetrically, to accept a limitation of their self-rule. This political question is, 
consequently, the reason why the Euro has, on many occasions, been the main target of anti-
EU forces and anti-EU criticism.  
The asymmetry between Euro and non-Euro MS is not the only one in the Eurozone, 
even though it is the case I am studying. There are other divisions and asymmetries that are 
emerging inside the system: some are those between creditors (like Germany) and debtors in 
TARGET 2 (the inter-bank payment system for Eurozone countries), which apparently is 
witnessing a great divergence between banking systems (ECB, 2018), but other lines can be 
drawn, for instance between countries (and regions) improving their competitiveness and those 
which are struggling to do so (European Commission, 2019). These divisions do not contribute 
to the unity of the Eurozone, in the absence of more consistent fiscal transfers or, alternatively, 
in the absence of private investments coming from the core Euro countries (again, like 
Germany or the Netherlands) to the peripheral states (like Portugal or Greece).  
Another issue affecting the Eurozone today is the lack of trust between MS regarding 
the future development of the Eurozone. Federal trust (the mutual understanding underpinning 
the belonging of the constituent units to the federal political system), as Burgess defined it 
(Burgess, 2012), is the backbone of the federal spirit. However, this trust has been severely 
weakened during the sovereign debt crisis, and the rise of nationalistic populism, as well as 
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discrediting liberal democracy, does not help, and instead worsens the situation. This lack of 
federal spirit is hindering the completion of the EDIS, and is complicating and delaying 
discussions about fiscal unions, as well as preventing any proposals for single governmental 
bonds (sometimes called Eurobonds in the media) from being put forward or developed. 
Ironically, this collapse in terms of mutual trust came exactly in the era when the Eurozone, 
with essential changes to introduce to tackle the crisis, needed it the most. Things are changing 
now, after the breakout of the Covid-19 pandemic, but still, the issue of common instruments 
of debt and the usage of EU-wide grants had been long opposed by some countries, notably 
“the frugal four”: Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden 
Another divide which has emerged is that between Western and Eastern states, which 
partly corresponds to that between Euro and non-Euro MS. Some of these states, namely 
Hungary, and Poland after the return to power of the PiS, are not only questioning the nature 
and the targets of the European integration process, but also the very principles of liberal 
democracy and European values. 
Burgess (2009:39) argued that the EU already represented a new federal model. In this 
thesis it is argued that his conclusions are correct, but that, even more than for the EU, the 
Eurozone represents the front-runner of the EU. The behaviour of the ECB is the proof of a 
supranational institution that has behaved in exactly the same way as any other central bank, 
despite legal challenges and political opposition by some government forces and interest 
groups. Discussions and projects on the international usage of the Euro are ongoing, and will 
be among the aims of the Commission over the coming years (these are not being investigated 
it in this thesis, but might be interesting for further research, especially for its impact on 
federalism in the Eurozone). Moreover, the quest for completing the Banking Union, 
completing the Capital Market Union, and exploring the possibility of a fiscal union are likely 
to continue increasing the gap in terms of integration between Euro and non-Euro MS, and may 
become an incentive for states outside the Euro Area for joining, in order not to miss out on 
future developments, especially if it demonstrates that the benefits outnumber the risks or the 
disadvantages.  
However, we can be sure of the fact the Eurozone does not constitute a separate polity 
by itself, and it is indeed inseparable from the EU. In fact, as already highlighted, with the 
exception of Denmark, all states are formally legally bound to adopting the Euro, so the first 
objection might be that the asymmetry is only temporary and not permanent, even more given 
that monetary policy is described as one of the core, exclusive policies of the EU (TEU, 2009). 
Additionally, because the EU, despite having many state-like elements and undergoing a 
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process of state-building, is not a state, but is a federal political system made of different states 
and peoples, that is unlikely to become a state in the traditional sense any time soon. 
Nonetheless, in a post-Westphalian perspective, and given how the concept of sovereignty has 
changed, the EU represents a case of composite sovereignty, where both traditional and post-
traditional sovereignty coexist. From this point of view, the EU displays pattern of federal 
statehood even if it is not a state in traditional sense. 
It would be wrong to consider a possible development towards an EU federation as the 
reproduction of a federal government with the same benchmarks we have already seen in 
history. Conversely, in a supranational framework like that of the Eurozone, those same 
elements of statehood and sovereignty are very likely to be different than those of traditional 
federations, perhaps looser, but at the same time closer to those of a state than any regional 
organisation. In Spinelli’s words, “The European Federation was not the proposal to change 
the colour of an already existing power. It was the sober proposal to create a European 
democratic power” (Spinelli, 1984). A European democratic and federal power does not 
necessarily mean reproducing exactly the same features we now find in existing federal states. 
As previously mentioned, recent historical events, like the rejection of the 
Constitutional Treaty, or Brexit, have surely made the perspectives of academia and of many 
observers about the future of the Union more cynical, more negative, and bleaker. In this way, 
the core point of the discussion is missed: that a process of federal state-building is made of 
many setbacks, failures, accelerations, and slowdowns. Similar processes can be seen in the 
history of any polity, especially in coming together federal political systems. By contrast, 
commentators and scholars have on multiple occasions predicted or described a collapse of the 
EU as a probable scenario (Mearsheimer, 2018), and of course politicians (Farage, 2019) were 
too quick and very frequent in declaring the “failure of the EU” or “the end of the EU”, as if it 
were a prophecy or even wishful thinking. It seems that, even given the fact that the EU 
contains state-like elements and confederal elements, represents the most advanced and yet 
most successful process of federal state-building at the supranational level, and despite all the 
failures and slowdowns that have structurally occurred, the EU still represents an intellectual 
and even ontological challenge to all those political scientists and politicians that fail to see 
concepts like sovereignty, power and statecraft in an image other than that of traditional 
national states. Additionally, one of the effects of Brexit was not an acceleration of the 
disintegration, but instead it worked as cautionary tale for other countries to not leave. This is 
the reason why a collapse of the EU remains a very unlikely scenario. 
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The fact is that the Eurozone is the most advanced example, the vanguard, of what is 
just the laboratory of something new, that never existed before. In 1998, Elazar pointed out 
how, with the emergence and progression of globalisation, confederal arrangements would be 
revived as normative tools to establish new international institutions and foster relations 
between states in global governance. Similarly, Elazar (1998) believed that in a globalised 
word, confederations as federal political systems would re-emerge as a suitable form of polity 
for the 21st century, but as independent, free-standing federal political systems, not just as a 
temporary, pre-federation step. When it comes to the EU, and especially the management of 
monetary policy, it seems that the Union has already developed beyond that model. By contrast, 
there are other areas of integration that are subject to other forms of internal asymmetries like, 
for instance, in the field of Freedom, Security and Justice, as well as in the field of Security 
and Defence (PESCO). 
The presence of all these different arrangements, although not being investigating here, 
still suggests the existence of a multi-speed Union. Once again, this means a Union with 
different levels of integration, with federal state-building inside it, and that is, at the same time, 
a federal political system that has both federation-like and confederation-like elements, 
depending on the competence or the policy area. As already described in chapter IV, many 
policy-makers and scholars have argued for the simplification, and formalisation, of a multi-
speed Union. Nonetheless, this outcome is undesirable to many policymakers (Brok, 2017; 
Morillas, 2017), since it could easily become too difficult to design and manage, as the 
functions of the EU grow. Additionally, many consider such an arrangement to be the ultimate 
dismissal of the process of integration. Permanent opt-outs were originally conceived of as 
being an exception for very specific cases, not the norm (Holzinger & Tosun, 2019). 
Nonetheless, as witnessed in the case of the Eurozone, asymmetries and forms of enhanced 
cooperation did not necessarily cause the disintegration of the Eurozone (Leuffen, Rittberger 
& Schimmelfennig 2012; Freudlsperger, 2019). By contrast, some degrees of asymmetry did 
in fact result in some advancements in European integration. One of the main examples is, for 
instance, the “Franco-German engine” and, as this thesis argues, the Eurozone. I might argue 
that asymmetries can be compared to a negative parabola; to a certain extent, while some 
asymmetries grow in a multinational and supranational context like the EU, the probability of 
further integration grows until it reaches a peak, which represents the highest level of 
integration that internal asymmetries trigger. After that level, the more asymmetries emerge, 
the higher the inefficiencies grow and the higher the risk of disintegration is.  
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The consequences of managing and dealing with overlapping opt-outs and asymmetries 
in EU integration explains why there is lot of hostility regarding the potential to formalise and 
constitutionalise a multi-speed Europe (Brok, 2017). Despite this scepticism or the difficulties 
in implementation, Verhofstadt’s proposal (Verhofstadt, 2017) was simple enough, and was 
based on a simple classification: the willingness to go deeper and further in integration, or not. 
His proposal assumed that countries already adopting the Euro had to take part in the first tier, 
that of MS keen on going further. Additionally, as discussed in chapter IV the Verhofstadt 
proposal would have the advantage of creating an adequate democratic governance required by 
the Eurozone. Nonetheless, the unwillingness to undertake such a choice leaves only one 
option, that of developing democratic and political changes tailored for the Eurozone, as long 
as some MS have not adopted the single currency. Additionally, as mentioned before, the 
withdrawal of the United Kingdom, the second economy of the EU and the main objector of 
monetary integration, strongly reduced the appetite or the need for such development. 
This is also the reason for arguing that, before proceeding with further enlargements, 
the Eurozone should strengthen the foundations of its governance by completing the Banking 
Union, through the introduction of EDIS, and starting the development of a form of fiscal 
union, which may be happen as a future development after the establishment of the Next 
Generation EU Programme. This will be a step to be undertaken, and for instance, like the first 
cases of working groups dealing with the topic of monetary integration in the 1960s, a first 
permanent group on fiscal policies has been established in 2015 as part of the “Five-Presidents 
Report”: the European Fiscal Board. Currently, the Fiscal Board mainly has an advisory role: 
it has a duty to evaluate the implementation of the Union’s fiscal framework, the 
appropriateness of the actual fiscal stance at the Euro area and national levels, and make 
suggestions for the future development of the Union’s fiscal framework. Even though its role 
is mainly supervisory and advisory, it is likely that the European Fiscal Board will be the 
starting point for future initiatives in fiscal integration, as mentioned in chapter IV.  
This means that, in the field of EMU, as well as in other areas, integration will have to 
go deeper. One of the areas that is very important for the success of the Eurozone would be 
unifying its external representation in international economic organisations. Additionally, 
another field which should be developed is that related to the usage of the Euro as an 
international currency. This topic is not just related to that of the external relations, but strictly 
related to another, which has not been fully developed in this thesis, but which represents an 
important topic for further research: that of the European Capital Market, which remains highly 
fragmented. The success of the Euro as international currency depends on an ability to unify 
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fragmented European capital markets and attract more investments from external sources, and 
on the ability to replace the US dollar in international contracts between EU based and non-EU 
parties. With the emergence of the pandemic, what the Eurozone needs the most is an 
integrated, unified fiscal system underpinning it, and more specifically, a proper political 
dimension where fiscal and macroeconomic policies related to the Euro can be discussed.  
In fact, the increase in the responsibilities of the Commission are not enough, per se, to 
improve the supranational political dimension of the EU: achieving this would entail an 
increase in the quality of the democratic governance of the Eurozone. Nevertheless, this might 
be extremely difficult since, from a legal point of view, both the Commission and the EP 
represent the EU as a whole, not the Eurozone or a specific group of countries. Consequently, 
the preferable solution, in the absence of a real diversification of membership tiers, would be, 
as mentioned, the application of informal solutions, like de facto “Eurozone-votes for Eurozone 
laws” provisions in the appointment of officials, and in the legislative process. This would 
represent a partial and temporary solution, and it may even represent an incentive for MS to 
adopt the Single Currency, to regain more importance and weight on the European stage. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that this runs counter to the framework of the EU treaties (as a 
matter of fact, the treaties state clearly that the European Parliament represents all the citizens 
of the EU regardless of Schengen, Euro adoption or other status). 
One of the last questions that this thesis aims at explaining, is what the Eurozone and 
its future developments mean for the idea of integration as federal state-building and for the 
idea itself of a federal Europe. As monetary policy represents one of the exclusive competences 
of the EU and the Eurozone (TEU, 2007), some critical voices have emerged (de Wilde & 
Trenz, 2012); these are not just movements for the dismissal of the EU or for the abolition of 
the Euro, or in favour of withdrawal from the common currency, but also contrasting federal 
proposals for the future of the EMU, like movements demanding a more genuine EMU 
governance, a proper fiscal and social union and in some cases the full federalisation of the 
EU. The existence of such movements, demanding either more or less integration, is a natural 
feature in diverse and composite federal political systems. The fact that there are movements 
demanding and advocating proposals like roll-backs of integration or even the withdrawal of a 
MS from the Union, such as in the case of the UK (but this case is not entirely comparable 
because the UK never became a member of the Eurozone), are perhaps the main confirmation 
that the EU is a living and developing federal political system. These developments imply that 
its policies and existence have an impact on citizens, albeit sometimes negatively, so much that 
they feel the urge to demand a dismissal or a withdrawal. In summary, the fact that there are 
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not only proposals for further integration, coming for instance from the French government 
(Macron, 2017) and the Commission (European Commission, 2017), but also proposals for a 
slowdown and a different development of the Eurozone towards a purely intergovernmental 
and market-oriented paradigm, represents the evidence that there is a debate on the future and 
on the nature of the Union and, as seen in the history of the United States and Swiss federations, 
this debate is typical of federal political systems in transition.  
Consequently, the presence of clashing visions on the future of the Eurozone, rather 
than the EU, with countries like the Visegrad Group or the ‘Northerners’ demanding a 
confederal turn based on the primacy of the MS, and others insisting on Europeanisation, does 
not represent a sign of weakness or disintegration, but it represents the fact that the EU is a 
living federal political system, a system in transition which is undergoing a debate that other 
examples, before the EU, underwent in the past. Proposals for a slowdown and a different 
development of the Eurozone towards a purely intergovernmental and market-oriented 
paradigm, represents the evidence that there is a debate on the future and on the nature of the 
Union and, as seen in the history of the United States and Swiss federations, this debate is 
typical of federal political systems in transition.  
Additionally, the findings of this thesis raise a few more questions. For instance, the 
quest for more democracy and more legitimacy (Majone, 1994; 1996) in the EU, and especially 
the Eurozone, is strictly correlated to the conclusions of this thesis. The conclusion drawn by 
King (1982), that a democracy without federalism can exist, but federalism cannot exist without 
democracy, becomes more and more relevant. This is a question that, as the Four Presidents 
Report highlighted in 2012, needs to be addressed. There have been many definitions and 
reflections on the nature of democracy in the EU (Weiler, 1995; Zweifel, 2002; Moravcsik 
2002). There have been debates on the definition and presence of a democratic deficit at 
European level. The topic of the democratic deficit has been particularly popular, both among 
federalist forces as well as among Eurosceptics. It has been popular among federalists (Corbett, 
1977) who first used it to describe the lack of accountability and the excess of 
intergovernmental, backdoors agreement, and for demanding more federalism, (Marquand 
1979: 64) but it became more popular during the 1980s. For instance, even the European Single 
Act aimed to ‘rectify the democratic deficit in the Community’s decision-making process’ 
(Zweifel, 2003:812). By contrast, Eurosceptic or anti-EU advocates throughout Europe 
hijacked this argument to argue for a slowdown (Bonde 2010: 149), or even a rollback of 
European integration (especially in its more political and institutional aspects) on the basis that 
traditionally liberal democracy developed only when supported by a single, consistent, national 
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group. It is, for instance, the argument of scholars like Weiler, (1999: 337; Weiler, Haltern and 
Mayer, 1995) and Miller (2000), that true democracy is only achievable at the national level. 
This may lead them to the conclusion that liberal democracy, at the supranational level, is 
impossible to develop and, consequently no democratic political union is achievable, and this 
would also question the sustainability of European integration in the long run. Whether this 
claim is true or not, it has not been deeply investigated in the thesis, but it is considered that 
certain aspects of comitology, and the lack of legislative initiative for the parliament, make the 
case  of the existence of a democratic deficit stronger. In this case, there are two solutions for 
solving the deficit. The first one is a confederal/intergovernmental solution, envisaging a 
repatriation of powers to national governments and parliaments and a general roll-back of 
integration. Even if this solution might seem easy to pursue, this solution disregards the level 
of integration, of institutional complexity that has been developed. Additionally, this solution 
does not seem good enough to help Europe face the challenges that this era requires us to win. 
In economic terms, a potential disintegration of the Union would just destroy what the Member 
States have invested in the building of Europe, while also making the costs of cooperation 
higher, as the post-Brexit case might rapidly teach us. Additionally, the argument that 
democracy could only exist at national level is just a self-fulfilling assertion, a tautology, based 
on a specific historical experience, while dismissing the more recent attempts of implementing 
and experimenting innovative forms of state-building and the struggle to develop new forms 
of supranational democracy. The second one is instead a federalist solution, based on the 
creation of a proper democracy at the supranational level, that would be the suitable to preserve 
the achievements in terms of integration, and suitable to prepare the Union to integrate further 
and to face the new challenges and to give a chance to developing a supranational, federal 
democracy. 
For other authors, like for instance Nikolaidis, debates about a democratic deficit in the 
EU are not entirely correct. In her definition, the Union is a demoicracy (Nikolaidis, 2014): not 
a single democracy but a combination of a number of national democracies. Therefore, her 
conclusion is that the EU may not be, and perhaps may never be a democracy per se, but a 
collection of national democracies. Nevertheless, there are elements of democracy at 
supranational level, so that the notion of the European Union as a mere demoicracy is reductive. 
In any scenario, the Eurozone needs a proper democracy at the supranational level, a 
democratic supranational dimension coexisting with, but not replacing, national demoi. In this 
framework, a repatriation of powers would only open the road to a break-up of the Eurozone, 
an undesirable result under any circumstance, except by some forecasts, whose validity has 
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been disproven many times. At the same time the European Parliament needs to retake the 
initiative, and a more balanced relationship between the European Parliament and the Council 
of the EU in its different configurations is necessary, not just for giving a proper democratic 
framework to the economic and monetary union, but in particularly in the case of a possible 
development of a fiscal union and of a possible development of a defence and security union. 
Since these areas, together with the monetary policy, represent the basis of traditional 
statehood, it is fundamental that any of these development goes together with a level-up of 
European democracy. At the same time, a stronger dialogue between the parliaments, at 
European and national level should be encouraged and preserved, to develop a more genuine 
federalism, especially in those cases where illiberal governments attempted at thwarting the 
liberal constitutional order in their own countries. Developing a supranational federalism and 
a multi-level parliamentary dialogue might also be a way to protect the division of power at all 
levels of governments. National and supranational democracies are not a zero-sum game, but 
indeed there is a case for a positive-sum game, where the success of one level guarantees the 
success of the other and vice-versa. At the same time, supranational sovereignty and national 
sovereignty are not a zero-sum game, but indeed a positive-sum game, as in different and non-
federalist terms Milward (2000) argued, since it remains the best instrument for Member States, 
to see their policies and objectives successful at global level. 
A more positive narrative should be adopted by academia. Some recent episodes have 
boosted a more positive vision for the EU, and have increased optimism for future perspectives 
of democracy. Among these recent episodes and initiatives, there were political ones coming 
from civil society, by ordinary citizens, like Pulse of Europe, AEGEE, Young European 
Federalists (Alemanno & Organ, 2020; Turnbull-Dugarte, 2020). In the European Elections of 
2019, for the first time, the electoral turnout increased, to return to the levels of the 1990s. The 
increase in all the EU was 8%. Maybe it is too early to confirm the birth of a European, 
supranational democratic space. Nonetheless, after the episodes of the European elections in 
2014 and more importantly in 2019, there is evidence that a form of democratic debate has 
started developing, together with the participation of civil society which, although very recent, 
it looks promising.  
The main episode was the attempt to introduce, in 2014, more electoral legitimacy and 
transparency in the European elections, by linking the appointment of the president of the 
European Commission to the outcome of the European elections (as described in Chapter II), 
in a way that was designed to mirror the electoral dynamic of general elections in Member 
States. The top candidate (in German the Spitzenkandidaten) process seemed to be a start to 
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addressing the issue of the democratic deficit. This attempt, despite looking promising for the 
perspectives of democracy, was not met favourably by the European Council, which considered 
it to be an imposition by the EP, and sought to retain its right to make this appointment 
(European Council, 2018). In 2019, as result of a fragmented outcome of the European 
elections, the European Council, unlike in 2014, refused to appoint any of the lead candidates. 
This result was partly caused by the inability (caused in part by internal standoffs among 
parliamentary groups) of the EU Parliament groups to present any of the official top candidates 
competing in the European elections to the Council. The standoff represented an opportunity 
for Angela Merkel to propose the German minister for Defence, Ursula von der Leyen, as 
President of the European Commission. The decision to appoint von der Leyen, who was 
neither running for the post of President of the Commission or as MEP, sparked criticism by 
some commentators and Spitzenkandidaten (Weber, 2019; Alemanno, 2019), since it was 
seemingly putting the lead candidate process in jeopardy. Nonetheless, other policy-makers 
(Tusk, 2019; Macron, 2019) argued that the Spitzenkandidaten process was not automatic, that 
the fragmentation of the party system was no guarantee for a proper supranational election, and 
that in any scenario the Council maintained the right to appoint the Head of the Commission. 
The action of the Council was therefore legally appropriate, even if its decision might 
undermine the argument of the democratic legitimacy of the EU.  
Nonetheless, in the aftermath of the 2019 European elections, the heads of government 
recognised that there was a problem of democratic legitimacy (Bettel, 2019). von der Leyen 
and others did not seem to delegitimise the lead candidate process, but pledged to use the 
experience to develop another solution to be introduced in the treaties, like for instance a 
transnational list as base for electing lead candidates (Macron, 2019). von der Leyen, on her 
side, in her first speech at the EP, pledged to give the Parliament an informal right of initiative, 
by committing the Commission to start any legislative initiative should it be demanded by the 
Parliament (von der Leyen, 2019). Should von der Leyen keep this end of the bargain, this 
would represent an important step forward for European supranational democracy and might 
hopefully pave the way to a reform of the Treaties. 
Finally, another element that should be further analysed is that of the Europeanisation 
of public discourse in the EU. Even if it was barely mentioned and not analysed in this thesis, 
a common public discourse is a fundamental part of any coherent political system, including 
any federal political system (Burgess, 2012). Maybe partly because of Brexit and the 
emergence of nationalist governments, and partly because of the sovereign debt crisis, there 
has been a Europeanisation of public discourse and democratic debate. It is still at a very early 
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stage, and has particularly concerned Eurozone countries. Paradoxically, some argue that these 
MS have started to develop a common, political consciousness and debate, both on the Pro-EU 
and on the anti-EU spectrum, after the sovereign debt crisis (Risse, 2014). From this point of 
view, the Europeanisation of national public spheres is beneficial, and necessary to have better 
democracy at the supranational level (ibid.). The quest for a democratic, federal public space 
is extremely important for the survival and existence of the Eurozone, since a solid democratic 
space, and dynamics, are crucial for the prospects of federalism in the Eurozone, and to restore 
the Federal Spirit necessary to see a federal political system succeeding.  
Even if this thesis accepts the hypothesis of the Eurozone crisis as a catalyst for more 
democracy at the supranational level, there is an awareness that more proof is needed. Many 
times, voters have not been friendly towards the European project. In fact, when the Treaty of 
Maastricht faced the voters’ judgement, it passed with a very slight majority (51% to 49% in 
favour) in France, whereas in Denmark, the Treaty was rejected with a very slight majority 
(50.7% to 49.3% against). From that moment on, it became clear that European integration, 
that had developed largely thanks to diplomatic and technocratic discussions between MS 
bodies, was for too long kept at a distance from the involvement of ordinary citizens. In that 
specific context, it was relatively clear that, when dealing with public consultation, the 
European project was seen negatively or sceptically by a large portion of its population, and by 
contrast, positively or enthusiastically by a smaller portion. The most famous of these are surely 
the first rejection of the Treaty of Nice by the Irish, the rejection of the EU Constitution by 
French and Dutch electorates, and then the first rejection of the Lisbon Treaty, again by Irish 
voters. All these cases contributed to the narrative of the EU as an elitist project, failing to 
reach out to its citizens. The outcome of the Brexit referendum seemed to be just another 
confirmation of this trend. Nonetheless, the quest for developing a true democracy at the 
European level is so entangled with the future development of a supranational union, that it 
cannot be abandoned. 
Given the quest for a more democracy at the supranational level, and a more efficient 
form of decision-making at the European level as part of a more far-reaching process of federal 
state-building, there are some lessons to be drawn, that can tell us more about the Eurozone 
and federalism. A few authors (Piris, 2012; Law, 2012; Fabbrini, 2015), have argued in 
different ways that the EU (or the Eurozone, in the case of Fabbrini) might aspire to achieve, 
in terms of federal political system, a structure known as a Federal Union of States (Law, 2012; 
Fabbrini, 2015); this form of federal political system retains the same characteristics of a 
traditional federation, despite not being a state. By contrast, focusing too much on taxonomy 
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and trying to define federal political systems according to specific criteria, either if they are 
coming together federations or federal unions of states, holding together federations or federal 
(or decentralised) states, risks diverting too many resources and focus from the content of the 
changes. 
Given Friedrich’s (1954, 1962) teaching, and consistent with our theoretical 
framework, federalism has developed differently, in terms of form of government, depending 
on the form of agreement the constituent units prefer (international organisation, confederation 
or federation), and on the ideological approach supporting it (liberal internationalism, 
confederalism, federalism). In this specific case, it might be said that we are witnessing the 
reproduction at the supranational level, in a different, specific way, of patterns that have already 
been seen before, in other federal political systems and in other cases of state-building. What 
the thesis has aimed to demonstrate and, indirectly address and reaffirm, is that European 
integration is essentially a process of state-building at the European, supranational level. This 
confirms that, whenever the political will emerges, and whenever the circumstances open more 
windows of opportunities (Pryce and Wessels, 1987), it is possible to build federalism between 
states. Whether this will develop along Haas’ neofunctionalist terms, or through 
intergovernmental agreement(s) following a liberal intergovernmentalist path, or whether there 
will be a federalist big bang moment in federalist, Spinellite terms, or in a combination of all 
these three elements, it is a matter for futurologists. The EU remains a cathedral under 
construction, and the cathedral in this case is a supranational federal statehood. Like cathedrals, 
this may take ages to achieve completion, its final shape may differ significantly from the 
original blueprint, or it may remain unfinished.  
Nonetheless, by taking supranational, federal state-building as hypothesis of a new 
development of federal arrangements, we should take into consideration that the form of 
sovereignty that the EU would possess, in case of success, might be in any case very different 
from traditional national sovereignty. New forms of composite, post-traditional sovereignty 
have been analysed or proposed, (Avbelj, 2014; Brack, Coman & Crespy, 2019). In these, 
sovereignty is not indivisible and uniform as in a Bodinian paradigm (Bodin, 1955) but 
fragmented and symbiotic as in Althusius’ definition. It is very likely that a European, 
supranational federal political system, or even supranational federation, will have a lower 
degree of centralisation than any other existing federation. It is legitimate to expect that it will 
be strongly conditioned by the will of the MS to maintain their own cultural and national 
identity and statehood, as well as national constitutional traditions. The recent resurfacing 
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across Europe of tribal politics, but also of nationalist movements, some liberal, some 
xenophobic and authoritarian, might suggest that the journey will still take time.  
It is unlikely that a supranational, federal kinship will completely replace national 
sentiments; at the same time, it is important to rebuild a narrative where European and national 
identities are not in competition, nor are European and national interests, but where they go 
hand in hand and are part of the same, federal discourse, and the same federal spirit. 
Nonetheless, the prospect of unconventional and non-traditional forms of sovereignty, and the 
looseness of federal arrangements under this form of polity, should not prevent the EU, the 
Eurozone, or any other future form of Federal political system from having a supranational 
democracy (Cafaro, 2017; Bosco, 2020), a legitimate government, and the possibility to 
reproduce and exert the traditional competences of states, by including the MS in the decision-
making process. The Eurozone precisely qualifies for this: the process is still ongoing and will 
likely include more areas of competences, at the EU level too. The EU is a dynamic process of 
federalism at supranational level, while the Eurozone is the avant-garde of this process.  
Further research questions.  
Plans for completing the Banking Union and the Capital Market Union, for boosting the 
international role of the Euro, as well as its external representation are still ongoing, and as 
expressed by von der Leyen, are all part of the agenda for a “geopolitical Union”, which can 
stand its ground and play a role as a main actor in an international scenario. These represent 
another process of federal state-building, and will have further effects on the development of 
the EU’s federal political system, and even more on the role of the Eurozone within it, since 
the Euro is at the centre of the Commission’s strategy for a deeper integration. As we will see, 
the probable future issue of EU bonds, linked to the launch of the Recovery Fund, may well 
increase the demand for Euro-denominated bonds, with the likely outcome of a significant 
increase in the international use of the Euro (Giudice, 2020). In fact, the lack of an EU-bond, 
akin to that issued by the US treasury, that could interest institutional investors, and the 
fragmentation of the capital markets, represent strong limits for the Euro. These elements also 
deserve to be assessed through federal theory.  
Additionally, this thesis is currently limited to the experience of the Eurozone. Many 
areas of European integration that merit being analysed using the same framework were left 
untouched, but still represent areas that could, and should, be analysed in the future. It is still 
unknown whether what happened with Eurozone integration, and with the monetary policy, 
will be replicated in, for instance, security and foreign policy, or by contrast, if they will 
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integrate surprisingly much faster in the future, after being stuck for decades or, if their 
integration will be once again derailed.  
While this thesis was being written, further events occurred. As previously mentioned, 
this thesis did not address the Covid-19 crisis, which has had a deep impact on EU countries, 
both in term of lives and in economic terms. Additionally, the Weiss Case on the 
proportionality of the PSPP of the ECB has finally been concluded by the German Federal 
Constitutional Court (BVerfG). The judgment dismissed a previous judgement of the ECJ on 
the PSPP programme and called it “ultra vires”, forcing the German Federal bank to make the 
case for its proportionality in front of the national institutions, or to pull out of the programme. 
The judgment of the BVerfG has been sharply criticised by many voices within the German 
academic world and even among other high justices. It has been described as a form of legal 
vandalism (Mayer, 2020), as inconsistent with its previous discipline (Marzal, 2020; Wolff, 
2020), as an act of arrogance and jealousy against the ECJ, and even as a declaration of war on 
the EU’s legal framework (Pistor, 2020; McCrea, 2020; Buiter, 2020). It sparked so many 
criticisms that former BVerfG President Vosskuhle, and current President Justice Peter Huber 
(and main author of the judgement) intervened in national media outlets in an attempt to explain 
it. As it seemed that it could spark the beginning of a legal war between the ECJ and the 
BVerfG, and even trigger an infringement procedure by the Commission against the German 
state, both the ECJ and the German authorities decided to de-escalate the conflict and address 
the issues raised by the BVerfG. The BVerfG went in the same direction: Justice Astrid 
Wallrabenstein and President Huber downplayed the issue and addressed it, by stating that even 
a simple report to the German Parliament by the German Federal Bank would have been 
enough for the BVerfG. Even if many of the criticisms are true and this judgement might be 
considered to be a mistake, there are some positive and important elements emerging. First, it 
highlighted the fact that further treaty changes may be required. Second, it highlighted that, 
even if the ECB is independent, dialogue between the ECB and the EP is still very necessary 
(even though this actually happened during the development of the crisis, and Draghi himself 
invited the MEPs to brief him during the Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) Committee 
Meetings, as did his successor Lagarde), as well as central banks. Above all, it highlighted that 
the action of the ECB has some limits, and even if the ECB acted as a sovereign actor for the 
Eurozone, this role should be played by others on matters other than monetary policy (and in 
fact the attempt of the BVerfG was to draw a line between monetary and economic policy) 
even though it is very difficult to decide where to draw this line. One of the main criticisms 
against the court, was precisely on the way they attempted to draw this line, which some 
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described as arbitrary and not balanced, and irrespective of the complexity of the issue. The 
ECB can act federally, but it cannot replace a government, and monetary policy cannot 
normally replace fiscal policy. Thus, it underlined that monetary policy is not enough, and that 
fiscal policy, under parliamentary supervision and with democratic legitimacy, cannot be 
replaced. In a way, the BVerfG’s judgement reminded us that treaty changes, democratic 
control and fiscal integration are still on the “to do list”. 
This controversial judgement came just few days (5th May) before the proposals for the 
Recovery Fund by the Commission (13th May). The proposals for the Recovery Fund, pushed 
by Germany and France, with the support of heavily hit countries like Spain and Italy and other 
countries relying on Cohesion Funds, consisted of €500 bn. collected through the issue of new 
EU bonds, to be repaid through new own resources. President von der Leyen presented an 
ambitious plan, not only by increasing the MFF’s size, but also a Recovery Fund of €500 bn., 
to be distributed via grants, as in the Franco-German proposal, and €250 bn. to be distributed 
through loans to be repaid by MS. This €750 bn. represents one of the most ambitious plans by 
the Commission, and it came at the same time as the introduction of SURE, the unemployment 
insurance scheme, and the creation of new facilitated credit lines within the ESM 
The Next Generation EU programme is likely to be approved (Juncker, 2020) once the 
divergence with the “Frugal Four” has been resolved. If it remains essentially in its initial form, 
this would represent a dramatic change. It would represent a move as important as Draghi’s 
“Whatever it takes” and some, despite some objections (Ferguson 2020; Chryssogelos, 2020; 
Tharoor, 2020), have already defined it as the likely “Hamilton’s moment of the EU” (Funk 
Kirkegaard, 2020; Quatremer, 2020). The fact that the EU may issue its own debt and collect 
new own resources is in fact an impressive step forward, and it is indeed a new element of 
federal state-building. Such a turn would have not been imaginable until few years ago and, 
like a prophecy, it follows Monnet’s pattern of a “Europe being built through crisis”. In this 
case, the crisis is represented by a pandemic that has claimed thousands of lives and brought 
European (and world) economies to their knees, even more than the sovereign debt crisis. The 
economic downturn was so deep that it forced Merkel to abandon her previous cautious 
position on solidarity and risk-sharing, and cooperate with Macron over the Recovery Fund 
proposal. Merkel confirmed that the future of the whole European economy was at stake, and 
that new investments were vital for its survival and success. This proposal is likely to make the 
BICC redundant and irrelevant. By contrast, should it make it into its current form, it is likely 
that the gap between Euro and non-Euro MS is going to be less relevant, since both the new 
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MFF and the Recovery Fund are designed to be EU instruments, and not limited to the Euro 
Area.  
Final thoughts.  
Even if this thesis aimed at continuing the work of Friedrich (1968, 1969) in its understanding 
of federalism as dynamic process of building a polity; Pinder (1996) and his analysis from a 
federalist perspective of the implications of EMU on EU integration; and Burgess (2000, 2009) 
in his complex research in tracing back the development of Europe as federal political system 
in the history of European integration, this thesis is nowhere close to ending the debate. As 
mentioned at the beginning, it took many decades for historians and political scientists to 
understand the nature of federal political systems, federalism and federations. The distinction 
had not been clear for years, so that in 1903 Sidgwick still considered confederations and 
federations to be just the same forms of political system. In the same way Friedrich was barely 
criticised for not taking into proper consideration the canonical differentiation between 
confederations and federations (Burgess, 2012). Nonetheless, there is enough evidence to say 
that the EU, in all its uncompletedness, is already a Federal Europe, and its elements of 
differentiated integration, of different confederation-like elements coexisting with federation-
like elements, represent forms of asymmetrical federalism and that the process of European 
integration, even if not linear and not smooth, remains the most important example of federal 
state-building at supranational level. Elazar in 1995 used to ask, whether the development in 
regional scenarios were enough to develop some form of state-building. As conclusion of this 
project, I could state that the answer is positive. 
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